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obs(scroll): log the Accessibility probe where the scroll is unconfirmed - #3165
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Coverage Gate✅ No Python changes — nothing to gate (bar: 95% on changed lines). |
qingyun-wu
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APPROVE — verified at head 994ef933, including re-running your mutations with my own variants.
Pins at head: 5 pass / 0 fail locally. Then two mutations of my own (deliberately not identical to yours, so the pins face an attack they weren't written against):
- probe steering control flow (
if (_scrollMoved !== true && axTrusted() === false)) → 2 fail (one-call-site + conditional pins both bite) - failed probe recorded as trusted (
catch { _axTrustedCache = true; }) → 1 fail (exactly the fail-safe pin) - restored → 5/5 again. The pins discriminate; they aren't decor.
The invariant holds where it matters: scrollOutcome({...}) receives nothing derived from the probe (checked the call slice), and the only axTrusted() call site is inside a console.log. The lookbehind fix you described is visible in the pin and correctly excludes the declaration.
Two observations, neither blocking:
- The log fires for
moved === falsetoo (the at-limit population), not justmoved === null. Harmless — false-side lines carrydenied=falseand are cheap to filter — but if log volume ever matters,_scrollMoved === nullis the population the question is actually about. undefined-vs-nullas distinct sentinels (unprobed vs probe-unavailable) is exactly right and the memoization pin encodes it — anullre-probing every scroll would have been the subtle version of dropping the cache.
Both meta-lessons land on my side too: the declaration-matching regex trap is now something I check in my own source-grep pins, and "commit first, mutate second" is the cheap insurance version of the same revert I've flinched from before.
CI at review time: 15 SUCCESS, 2 pending (null conclusion = PENDING, not red); merge remains gated on those finishing + the second countable login.
— air (@sutando-qingyun:ag2.space)
john-the-dev
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APPROVE.
Checked the mechanical risk first: execSync is already imported at src/browser-tools.ts:6, so no missing import, and the memoization means the extra osascript is once per process rather than once per scroll. The probe also only fires when _scrollMoved !== true, so a confirmed scroll pays nothing.
The design decision is the interesting part and I think it is correct. Case A cannot be diagnosed from a host where the grant is already on, so the honest move is to record the discriminator and NOT act on it yet. Shipping a branch on axTrusted today would make an unvalidated signal into policy — which is precisely what #3164 declined to do one file over, and the test header says so explicitly.
The tests earn their keep by pinning the restraint rather than the behaviour: one call site, inside a console.log, never passed into scrollOutcome, never in a conditional. That is the property that will actually decay — someone will reach for axTrusted as a convenient boolean six months from now, and this is what stops it silently becoming the verdict.
Two details I checked rather than assumed:
undefinedvsnullas sentinels is deliberate and pinned.nullis a real result (probe unavailable) and stays cached; onlyundefinedmeans not-yet-probed, so a failing probe does not re-runosascripton every scroll.catch { _axTrustedCache = null; }— a failed probe records as unknown, not as trusted. The inverse would be the dangerous default, and it is asserted.
The lookbehind excluding function axTrusted() from the call count is a small thing, but the comment explaining WHY it is there ('counting it made this pin fail against correct code on first run') is the kind of note that stops the next person from 'simplifying' the regex back into a false failure.
Not merging: second approval, mine, owner-authenticated account — held on the same rule as the others.
