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fix(sdk): refresh stale quorum keys instead of banning every node - #5236
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The wasm trusted context prefetches quorum keys once and cannot refetch a missing one inside the synchronous get_quorum_public_key. After a quorum rotation every proof failed with InvalidQuorum, which is retryable, so each request banned node after node until the address pool was empty and all requests failed with 'no available addresses to use' until the page was reloaded. Add SdkBuilder::with_quorum_refresher. Fetch, FetchMany and the state-transition wait path now refresh the provider's quorum keys on a missing-quorum proof (one coalesced refresh for concurrent misses) and ask again. A key still missing after that fails the request without banning a node. wasm-sdk registers the trusted context's refresh_quorum_caches as the hook. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Navigate logical layers of code changes, visualize relationships, and explore their blast radius. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe SDK adds shared quorum-key refresh and retry handling for proof-backed operations. The fetch, fetch-many, and transition-wait paths use the wrapper. The WASM trusted context supplies a callback that refreshes its quorum cache. ChangesQuorum refresh and retry
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Change: Bug fix Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Fetch
participant Sdk
participant QuorumRefresher
participant WasmTrustedContext
Fetch->>Sdk: Run proof-backed attempt
Sdk->>QuorumRefresher: Refresh after InvalidQuorum
QuorumRefresher->>WasmTrustedContext: Invoke quorum refresh callback
Sdk->>Fetch: Retry attempt once
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The change lets SDK requests recover after quorum rotation instead of banning nodes. However, a misbehaving node can cause repeated quorum refreshes for requests routed to it. Rate-limiting completed refreshes is a bounded follow-up. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The change addresses stale-key failures while retaining proof verification. However, a malicious responding node can repeatedly trigger extra key-service requests and delay reads. Sharing bounds simultaneous refreshes, not repeated refreshes. Address rotation limits the demonstrated exposure to requests encountering malicious endpoints rather than the whole network. Retained concerns
Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
Security Findings and Attack Paths
Trust Boundaries and Controls
Resilience and Maintainability Implications
Hardening Proposals
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Review comments at @packages/rs-sdk/src/sdk/quorum_refresh.rs:
- Around line 105-127: Update QuorumRefresher’s completed-refresh handling so
repeated misses for the same quorum hash reuse or rate-limit the completed
result instead of starting a refresh on every request. Preserve in-flight
deduplication and keep the missing-quorum error non-retryable.
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packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/fetch.rspackages/rs-sdk/src/platform/fetch_many.rspackages/rs-sdk/src/platform/transition/broadcast.rspackages/rs-sdk/src/sdk.rspackages/rs-sdk/src/sdk/quorum_refresh.rspackages/wasm-sdk/src/context_provider.rspackages/wasm-sdk/src/sdk.rs
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A node is never banned for naming an unknown quorum, so a node that keeps doing so could cost a refresh on every request it serves once the previous refresh had finished. Misses within REFRESH_COOLDOWN of a refresh now get its result. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
The quorum-refresh implementation correctly coalesces concurrent refreshes, preserves proof verification, and prevents healthy nodes from being banned when a quorum key remains unavailable. Three non-blocking robustness issues remain: synchronous refresh-hook panics escape the panic boundary, cooldowns use wall-clock time, and replacing the context provider can leave an obsolete refresh hook attached.
🟡 3 suggestion(s)
1 finding(s) not shown inline (the lines are not part of this PR's diff)
🟡 Suggestion: Keep the quorum refresher coupled to its context provider
packages/rs-sdk/src/sdk.rs:680-688
The refresh hook is intended to refresh the context provider's quorum-key cache, but set_context_provider replaces only the provider and leaves the previously configured hook untouched. The same mismatch is exposed by the WASM builder: after configuring a trusted context and its refresher, calling withContextProvider installs another provider while retaining the old trusted-context refresh closure. Subsequent missing-quorum proofs can therefore refresh provider A while verification reads from provider B and still fail. Couple the provider and refresh capability, or ensure every provider replacement also replaces or clears the associated refresher; add a regression test for provider replacement after refresh configuration.
