reject out-of-range \DDD escapes in name text parsing - #1308
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\DDDdenotes a single octet (RFC 1035 5.1), but the two name-text decoders disagree on out-of-range values.from_unicode()builds the escape as a code point withchr(total)and never boundstotal, so\256through\999are accepted and IDNA-encoded instead of rejected.from_text()(the all-ASCII path) does reject them, but via a rawstruct.errorout ofstruct.pack("!B", total)rather than aDNSException.Both now raise
BadEscapeonce the three digits exceed 255, matching the tokenizer and SVCB_unescapedecoders that already cap at a single octet. Added a regression test covering both entry points.