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Description
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Summary
Review of PRs #114, #115 and #116 (independent review threads, each resolved or raised by copilot-pull-request-reviewer) shows two repeated engineering-loop failures that no active learned rule covers. .github/copilot-code-review.yml requires minimumDistinctRuns: 2. Both candidates below meet it with 3 or 2 distinct PRs. The only active rule covers cross-runtime guidance parity. The Agent Rule Review artifact for the latest completed run (43024419099) contained no candidate report, so this evidence comes from PR review threads.
Candidate 1: Canonicalize environment and scope labels in one shared helper
Pattern: environment or scope labels are compared with ad-hoc, partial normalization, so conflicting or valid values slip through or throw.
- FLAB: add reviewed query setup and scoped non-production POST consent #114: PPE base accepted
/api/SIT/v1anddevelopmentbecause path labels were case-sensitive anddevelopmentwas not canonicalized to DEV (FLAB: add reviewed query setup and scoped non-production POST consent #114 (comment)). - FLAB: support approved browser API journeys and blocker recovery #115:
/api/sit-v1and/api/dev_v1were accepted because only hostname labels were split on punctuation (FLAB: support approved browser API journeys and blocker recovery #115 (comment)). - FLAB: add scoped tagged-ticket automation and permission retries #116: object-form
environments: { DEV: {} }threw while array form worked, and lowercasepost.devkeys were missed (FLAB: add scoped tagged-ticket automation and permission retries #116 (comment), FLAB: add scoped tagged-ticket automation and permission retries #116 (comment), FLAB: add scoped tagged-ticket automation and permission retries #116 (comment) area,discussion_r4603899930).
Proposed rule: Any code that selects, compares, or authorizes by environment or scope (hostname labels, path labels, profile environments in array or object form, post.<env> keys) must use the shared case-insensitive canonicalization and tokenization (dot, slash, hyphen, underscore; development → DEV). Add regression cases for mixed case, separators, aliases, and both profile shapes.
Candidate 2: Screen credentials on every path that persists, forwards, or displays free text
Pattern: a credential filter is added at one boundary and bypassed at a sibling boundary or through encoding.
- FLAB: support approved browser API journeys and blocker recovery #115: title-only credential prompt, terminology-only matching, natural-language statements (
My PIN is 1234), andheaders.set("Authorization", ...)/ tuple forms bypassed screening (FLAB: support approved browser API journeys and blocker recovery #115 (comment), FLAB: support approved browser API journeys and blocker recovery #115 (comment), FLAB: support approved browser API journeys and blocker recovery #115 (comment)). - FLAB: add scoped tagged-ticket automation and permission retries #116: summaries persisted with
Cookie:/Authorization:/API keys, executor output forwarded before screening, ticket text reaching the prompt unfiltered, andJSON.stringifyescaping hiding values from the scanner (FLAB: add scoped tagged-ticket automation and permission retries #116 (comment), FLAB: add scoped tagged-ticket automation and permission retries #116 (comment), FLAB: add scoped tagged-ticket automation and permission retries #116 (comment), FLAB: add scoped tagged-ticket automation and permission retries #116 (comment)).
Proposed rule: When adding or changing credential screening, route every ingress and egress of untrusted free text (prompts, summaries, logs, terminal forwarding, persisted results, titles, details, and choices) through one shared screen applied to the original unescaped string before it is stored, forwarded, or displayed. Regression tests must cover labeled, natural-language, header-setter/tuple, and escaped forms, plus safe diagnostic mentions such as "password reset test fails".
Why existing rules do not cover them
The sole active rule ("Mirror cross-runtime guidance in every execution entry point") addresses parity across runtimes and agent sources, not label canonicalization or credential-screening coverage.
Validation or retirement condition
Promote after human review. Retire after 10 consecutive qualifying PRs touching environment/scope handling or free-text credential screening produce no reviewer finding of the same class (per retirement.minimumCleanRuns).
Security and compatibility risk
Both rules are security-protective and should not widen access. Risks: over-strict credential matching can reject safe diagnostics (mitigated by the required safe-mention regressions) and canonicalization may reject previously accepted ambiguous bases. Evidence contains no credentials, private data, or endpoints. Promotion or retirement must go through a pull request; no source was modified.
Generated by Review FixLab learned-rule candidates · copilot · auto · 25.5 AIC · ⊞ 4K · ◷
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