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, architecture-layering, rust-quality, security-auditor)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
normalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This is a substantial cross-cutting SDK and WASM networking/retry-behavior change with concurrency and error-handling logic, but it does not directly alter consensus, funds movement, cryptography, signatures, peer-facing deserialization, or storage migrations. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity below 15% reserve: weekly 13% left, 5h 100% left),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-sdk/src/sdk/quorum_refresh.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-sdk/src/sdk/quorum_refresh.rs:70-76: Catch panics while constructing the refresh future
The call to `(self.refresh)()` is evaluated before `AssertUnwindSafe(...).catch_unwind()` is constructed. Consequently, the current boundary catches panics raised while polling the returned future, but not a panic raised synchronously while the hook constructs that future. That panic escapes `QuorumRefresher::refresh()` and contradicts the documented guarantee that a panicking hook becomes `Err("quorum refresh panicked")`; the existing test only covers a panic inside the async body. Invoke the hook inside an explicit `std::panic::catch_unwind` and retain the existing future-level panic boundary.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-sdk/src/sdk/quorum_refresh.rs:36-63: Use a monotonic clock for the refresh cooldown
The new ten-second reuse window is measured with `chrono::Utc::now()`, which is a wall clock. A backward system or browser clock adjustment can extend reuse of a stale completed refresh indefinitely, while a forward adjustment can expire the window early and cause unnecessary refreshes. This cooldown represents elapsed time since the refresh started and should use a monotonic elapsed-time source that works on the supported wasm target, such as an appropriate monotonic/web time abstraction.
In `packages/rs-sdk/src/sdk.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-sdk/src/sdk.rs:680-688: Keep the quorum refresher coupled to its context provider
The refresh hook is intended to refresh the context provider's quorum-key cache, but `set_context_provider` replaces only the provider and leaves the previously configured hook untouched. The same mismatch is exposed by the WASM builder: after configuring a trusted context and its refresher, calling `withContextProvider` installs another provider while retaining the old trusted-context refresh closure. Subsequent missing-quorum proofs can therefore refresh provider A while verification reads from provider B and still fail. Couple the provider and refresh capability, or ensure every provider replacement also replaces or clears the associated refresher; add a regression test for provider replacement after refresh configuration.
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More field data for this fix, from the sakura devnet (Platform 5.0.0-beta.1 with
A refresh on a cache miss, or a periodic refresh of the quorum list, would let both clients drop the workaround. 🤖 Posted autonomously by Claude on behalf of pasta. |
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This also fixes a write-side problem that the description doesn't mention yet. Typed writes report an accepted transition as failed. At v5.0.0-beta.1, the wasm-sdk typed writes don't go through
When the network has moved past that prefetch, the transition is executed but the call throws Every one of those helpers reaches
One limit is worth noting. If the quorum list service itself doesn't list the new quorum yet, the refreshed list still lacks the key. The write then fails with the new non-retryable error even though it landed. We reported that service-side gap as dashpay/quorum-list-server#16. Our workaround today: rebuild the SDK before 🤖 Posted autonomously by Claude on behalf of pasta. |
…ok panics
The 10 s reuse window was measured on the wall clock, so a clock change
could stretch the reuse of a stale refresh or cut the window short. Use
web-time's Instant, which is monotonic on native and wasm32 alike.
A hook that panicked while building its future escaped refresh(), since
only polling the returned future was inside catch_unwind. Both now become
Err("quorum refresh panicked").
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 2 only (Phase 1 failed)
The monotonic cooldown and both panic boundaries resolve two prior findings, and the recovery paths retain existing proof and signature verification. Two nonblocking suggestions remain: provider replacement can leave a refresher targeting the old cache, and the new tests do not exercise automatic recovery through the trusted builder and public request paths. This was static verification at head 4c88d84; no builds or tests were run, and the supplied CI snapshot does not establish completed build/test validation.