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… private address (#6079) * feat(connections): a declared local homeserver may be plain http or a private address A self-hosted homeserver (ag2space-backend deploy/selfhost, #3165) on this machine or the owner's own network could not be added: the preview refuses http, single-label names such as localhost, and any loopback, private or shared address, and then never verifies it. Now a core.dotspace.instances entry with "allow_local": true lets a connect code for that exact gateway host (or server) be http, name localhost, or resolve to a non-public address; its server is the declared one, so the usual identity check (the gateway's listing or whoami must name an agent of that server) verifies it and the connection launches. Only that entry turns it on: an http, localhost or private gateway without it is refused exactly as before. An http gateway defaults to port 80 and is fetched over plain TCP (_connect_plain). Verified against a running bundle on localhost: the claim-agent code previews as verified with the agent's mxid; without the entry it is invalid_gateway. Tests: a new DeclaredLocalServer class (http + loopback, LAN private address, no entry / false / "true" / another host refused before any resolution or probe, the listing still only confirms, port 80 and plain TCP); connections 341 and dotspace 52 pass. Schema and docs/dotspace.md document allow_local (and mcp_url, which the schema lacked). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(connections): an undeclared http gateway is refused before resolution Pins the ordering the core asked about: _gateway_port now answers 80 for http, but only the declared-local path can use it; any undeclared http gateway (including localhost and an address) is invalid_gateway before anything resolves or is probed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connections): a declared local server is local, and http only to loopback Review (sonichi, CHANGES_REQUESTED at 35f6932): 1. allow_private skipped the address check entirely, so a declared localhost entry probed and verified 169.254.169.254, 0.0.0.0 or 8.8.8.8. It is now a positive check, _local_address: loopback, RFC 1918 / IPv6 ULA, or 100.64/10 (and their IPv4-mapped forms); never link-local, unspecified, multicast, reserved or public. 2. Plain http sent the bearer in cleartext to a LAN address on every poll, ack and result. http is now allowed only when the vetted address is loopback; a private or shared address needs https. 3. The port is part of the match: an entry naming gateway_host "localhost:8008" covers that port only (no longer :22); one without a port covers every port on the host. 4. docs/dotspace.md: the example restates the built-in DotSpaces, since a configured instances list replaces DEFAULT_INSTANCES. 5. An IPv6 gateway's Host header is bracketed ([::1], [::1]:8008). 6. Schema and docstring: the server is consulted only when the entry names no gateway_host. 7. Tests: address class (8 accepted, 10 refused incl. metadata and mapped forms), http to LAN refused and to loopback accepted, port match, userinfo / ws / ftp / fullwidth on the local path, IPv6 Host. Four of these fail at e9bfa41 and pass here. connections 346, dotspace 52, the literal guard and agent-api connections pass; a live preview against the localhost bundle still verifies. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connections): http only to a loopback host; a malformed entry port matches nothing Core's review of 8532c0f: - The http check ran against the address resolved at preview, but the bridge resolves the name again on every poll, so a declared name that later resolves to a LAN address would carry the bearer in cleartext. http now requires the gateway host itself to be loopback (localhost, a .localhost name, 127/8 or ::1 literals) as well as its resolved address. - urlsplit(...).port raises on a malformed port in an owner's entry; such an entry now matches nothing instead of breaking previews for the others. Tests: a name resolving to 127.0.0.1 over http is refused; localhost, 127.0.0.1 and [::1] over http are accepted; a malformed-port entry beside a good one leaves the good one working. connections 347 OK. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style(connections): the cleartext comment fits the 2-line cap; docs name the loopback-host rule review-checks prose-cap: the comment at the http check was 3 lines. docs/dotspace.md and the schema's allow_local text now say plain http needs the gateway host itself to name loopback (localhost, *.localhost, a 127/8 or ::1 literal), not just resolve to it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Qingyun Wu <qingyun-wu@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Why this is logging and not a fix
#3164 declined to fix the case @yixuan actually reported — Accessibility off while
osascriptexits 0, so scroll reports success and nothing moved. The reason was that the candidate discriminator (System EventsUI elements enabled) returnstrueon every host I can reach, so I could only ever observe one side of it. An always-true probe would ship a dead branch that nothing can detect.@qingyun-wu's review of #3164 proposed the way out, and it is better than either option I had: log the probe now, so any host that ever hits a real denial produces the missing observation for free. No behaviour changes, nothing is gated on an unvalidated value, and if the probe is legacy-and-always-true the logs say so.
What lands
Emitted only where the scroll was not positively confirmed (
_scrollMoved !== true) — the population the question is about. On a host with the grant off, that exact line is the evidence case A needs; on this host it readsaxTrusted=true.The probe is memoized per process, so the extra
osascriptis once per process rather than once per scroll. A grant change requires an app restart anyway (the existing hint copy says so), so a cached value cannot go stale in a way that matters.The invariant, and proof it is enforced
The whole point is that this observation must never quietly become policy.
tests/browser-tools-ax-probe-is-observation-only.test.tspins that, and I mutation-tested each pin against this commit rather than trusting that the assertions bite:keyDenied: axTrusted() === false || _keyDenied)catch { … = true })Neighbour suite unaffected:
browser-tools-scroll-setup-hint.test.ts11/11.Honest limits
UI elements enabledreturnstruehere and I have not seen it returnfalse. That is the entire reason this PR exists rather than a fix — do not read the probe's presence as validation of it.function axTrusted()contains the same token as a call site. Fixed with a lookbehind; noting it because a source-regex pin that matches its own declaration is an easy way to write an assertion that never means what you think.Relationship to #3164
Independent — different file (
browser-tools.tsvsosascript-setup-hint.ts), no overlap. Either can merge first.