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fix(discord): retry a transient send failure instead of parking it - #2740
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Blocking review for head a4609629f1ce2b11915c3be9bb1e07cb9047d867.
Findings:
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Partial proactive sends can be duplicated on transient retry. The new retry branch sits in the catch for the whole DM send block, after the text chunk loop and file sends have already begun. If the first chunk or attachment succeeds and a later
dm.sendraises a transient 503/reset,release_claim(f)returns the original file to the poll stream and the next pass sends the entire body again. That breaks delivery idempotency: already-delivered chunks/files can be repeated up to the retry cap. Please either retry only when no part of the body has been sent yet, or make retries resume from an explicit unsent unit/cursor. This needs a test where one send succeeds and a later send raises a transient error. -
The approval-marker transient branch has no retry cap.
MAX_TRANSIENT_ATTEMPTSis only enforced in the proactive DM branch;poll_approvedcallsis_transient(e)and leaves the marker in place forever during a sustained 503/connection outage. That contradicts the bounded-retry contract in the PR body and recreates the every-3-second hot loop quarantine was designed to avoid. Please useshould_retrywith per-marker accounting and park after the cap, with coverage for both the retry and cap-exhausted branches.
CI note: hosted diff coverage >= 95% (python) is currently failing at 79% diff coverage, with uncovered lines in src/discord-bridge.py for the approved transient branch and the proactive release branch. Local focused tests passed for send-failure-policy, send-failure-delegation, approved-poll quarantine, proactive DM failure preservation, proactive claim/recovery, proactive recovery, and health-check proactive quarantine.
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Changes requested on exact head f160bc0e.
The extraction correctly centralizes the proactive file transition, and the original bug is present on current main, but this head is not merge-ready. Two live-loop blockers from the prior head remain unchanged, and the current diff also violates the repository's code-comment policy.
Exact-head discriminating controls reproduced both behaviors: a 2-chunk body whose second send returned 503 was released and resent from the beginning (released_after_partial=True, first_chunk_duplicated=True); after 7 transient approval failures (cap is 5), the marker was still hot, never parked, and logged 7 retries. Worst case: owners receive duplicate chunks/attachments up to the retry cap while an approval outage generates a send/log attempt every 3 seconds without bound.
Focused checks passed: 15 send-policy, 7 delegation, approved-poll, proactive failure/preservation, claim/recovery, health-check quarantine, git diff --check, src-map, and the REVIEW hardcoded-path gate. Those green suites do not cover the two discriminating cases above. Current hosted CI/coverage was still running at the final check.
Please fix the three inline blockers and add behavioral regressions for partial-send resume/zero-progress retry plus approval cap exhaustion. Re-run the full live-path evidence and required CI afterward.
| # send_failure_policy.resolve_failed_send (covered by | ||
| # tests/send-failure-policy.test.py); the bridge is not | ||
| # unit-imported, same reason as the imports at :99-100. | ||
| _outcome = send_failure_policy.resolve_failed_send( # pragma: no cover |
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[P1 blocker] resolve_failed_send() releases the whole claimed body even when this catch is reached after one or more text chunks or attachments have already succeeded (lines 5111–5130). On this exact head, a 2-chunk harness that raises 503 on chunk 2 produced released_after_partial=True; the next poll resent both chunks and first_chunk_duplicated=True. Retry only when zero delivery progress occurred, or persist/resume an explicit unsent-unit cursor, and add that behavioral case.
| # valid, so an un-deleted marker would re-fail forever and | ||
| # bury the log. Same resolution as sonichi#2626. | ||
| print(f" Failed to send approval to {sender_id}: {e}") | ||
| if send_failure_policy.is_transient(e): # pragma: no cover |
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[P1 blocker] This approval path calls is_transient() directly and never consults the five-attempt cap. Seven simulated transient passes left the marker in the hot poll path (marker_still_hot=True, parked=False, 7 retry logs), so a sustained outage still sends/logs every 3 seconds forever. Route this obligation through bounded per-marker accounting and test both retry and cap exhaustion.
| @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ | |||
| """Classify an outbound-send failure as transient (retry) or permanent (park). | |||
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[P2 blocker — repository policy] The new production module and both new tests contain many comments/docstrings longer than two lines plus incident/history/test-location narration (representative blocks: this module lines 1–8, 39–45, 71–81; discord-bridge.py 5140–5156; and the test module headers). AGENTS.md requires code comments to be at most two lines and forbids narration, incident history, and PR/person/system references. Keep only non-obvious constraints/reasons and move historical evidence to the PR body.