🟡 2 suggestion(s)
1 finding(s) not shown inline (the lines are not part of this PR's diff)
🟡 Suggestion: Keep the quorum refresher coupled to its context provider
packages/rs-sdk/src/sdk.rs:685-688
This setter replaces only context_provider, leaving the newly registered quorum_refresher unchanged. A hook can capture provider A—as the WASM hook does—so installing provider B makes recovery refresh A while proof verification continues consulting B. If B's key remains missing, the request returns the new non-retryable error without ever refreshing B. SdkBuilder::with_context_provider likewise retains an earlier hook, and SDK clones have independently replaceable provider slots while sharing the refresher. Replace the provider and its optional refresher together, including the associated coalescing state, or invalidate the old hook and expose an explicit replacement API. Add regression coverage proving that replacement no longer contacts A and can recover through B.
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, architecture-layering, platform-versioning, rust-quality)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: platform-versioning); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 7: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 8: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 9: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 10: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: platform-versioning); reviewer 11: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 12: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
normalby fallback after triage failure (exit 1 timed_out=False: API Error: 400 unknown provider for model gpt-6.1-sol) - Phase 1 reviewers: failed (failed on every model; its output was dropped)
- Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— platform-versioning (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— platform-versioning (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-sdk/src/sdk.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-sdk/src/sdk.rs:685-688: Keep the quorum refresher coupled to its context provider
This setter replaces only `context_provider`, leaving the newly registered `quorum_refresher` unchanged. A hook can capture provider A—as the WASM hook does—so installing provider B makes recovery refresh A while proof verification continues consulting B. If B's key remains missing, the request returns the new non-retryable error without ever refreshing B. `SdkBuilder::with_context_provider` likewise retains an earlier hook, and SDK clones have independently replaceable provider slots while sharing the refresher. Replace the provider and its optional refresher together, including the associated coalescing state, or invalidate the old hook and expose an explicit replacement API. Add regression coverage proving that replacement no longer contacts A and can recover through B.
In `packages/wasm-sdk/src/context_provider.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/wasm-sdk/src/context_provider.rs:670-672: Exercise rotated-quorum recovery through a trusted SDK request
This test invokes `context.quorum_refresher()` directly, while the Rust tests call `with_quorum_refresh` with scripted results. They verify the hook and helper independently, but would still pass if `WasmSdkBuilder::with_trusted_context` stopped registering the hook or `wait_for_outcome_with_metadata` stopped wrapping the result wait. The existing proof-preparation test exercises the separate proactive refresh path. Add a local/mock regression that attaches the context through `with_trusted_context` and processes a response with real proof verification against an initially uncached quorum. Exercise a typed write or its outcome wait, asserting that refresh enables verification and only the wait—not the accepted broadcast—is repeated. Also exercise a persistent missing key through the outer retry layer and assert that the responding address remains unbanned.
| (context.quorum_refresher())() | ||
| .await | ||
| .expect("the refresh hook must reach the quorum service"); |
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🟡 Suggestion: Exercise rotated-quorum recovery through a trusted SDK request
This test invokes context.quorum_refresher() directly, while the Rust tests call with_quorum_refresh with scripted results. They verify the hook and helper independently, but would still pass if WasmSdkBuilder::with_trusted_context stopped registering the hook or wait_for_outcome_with_metadata stopped wrapping the result wait. The existing proof-preparation test exercises the separate proactive refresh path. Add a local/mock regression that attaches the context through with_trusted_context and processes a response with real proof verification against an initially uncached quorum. Exercise a typed write or its outcome wait, asserting that refresh enables verification and only the wait—not the accepted broadcast—is repeated. Also exercise a persistent missing key through the outer retry layer and assert that the responding address remains unbanned.
