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Fix safe-output URL redaction corrupting HTML tag boundaries #76719
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858b9f0
fix: preserve HTML boundaries during safe-output URL redaction
lpcox 5ea7e38
Fix sanitizer URL boundary review findings
Copilot c7efe24
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into lpcox-fix-safe-output…
Copilot b72ba77
fix: handle malformed HTML URL boundaries
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139 changes: 139 additions & 0 deletions
139
actions/setup/js/sanitize_content_url_boundaries.test.cjs
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ | ||
| import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest"; | ||
| import { createRequire } from "node:module"; | ||
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| const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); | ||
| const { sanitizeContentCore, sanitizeUrlProtocols, sanitizeUrlDomains, clearRedactedDomains } = require("./sanitize_content_core.cjs"); | ||
| const { sanitizeContent } = require("./sanitize_content.cjs"); | ||
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| beforeEach(() => { | ||
| vi.stubGlobal("core", { info: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn(), warning: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn() }); | ||
| vi.stubEnv("GH_AW_ALLOWED_DOMAINS", "github.com"); | ||
| vi.stubEnv("GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS_URLS", "allowed-only"); | ||
| vi.stubEnv("GITHUB_SERVER_URL", ""); | ||
| vi.stubEnv("GITHUB_API_URL", ""); | ||
| }); | ||
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| afterEach(() => { | ||
| clearRedactedDomains(); | ||
| vi.unstubAllEnvs(); | ||
| vi.unstubAllGlobals(); | ||
| }); | ||
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| const urls = [ | ||
| ...["", "javascript:alert(1)", "vbscript:msgbox(1)", "about:blank", "mailto:test@example.invalid", "tel:123456", "magnet:?xt=fixture", "DaTa%253Aimage/png;base64,AAAA==", "file:///image.png"].map(url => [ | ||
| url, | ||
| "(redacted)", | ||
| ]), | ||
| ...["http://", "ftp://", "https://", "//", "\\\\", "www."].map(prefix => [`${prefix}outside.invalid/image.png`, prefix === "www." ? "(www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)" : "(outside.invalid/redacted)"]), | ||
| ]; | ||
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| const sanitizers = [ | ||
| ["core", text => sanitizeContentCore(text)], | ||
| ["default", text => sanitizeContent(text)], | ||
| ["selective mentions", text => sanitizeContent(text, { allowedAliases: ["synthetic"] })], | ||
| ["deferred mentions", text => sanitizeContent(text, { deferMentions: true })], | ||
| ]; | ||
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| describe.each(["allowed-only", "allowed-or-code-region"])("URL tag boundaries under %s", policy => { | ||
| describe.each(sanitizers)("%s sanitization", (_name, sanitize) => { | ||
| it.each(urls)("keeps %s redaction inside the original image", (url, redacted) => { | ||
| vi.stubEnv("GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS_URLS", policy); | ||
| for (const quote of ['"', "'", ""]) { | ||
| for (const tail of [' text "onerror=alert(1)>', '\n\nSteps: run "and check\nonerror=alert(1)>']) { | ||
| const tag = `<img src=${quote}${redacted}${quote}>`; | ||
| const input = `<img src=${quote}${url}${quote} onload="alert(2)" style="display:none">`; | ||
| const output = sanitize(input + tail); | ||
| expect(output).toBe(tag + tail); | ||
| expect(output.match(/<img\b[^>]*>/g)).toEqual([tag]); | ||
| expect(sanitize(output)).toBe(output); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| }); | ||
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| it("preserves allowed image URLs and layout attributes", () => { | ||
| vi.stubEnv("GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS_URLS", policy); | ||
| const input = '<img src="https://github.com/image.png" width="12" height="8" alt="image">'; | ||
| expect(sanitize(input)).toBe(input); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it("retains the configured code-region URL policy", () => { | ||
| vi.stubEnv("GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS_URLS", policy); | ||
| const input = "```text\n\n```"; | ||
| expect(sanitize(input)).toBe(policy === "allowed-only" ? "```text\n(redacted)\n```" : input); | ||
| }); | ||
| }); | ||
| }); | ||
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| describe("URL matcher structural delimiters", () => { | ||
| it("preserves the tag boundary in the reported minimal reproduction", () => { | ||
| expect(sanitizeContentCore('<img src=""> text "onerror=alert(1)>')).toBe('<img src="(redacted)"> text "onerror=alert(1)>'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it.each(["javascript", "vbscript", "about"])("redacts %s when a quote or angle bracket immediately follows the scheme", scheme => { | ||