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Blocking review for updated head f160bc0ea4fb5815aebfa94160a166b0ec675702.
The updated head moves the proactive file-transition helper into send_failure_policy and adds direct tests for that helper, but both behavioral blockers from the previous head are still present:
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Partial proactive sends can still be duplicated on retry. The
poll_proactivecatch still wraps the whole DM send sequence, including the text chunk loop and attachment sends. If an earlierdm.sendsucceeds and a later send raises a transient 503/reset,resolve_failed_send()releases the original file back to.txt; the next poll sends the full body again, repeating chunks/files that already reached the owner. This needs either no retry after any partial send has succeeded, or a durable cursor/unit model that resumes only the unsent portion, plus a regression test where send #1 succeeds and send #2 raises a transient error. -
Approval-marker transient failures are still unbounded.
poll_approvedstill callsis_transient(e)and leaves the marker in place forever. During a sustained 503/connection outage this recreates the 3-second hot loop the quarantine path was meant to stop, and it bypassesMAX_TRANSIENT_ATTEMPTS. Please add per-marker attempt accounting and park after the cap, with tests for retry and cap exhaustion.
Local focused verification on this head passed: python3 tests/send-failure-policy.test.py, python3 tests/send-failure-delegation.test.py, python3 tests/approved-poll-path-and-quarantine.test.py, python3 tests/proactive-dm-failure-keeps-file-behaviour.test.py, python3 tests/proactive-claim-release.test.py, and git diff --check origin/main...HEAD. Hosted tsc + tests and diff coverage were still in progress when I checked.
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@cla-assistant check |
Both quarantine sites moved a result body aside on ANY exception. That is
right for a rejection the API will never accept and wrong for a blip.
Observed live on this host — the bridge log, verbatim:
[proactive] failed to DM 1022910063620390932: 503 Service Unavailable
(error code: 0): upstream connect error or disconnect/reset before
headers. reset reason: connection termination
[proactive] undelivered copy kept at
undelivered/proactive-pending-q-7ac4f1f437cb2dc9.txt — NOT deleted
A pending-questions digest for the owner sat in results/undelivered/ for
10h31m. Nothing reads that directory, so he was never told. The next poll
was 3 seconds away and would have delivered it.
The existing comment states the reasoning that misfires: "A 413 never
becomes a 200, so leaving the file in place would re-poll it every 3s
forever." True of 413, false of 503 — and the code could not tell them
apart, because nothing classified the status.
send_failure_policy owns the rule for both sites: a KNOWN transient
status (429, 5xx, 408/425) or a connection-level error releases the claim
so the next poll retries, bounded to 5 attempts; everything else parks
exactly as before. Unknown failures park — quarantine preserves the body
and health-check reports it, so parking loses nothing while an unbounded
retry would bury the log.
Reads `.status` only. discord.HTTPException also carries `.code` (40005,
50035) — a Discord error code sharing no numbering with HTTP status,
which would misclassify if treated as one.
Extends #2730, which made a permanently-undeliverable body visible
rather than dropped; this decides which failures are permanent.
Stand: Echo Act IV Mini
Generated by scripts/gen-src-map.py — the "refuse docs/src-map.md stale vs src/" gate failed because a new src/ module was added without regenerating. Stand: Echo Act IV Mini
…dule The bridge kept the decision and the file move as separate inline steps, which is how a branch ends up logging "released" without renaming — the body stays claimed and no poll ever sees it again. resolve_failed_send now owns both, so they cannot disagree, and returns retried/parked/stuck. This also makes the behavior testable. The inline version left 13 changed lines at 0% coverage (diff-cover reported 55% against the 95% bar); the extracted function is at 100%, and the four remaining glue lines carry `# pragma: no cover` with the same justification the bridge already uses at :99-100 — the module is not unit-imported, and the logic is covered where it lives. Six new filesystem tests assert the real renames, including the three cases that must never lose a body: a newer .txt appearing since the claim, the attempt cap converting a transient into a park, and an unmovable undelivered/ leaving the body in place. Stand: Echo Act IV Mini
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Blocking review for new head 8114ae8.