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)
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Superseded by #5286: the same commits (head 🤖 Posted autonomously by Claude on behalf of pasta. |
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Issue being fixed or feature implemented
Browser apps built on wasm-sdk / evo-sdk stop working some time after the page loads. Every request fails with
[WASM] no available addresses to useuntil the page is reloaded. This happens on testnet as well as devnets, and mainnet uses the same code path.The cause:
WasmTrustedContext::prefetch_forbuildsTrustedHttpContextProviderwith.with_refetch_if_not_found(false). Fetching a missing key inside the synchronousContextProvider::get_quorum_public_keydeadlocks on wasm (Deadlock: futures::executor::block_on inside tokio runtime in TrustedHttpContextProvider #3432). So the quorum keys are fetched once, when the SDK is built, and never again on the read path. The only refresh isprepare_state_transition_context, and only the generic broadcast entry points (waitForResponse,broadcastAndWait,waitForAffectedState,broadcastAndWaitForAffectedState) call it.ContextProviderError::InvalidQuorum("Quorum not found in cache …"), which arrives asError::Proof(..).Error::can_retry()treats everyProof(_)as retryable, soupdate_address_ban_statusbans the node and the request moves on to the next one. That node's proof is signed by the same quorum, so it fails and is banned too. Within one burst of requests the whole address pool is banned. The client's cache was stale; no node did anything wrong.The same stale cache also breaks typed writes, and they report an accepted transition as failed.
identityCreate,identityTopUp,identityUpdate,documentCreate,documentReplace,contractPublishandcontractUpdatecall rs-sdk's*_and_wait*helpers directly, so they skipprepare_state_transition_contextand verify the result proof against the keys prefetched at connect. Once the network has moved past that prefetch, the transition executes but the call throwsQuorum not found in cache. The worst case isidentityCreate: the asset lock is already consumed, so a wallet that believes the error and retries getsIdentityAssetLockTransactionOutPointAlreadyConsumedError.Field data from the sakura devnet (forms a quorum about every 4 minutes): a trusted SDK that is never rebuilt reads fine for about 7 minutes, fails intermittently after that, and fails every read from about 14 minutes after it was built. Yappr (yap.pr), which runs evo-sdk in the browser, works around it today by rebuilding the SDK and retrying.
Native FFI uses
refetch_if_not_found = true, so it does not have the stale-cache problem.What was done?
SdkBuilder::with_quorum_refresher(QuorumRefreshFn)(new,rs-sdk/src/sdk/quorum_refresh.rs): an optional async hook that refreshes the context provider's quorum keys.Sdk::with_quorum_refreshwraps the per-attempt closures ofFetch,FetchManyandStateTransition::wait_for_outcome_with_metadata(broadcast.rs). Every typed write helper waits through that function, so writes get the same recovery as reads. When a proof names a quorum the provider does not know, it refreshes once and runs the attempt again:Sharedfuture). For 10 s after a refresh starts (on a monotonic clock), later misses reuse its result. A burst of failing reads costs one round trip to the quorum service, and a node that keeps naming unknown quorums can't trigger a refresh on every request it serves.refresh_quorum_cachesfetches the current and previous lists separately, so one of them may have delivered the key.Error::ContextProviderError(InvalidQuorum(..)). Every node signs with the same quorum, so moving on would only ban healthy nodes.retries.Err, so it can't poison the shared future.TrustedHttpContextProvider::refresh_quorum_cachesas the hook inWasmSdkBuilder::with_trusted_context. On wasm32 it is run throughspawn_local+ oneshot to meet theSendbound, the same wayrs-dapi-clientwraps its wasm transport.Without a registered hook, behaviour is unchanged.
The body changes in
fetch.rs,fetch_many.rsandbroadcast.rsonly re-indent the existing closures intosdk.with_quorum_refresh(move || async move { … }).git diff -wshows the real change.Known limit: if the quorum list service doesn't list the new quorum yet, the refreshed list still lacks the key. A write then fails with the non-retryable error even though it landed. That is a service-side gap, reported as dashpay/quorum-list-server#16.
How Has This Been Tested?
quorum_refresh.rs:with_trusted_contextregisters loads a quorum that formed after the prefetch from a mock quorum service.cargo test -p dash-sdk --lib quorum_refresh: 9 passedcargo test -p wasm-sdk --lib quorum_refresher: 1 passedrustfmt --checkon the touched files: cleancargo test -p dash-sdk --lib(251 passed),cargo test -p wasm-sdk --lib(143 passed),cargo clippy -p dash-sdk -p wasm-sdk --all-targets -- -D warningsandcargo check -p wasm-sdk --target wasm32-unknown-unknown, all cleanBreaking Changes
None. The new builder method is opt-in, and SDKs without a hook behave exactly as before.
Checklist:
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