| for (const delimiter of ['"', "'", "<", ">"]) { | ||
| expect(sanitizeUrlProtocols(`${scheme}:${delimiter}payload${delimiter}`)).toBe(`(redacted)${delimiter}payload${delimiter}`); | ||
| } | ||
| }); | ||
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| it("does not redact blocked-scheme prose when a space follows the colon", () => { | ||
| expect(sanitizeUrlProtocols("about: blank")).toBe("about: blank"); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it.each(urls)("does not consume delimiters after %s", (url, redacted) => { | ||
| const filter = /^(?:https:|[/\\]|www\.)/.test(url) ? text => sanitizeUrlDomains(text, ["github.com"]) : sanitizeUrlProtocols; | ||
| for (const delimiter of ['"', "'", ">", "<"]) { | ||
| expect(filter(`${url}${delimiter}tail`)).toBe(`${redacted}${delimiter}tail`); | ||
| } | ||
| }); | ||
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| it.each(urls)("does not consume an adjacent tag after %s", (url, redacted) => { | ||
| expect(sanitizeContent(`<img src=${url}><b>next</b>`)).toBe(`<img src=${redacted}><b>next</b>`); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it("does not treat a backslash as escaping an HTML attribute quote", () => { | ||
| expect(sanitizeUrlDomains('www.outside.invalid/path\\"tail', [])).toBe('(www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)"tail'); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it("keeps a bare www attribute candidate inside its HTML tag", () => { | ||
| const input = '<img src="safe" width=10 www.outside.invalid>text@outside.invalid/path'; | ||
| const expected = '<img src="safe" width=10 (www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)>text@outside.invalid/path'; | ||
| expect(sanitizeUrlDomains(input, ["github.com"])).toBe(expected); | ||
| expect(sanitizeContent(input)).toBe(expected); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it.each([ | ||
| ['"www.github.com"@outside.invalid/path', '"(outside.invalid/redacted)'], | ||
| ['command=www.github.com"@outside.invalid/path', "command=(outside.invalid/redacted)"], | ||
| ])("validates the full www authority in prose: %s", (input, expected) => { | ||
| expect(sanitizeUrlDomains(input, ["github.com"])).toBe(expected); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it.each([ | ||
| ['<img alt="www.github.com"@evil.example/x">', '<img alt="(evil.example/redacted)">'], | ||
| ['<b www.github.com"@evil.invalid/x', "<b (evil.invalid/redacted)"], | ||
| ['<b www.github.com"@-evil.invalid/x', "<b (evil.invalid/redacted)"], | ||
| ["a <b www.github.com'@_evil.invalid/x", "a <b (evil.invalid/redacted)"], | ||
| ])("validates the full www authority inside tag-like input: %s", (input, expected) => { | ||
| expect(sanitizeUrlDomains(input, ["github.com"])).toBe(expected); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it("recovers from an unterminated HTML quote before filtering later prose", () => { | ||
| const input = "<b don't\n www.outside.invalid/path>tail"; | ||
| expect(sanitizeUrlDomains(input, ["github.com"])).toBe("<b don't\n (www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)>tail"); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it("bounds scanner state for an excessively long unterminated tag", () => { | ||
| const prefix = `<b "${"x".repeat(4092)}`; | ||
| expect(sanitizeUrlDomains(`${prefix} www.outside.invalid/path>tail`, ["github.com"])).toBe(`${prefix} (www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)>tail`); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it.each(["", " ", "\n"])("does not consume an image boundary when userinfo-like prose follows an attribute with %j spacing", spacing => { | ||
| for (const [url, expected] of [ | ||
| ["www.github.com", "www.github.com"], | ||
| ["www.outside.invalid", "(www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)"], | ||
| ]) { | ||
| const tail = '>text@outside.invalid/path "onerror=alert(1)>'; | ||
| expect(sanitizeContent(`<img src =${spacing}${url}${tail}`)).toBe(`<img src =${spacing}${expected}${tail}`); | ||
| } | ||
| }); | ||
| }); |
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The scanner enters
inHtmlTagfor any<letter...prefix and never recovers when the tag is malformed or has an unterminated quote. For example,<b don'tleaveshtmlQuoteset through the remainder of the string, so later(www/redacted).candidates are parsed with HTML-tag termination rules and can have their URL boundary changed by unrelated prose. Since this state is attacker-controlled input, please bound/reset malformed tag state (for example at a newline or a conservative maximum) and add a regression for an unclosed tag before a later URL.There was a problem hiding this comment.
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Added recovery for unterminated quoted tags at line breaks and a 4096-character cap for tag state, with regressions for both recovery paths. The later URL boundary is preserved in
b72ba7759f.