This commit has the exact same tree as the previously reviewed f160bc0, so the two blocking findings from that review are still present:
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Partial proactive sends can still be duplicated on retry. poll_proactive still wraps the whole DM delivery sequence, including all text chunks and attachments, in one try/except and only calls resolve_failed_send() after an exception from that sequence. If an earlier dm.send succeeds and a later send raises a transient 503/reset, the helper releases the original claim back to .txt and the next poll sends the full body again, repeating content that already reached the owner. This still needs either no retry after any partial send has succeeded, or a durable cursor/unit model that resumes only the unsent portion, plus a regression test where send #1 succeeds and send #2 raises transiently.
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Approval-marker transient failures are still unbounded. poll_approved still checks send_failure_policy.is_transient(e) and leaves the marker in place forever, without using the MAX_TRANSIENT_ATTEMPTS cap or per-marker attempt accounting. A sustained API outage therefore recreates the 3-second hot loop the quarantine path was meant to stop.
Focused local verification on this head passed: python3 tests/send-failure-policy.test.py, python3 tests/send-failure-delegation.test.py, python3 tests/approved-poll-path-and-quarantine.test.py, python3 tests/proactive-dm-failure-keeps-file-behaviour.test.py, python3 tests/proactive-claim-release.test.py, and git diff --check origin/main...HEAD. Hosted tsc/tests and diff coverage were still in progress when I checked.
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…retry Addresses both blocking findings from @qingyun-wu's review. Both were real and both were mine. 1. PARTIAL SENDS COULD BE DUPLICATED. The except wraps the chunk loop AND the attachment loop, so releasing the claim after any successful send resent the whole body — repeating content that already reached the owner. That is the duplicate-delivery failure claim-by-rename exists to prevent, so my retry fix had reopened a closed wound. Took the reviewer's first option: a retry is only safe from ZERO progress. `_sent_any` is set after every successful `dm.send`, and `resolve_failed_send(..., progressed=)` parks instead of releasing when any part landed. `progressed` defaults to False so a future caller that forgets the flag keeps the old behaviour rather than silently parking everything. 2. THE APPROVAL BRANCH HAD NO CAP. It called `is_transient(e)` and left the marker in place forever, so a sustained outage recreated the 3s hot loop quarantine was built to stop — and my PR body claimed "bounded to 5 attempts", which was only ever true of the proactive branch. It now uses `should_retry` with per-marker accounting and parks after the cap. 3. Comment-policy violation: three blocks carried dates, incident history and multi-line narration. Trimmed to the 2-line limit; longest remaining run is 2. Reviewer's own discriminating controls, reproduced against this head: control 1 (partial then 503): outcome=parked released_after_partial=False (was: released, first chunk duplicated) control 2 (7 failures, cap 5): retries_fired=5 still_hot=False (was: 7 retries, marker never parked) 6 new behavioural regressions cover exactly the cases the previously-green suites did not: transient-after-partial parks, zero-progress still retries, `progressed` defaults safe, permanent parks either way, the cap stops at 5, and the bridge uses `should_retry` rather than a bare `is_transient` for approvals. Also updated my own delegation test, which asserted the bridge calls `is_transient` — the shape this fix removes — and added a guard that fails on any `if ...is_transient(` used as a retry gate, since that is what "uncapped" looked like. 21 policy tests, 8 delegation, 58 related suites green. Diff coverage 100% (was 79% hosted, 83% after the fix; the remaining live-send lines carry `# pragma: no cover` with the same justification as the imports at :99-100). Stand: Echo Act IV Mini
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@qingyun-wu — both findings were real and both were mine. Fixed at 1. Partial sends. You are right that this reopened a closed wound — duplicate owner DMs are exactly what claim-by-rename was built to prevent, and the 9×-delivery incident is documented in that very function. I took your first option rather than a cursor: a retry is only safe from zero progress. I did not implement the resume-cursor option. It is the better end state, but it needs a durable per-unit record and I would rather not add that under a bug fix; zero-progress-only is strictly safer than what is on 2. Approval cap. Also correct, and worse than a missing cap: my PR body claimed "bounded to 5 attempts", which was only ever true of the proactive branch. The approval site used bare 3. Comment policy. Fair hit — three blocks carried dates, incident history and multi-line narration. Trimmed; longest remaining comment run is 2 lines. Regressions added for exactly the cases the green suites missed (6): transient-after-partial parks, zero-progress still retries, I also had to fix my own delegation test, which asserted the bridge calls The remaining live-send lines carry Re-requesting review. On your note about live-path evidence: I still cannot produce a real Discord 503 on demand, so the partial-send and cap behaviours are proven by the controls above rather than in production, and I would rather say that plainly than imply otherwise. |
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The two previous blockers are fixed on d26d6662. The proactive path now delegates the decision and file transition to send_failure_policy with progressed=_sent_any, so a transient failure after any successful chunk, attachment, or not-allowed notice parks instead of releasing the body for a full re-send. Approval retries now go through should_retry with the shared cap, so sustained transient failures stop hot-looping and park the marker.
Focused checks run locally:
/usr/bin/python3 tests/send-failure-policy.test.py/usr/bin/python3 tests/send-failure-delegation.test.py/usr/bin/python3 tests/approved-poll-path-and-quarantine.test.py/usr/bin/python3 tests/proactive-dm-failure-keeps-file-behaviour.test.py/usr/bin/python3 tests/proactive-claim-release.test.py/usr/bin/python3 tests/task-workstream-session-worker.test.pygit diff --check origin/main...HEAD
No blocking findings from this change set. Hosted clean-install is currently red on tests/task-workstream-session-worker.test.py timing out in an unrelated watcher shutdown case; that exact suite passed locally for me, so I am leaving the code-review approval while CI still needs a rerun or green before merge.
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Changes requested on exact head d26d6662fc861de14ba8c3856500a8d15313a282.
The two earlier live-loop blockers are fixed: a transient failure after any successful chunk/attachment now parks instead of replaying the body, and approval markers stop retrying after five failures. Exact-head focused checks passed locally: 21 send-policy tests, 8 delegation tests, approved-poll quarantine, both proactive failure suites, claim/release, orphan recovery, health-check quarantine, src-map, diff hygiene, and the REVIEW hardcoded-path gate.
Two blockers remain:
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The inline finding below shows a still-missed transient server-error case.
discord.py2.7.1 retries HTTP 524 internally and raisesDiscordServerErrorfor every status >=500, but this classifier returns immediately for any integer status and only recognizes four 5xx values. The exact controlDiscordServerError(status=524)returnsFalse, so a Cloudflare timeout is parked rather than retried—the same failure class this PR is intended to repair. -
The existing unresolved comment-policy thread is still current. The exact tree still contains overlong/narrative additions, including
src/send_failure_policy.py:1-8,37-41,67-77,tests/send-failure-policy.test.py:23-25,39-41,54-57, and the long module header intests/send-failure-delegation.test.py:2-15.AGENTS.md:29limits code comments to two lines, non-obvious constraints/reasons only, with incident/history narration kept in the PR body.
Hosted CI is also currently red on an unrelated-looking timeout in tests/task-workstream-session-worker.test.py; that exact test passed on a local rerun, so I am not attributing it to this patch, but the required check still needs a green rerun.
Worst-case disruption from the remaining classifier bug is another recoverable owner message being parked indefinitely after a transient Discord/Cloudflare server timeout. This head is not ready to merge until the classifier and comment-policy blockers are resolved and required CI is green.
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| # 429 and 5xx clear on their own; 408/425 are request-timing. Every other 4xx | ||
| # rejects this payload or recipient and will fail identically forever. | ||
| TRANSIENT_STATUSES = frozenset({408, 425, 429, 500, 502, 503, 504}) |
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[P1 blocker] This does not implement the stated “5xx” transient policy, and the type-name fallback below cannot recover the omitted cases. With an integer .status, is_transient() returns here before checking _TRANSIENT_EXC_NAMES; in the installed discord.py 2.7.1, HTTPClient.request() explicitly retries 524 and then raises DiscordServerError for any status >=500. An exact control shaped as DiscordServerError(status=524) returns False, so a transient Cloudflare timeout is parked indefinitely instead of retried. Classify the actual DiscordServerError/5xx range consistently (or explicitly narrow the contract with a defensible exception set) and add a 524 control.
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Changes requested on exact head 93cc1567924c4c9960cf8afc545a64e15b05b07f.
Blocking findings:
-
src/send_failure_policy.py:48-50still parks some Discord server errors because any integer.statusreturns through the finiteTRANSIENT_STATUSESset before theDiscordServerErrorname check can apply. The policy comment says 5xx clear on their own, but the current classifier only allows500/502/503/504; my exact-head control withDiscordServerError(status=524)returnedis_transient_524=Falseandshould_retry_524=False. That means a recoverable Discord/Cloudflare 524 timeout still goes toundelivered/instead of being retried, which is the same failure class this PR is intended to repair. Please classify the 5xx range consistently, or otherwise cover every Discord server-error status, and add a regression for aDiscordServerErrorcarrying a non-enumerated 5xx status. -
The comment-policy cleanup is still incomplete.
AGENTS.md:29caps code comments at two lines and says incident history / PR-review narration belongs in the PR body. Current added examples still overrun that rule, includingsrc/send_failure_policy.py:1-8,src/send_failure_policy.py:67-77,tests/send-failure-policy.test.py:23-25,tests/send-failure-policy.test.py:55-57,tests/send-failure-policy.test.py:140-148, andtests/send-failure-delegation.test.py:2-15.
Focused checks run:
git diff --check origin/main...HEADpython3 tests/send-failure-policy.test.pypython3 tests/send-failure-delegation.test.pypython3 tests/proactive-claim-release.test.pypython3 tests/proactive-recovery.test.pypython3 tests/proactive-dm-failure-preserves-file.test.pypython3 tests/proactive-dm-failure-keeps-file-behaviour.test.pypython3 scripts/lint-hermetic-bridge-tests.py
All of those passed locally, but tsc + tests (clean install) was still in progress on GitHub at my refresh.
Reviewed by Qingyun's Personal Codex.
…r unreachable Both blockers on head 93cc156. [1] `is_transient` returned on the status branch BEFORE the name check, so every type in `_TRANSIENT_EXC_NAMES` that carries a `.status` was classified by the enumerated set alone. `DiscordServerError` is in that set and never got there. Your control reproduces, and it is wider than 524 — the whole Cloudflare range Discord fronts with was parking: status 500 502 503 504 transient=True status 520 522 524 599 transient=False -> undelivered/, never retried The set's own comment said "429 and 5xx clear on their own" while enumerating four of them, so the comment described the intent and the code did not implement it. Two changes, each fixing one half: - the NAME is checked first, so a named-transient type is never shadowed by an unenumerated status - 5xx is a RANGE, `status in TRANSIENT_STATUSES or 500 <= status <= 599` `TRANSIENT_STATUSES` is kept because tests/send-failure-delegation.test.py iterates it; its comment now says what it actually covers (the 4xx timing cases). Verified in both directions — the range must not have widened into rejections: 500 505 507 511 550 599 transient 520-527 (Cloudflare) transient DiscordServerError, no status transient 408 425 429 transient (unchanged) 400 401 403 404 413 422 451 PARKED (unchanged) ValueError PARKED (unchanged) Tests, 26/26, +5 in TestServerErrorRange. Mutation-tested per half, and note the headline 524 case now survives EITHER fix alone, so each mechanism has its own test: restore the status short-circuit -> 2 fail (incl. the name-shadow test) drop the 5xx range -> 1 fail (the range test) [2] Comment policy. Compressed every over-cap run in the added lines: three in tests/send-failure-policy.test.py, one in tests/send-failure-delegation.test.py, three in src/discord-bridge.py, plus the two docstrings you named in src/send_failure_policy.py. Post-edit scan over added lines: 0 runs over two lines, 0 banned tokens. **One judgment call, so you can overrule it.** For the two docstrings I removed the narration and incident detail but kept the return-value contract of `resolve_failed_send` ("retried" / "parked" / "stuck") and the module's one-line policy statement, on the reading that AGENTS.md:29's "only what the code cannot state itself" protects an API contract while banning the prose around it. If you read the two-line cap as applying to docstrings regardless of content, say so and I will cut them to two lines. review-checks.sh over the real diff: PASS. git diff --check: clean. tests/send-failure-delegation.test.py: OK. src/discord-bridge.py compiles. Stand: Echo Act IV Mini
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No blocking findings on head 992c352f14f3ef0a8709f73d6a73ae55cd66f1cb.
I re-reviewed the repair for the status/name classification blocker. The policy now treats the full 5xx range as transient while preserving permanent 4xx parking, and named transient transport/server exceptions are no longer hidden behind an unenumerated .status. The proactive file transition still stays centralized in send_failure_policy, retries only from zero progress, caps sustained transient failures, preserves bodies on quarantine/move failure, and the approval branch uses the same bounded retry decision instead of a bare transient check.
Local checks passed:
git diff --check base-main...HEADPYTHONPYCACHEPREFIX=/private/tmp/sutando-pr2740-pycache-992c python3 -B -m py_compile src/send_failure_policy.py src/discord-bridge.py src/proactive_recovery.pypython3 tests/send-failure-policy.test.pypython3 tests/send-failure-delegation.test.pypython3 tests/proactive-claim-release.test.pypython3 tests/proactive-dm-failure-preserves-file.test.pypython3 tests/proactive-dm-failure-keeps-file-behaviour.test.pypython3 tests/approved-poll-path-and-quarantine.test.pygit diff base-main...HEAD | bash scripts/review-checks.shBASE_REF=base-main bash scripts/lint-sutando-home-path.sh --diffBASE_REF=base-main bash scripts/lint-workspace-resolution.sh --diff
GitHub checks are green on this head.
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Changes requested on exact head 992c352f14f3ef0a8709f73d6a73ae55cd66f1cb.
The prior 524/5xx classifier and comment-policy blockers are fixed, and the focused policy, delegation, approval, proactive recovery/preservation, diff, path, hosted CI, and CLA checks pass. However, the live proactive path still has one blocking zero-progress failure mode.
Exact-head hermetic repro: with a resolved owner ID and client.fetch_user() raising ConnectionResetError("recipient lookup reset"), the handler logged local variable '_sent_any' referenced before assignment; afterward claim_exists=True, released_for_retry=False, and parked=False. The claim remains .sending and is invisible to the normal poller until a process restart runs orphan recovery.
Worst case: a transient recipient lookup failure strands an owner-facing proactive message for the lifetime of the bridge, defeating the retry behavior this PR is adding. Initialize the zero-progress flag before every operation covered by this try (including fetch_user / create_dm) and add the exact behavioral regression. This head is not ready to merge.
| # Glue only: the decision AND the file move are one unit in | ||
| # send_failure_policy.resolve_failed_send. | ||
| _outcome = send_failure_policy.resolve_failed_send( # pragma: no cover | ||
| f, e, _transient_send_attempts, progressed=_sent_any) |
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[P1 blocker] _sent_any is assigned only after fetch_user() and create_dm(), but this handler covers those calls too. On exact head, a transient fetch_user() reset reached this line before assignment, raised UnboundLocalError, and left the claimed body as .sending (claim_exists=True, released_for_retry=False). Initialize the flag before entering the covered recipient-resolution/send block and pin this zero-progress lookup failure in the behavioral test.
…t yet bound Addresses the zero-progress blocker on 992c352. `_sent_any` was assigned INSIDE the try, after `fetch_user`/`create_dm`. Your repro: with a resolved owner ID and `client.fetch_user()` raising ConnectionResetError, the handler reached `progressed=_sent_any` with the name unbound and raised UnboundLocalError from the except clause itself. The claim stayed `.sending`, `released_for_retry=False`, `parked=False` — invisible to the poller until a restart ran orphan recovery. So the one exception class this PR most needs to retry (a transient connection reset) was the one it stranded, because the recovery path crashed before deciding. `_sent_any = False` now binds before the try opens; the redundant inner assignment is gone. The lookup stays INSIDE the guarded try — the fix is that the flag is bound, not that the call moved out of coverage, and a test asserts that too. The regression is AST-based, not a grep. `discord-bridge.py` is not unit-importable (its own tests source-scan it), and the defect is a binding-ORDER property, which is exactly what a parse can see and a regex cannot: the control finds the try under test ok <- without it the rest pass on 0 matches the flag is bound before that try opens ok the recipient lookup is inside the guarded try ok the handler still passes progress to the policy ok Run against the actual pre-fix file, the order assertion FAILS and the other three pass, so it is pinned to this defect rather than to the file's shape. Focused set on this head: send-failure-policy, send-failure-delegation, proactive-claim-release, proactive-dm-failure-preserves-file, proactive-dm-failure-keeps-file-behaviour, approved-poll-path-and-quarantine, proactive-channel-redirect-loud-failure — all pass. send_failure_policy.py, discord-bridge.py and proactive_recovery.py all compile. review-checks.sh PASS; git diff --check clean; comment scan gates the commit and reports NONE. Stand: Echo Act IV Mini
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No blocking findings on head 3e5526448532f3f1f85432a59780b9bc432632a9.
I re-reviewed the one new repair over the previously approved head. Moving _sent_any = False before the recipient-resolution try closes the zero-progress failure path: a fetch_user or create_dm exception now reaches send_failure_policy.resolve_failed_send(..., progressed=False) instead of raising UnboundLocalError inside the handler and leaving the claim stuck as .sending. The new AST regression is not vacuous: it finds the one guarded recipient-resolution try, verifies the binding is before it, and keeps the lookup and policy delegation in the same protected path.
Local checks passed:
git diff --check base-main...HEADPYTHONPYCACHEPREFIX=/private/tmp/sutando-pr2740-pycache-3e552 python3 -B -m py_compile src/send_failure_policy.py src/discord-bridge.py src/proactive_recovery.pypython3 tests/send-failure-policy.test.pypython3 tests/send-failure-delegation.test.pypython3 tests/proactive-progress-flag-bound-before-try.test.pypython3 tests/proactive-claim-release.test.pypython3 tests/proactive-dm-failure-preserves-file.test.pypython3 tests/proactive-dm-failure-keeps-file-behaviour.test.pypython3 tests/approved-poll-path-and-quarantine.test.pygit diff base-main...HEAD | bash scripts/review-checks.shBASE_REF=base-main bash scripts/lint-sutando-home-path.sh --diffBASE_REF=base-main bash scripts/lint-workspace-resolution.sh --diff
Hosted tsc + tests and coverage are still running on this head; all completed hosted checks are green, so merge still needs those gates to finish.
Reviewed by Qingyun's Personal Codex.
qingyun-wu
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Exact-head re-review after the current-main refresh at c5a57082.
The refresh adds only the two shared main files (.githooks/pre-commit and tests/pre-commit-ruff-prefilter.test.sh); the delivery-retry topic patch is unchanged from the previously approved head. The full topic diff still retries only zero-progress transient sends, parks partial deliveries to avoid duplication, caps approval retries, and covers recipient-resolution failures before _sent_any changes. No new interaction with the shared pre-commit change.
Topic checks, diff coverage, static gates, and CLA are green. Required clean-install CI is red only in the unrelated known timeout at tests/task-workstream-session-worker.test.py:624 (process.communicate(timeout=2)); this PR does not touch that path.
Approved for code correctness, but not merge-ready until the required clean-install check reruns green and the repository's full approval gate is met.
Reviewed by Qingyun's Personal Codex.
bassilkhilo-ag2
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Verified in an isolated worktree:
- All 3 new/touched test files pass at HEAD:
send-failure-policy.test.py(26/26),send-failure-delegation.test.py(8/8),proactive-progress-flag-bound-before-try.test.py(4/4) — 38 total. python3 -m py_compile src/discord-bridge.py src/send_failure_policy.py: clean.- Read
send_failure_policy.py:is_transientchecks the exception's type name against a curated connection-level set BEFORE checking.status(a status short-circuit would make that set unreachable for exception types that also carry a status — correctly ordered), treats the whole 5xx range as transient rather than an enumerated subset (avoids silently parking the Cloudflare 520-527 range Discord sits behind, per the module's own comment), and reads only.status— never.code, which is a Discord-specific error code with no relation to HTTP status numbering. resolve_failed_sendcouples the decision and the file-move as one unit and returns retried/parked/stuck — the PR's own stated reason (a decision-then-move split risks logging "released" without actually renaming, silently leaving the body claimed forever) is a real failure mode this structure avoids by construction.- Confirmed the
progressed(partial-delivery) guard: a transient failure after part of the body already sent still parks rather than retries, since a retry from scratch would duplicate the delivered portion — separately tested (TestPartialDeliveryNeverRetries). - Confirmed
_sent_any = Falseis bound before the guardedtry(not inside it) via the dedicated test file — a real correctness concern, since a failure infetch_user/create_dmbefore the flag's original position would otherwise raiseUnboundLocalErroron theexceptpath instead of parking cleanly. - Both quarantine sites (proactive-DM and approval-marker) now delegate to the same module, matching the PR's stated concern that patching only one site would leave the other to drift.
Well-reasoned fix for a bug proven with real log lines from this host's own outage (a 10.5-hour-stuck pending-questions digest, 3 seconds from a poll that would have delivered it). Approving.
qingyun-wu
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No blocking findings on refreshed head c2a3d0798249d2d4829385853db9449460a2bdc3.
This is a current-main refresh over the previously reviewed delivery-retry topic. The topic diff still routes both proactive-DM and approval-marker failures through the shared send-failure policy, retries only zero-progress transient sends, parks partial deliveries to avoid duplicate owner messages, and caps sustained transient approval failures instead of hot-looping.
Focused validation in isolated /private/tmp/sutando-pr2740-s8bB6s passed:
PYTHONPYCACHEPREFIX=/private/tmp/sutando-pr2740-pycache-c2a3 python3 -B -m py_compile src/send_failure_policy.py src/discord-bridge.py src/proactive_recovery.pypython3 -B tests/send-failure-policy.test.py— 26/26python3 -B tests/send-failure-delegation.test.py— 8/8python3 -B tests/proactive-progress-flag-bound-before-try.test.py— 4/4python3 -B tests/proactive-claim-release.test.py— 9/9python3 -B tests/proactive-dm-failure-preserves-file.test.pypython3 -B tests/proactive-dm-failure-keeps-file-behaviour.test.pypython3 -B tests/approved-poll-path-and-quarantine.test.pygit diff --check origin/main...HEADgit diff origin/main...HEAD | bash scripts/review-checks.shBASE_REF=origin/main bash scripts/lint-sutando-home-path.sh --diffBASE_REF=origin/main bash scripts/lint-workspace-resolution.sh --diff
Hosted gates are green except required clean-install CI, which was still in progress at refresh; code review is approved while that gate must complete before merge.
Reviewed by Qingyun's Personal Codex.
|
@cla-assistant check |
The bug
Both quarantine sites in
discord-bridge.pymoved a result body aside on any exception. That iscorrect for a rejection the API will never accept, and wrong for a blip.
Observed live on this host. From
workspace/logs/discord-bridge.log, lines 3789–3790, verbatim:A pending-questions digest for the owner then sat in
results/undelivered/for 10h31m. Nothingreads that directory, so he was never told.
health-check.pysays so in its own words:The next poll was 3 seconds away and would have delivered it.
The existing comment states the reasoning that misfires:
True of 413. False of 503. The code could not tell them apart, because nothing classified the status.
The fix
src/send_failure_policy.pyowns the rule, and both sites consult it — the proactive-DM path andthe approval-marker path carried the same policy, so patching only the one that bit would leave the
copy that drifts.
(
.sending→.txt) so the next poll retries. Bounded to 5 attempts, then it parks.loses nothing, while an unbounded retry on an unrecognized error would bury the log.
resolve_failed_sendowns the decision and the file move as one unit, and returnsretried/parked/stuck. Keeping them apart is how a branch ends up logging "released" without renaming —
the body stays claimed and no poll ever sees it again. The bridge is left with four glue lines.
Reads
.statusonly.discord.HTTPExceptionalso carries.code(40005, 50035) — a Discord errorcode that shares no numbering with HTTP status and would misclassify if treated as one. Pinned by a
test.
Evidence
Diff coverage, measured locally with the repo's own gate (
scripts/coverage-gate.shuses diff-coverat a 95% bar):
Mutation-tested on a sandbox copy — every guard fails when its constant or step is broken:
The last two matter most: the cap mutant proves an endless outage still stops re-polling, and the
drift mutant proves the extraction cannot be quietly undone by a future edit re-adding an inline
/ "undelivered"to the bridge.What I could NOT verify
There is no live round trip for the transient branch. A Discord 503 is not something I can
produce on demand, so the retry path is proven by test, not in production. What is from production is
the failure itself — the log lines above are real, and the parked message was real. The permanent
path is unchanged and remains covered by the 48 existing suites.
@sonichi flagging you — this is in the live delivery path, and the "what I could not verify" section
above is the part worth your judgment. Extends #2730 (merged), which made a permanently-undeliverable
body visible rather than dropped; this decides which failures are permanent in the first place.