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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion .github/workflows/ponytail-reviewer.lock.yml

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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion .github/workflows/pr-code-quality-reviewer.lock.yml

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57 changes: 51 additions & 6 deletions actions/setup/js/sanitize_content_core.cjs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -384,7 +384,9 @@ function sanitizeUrlProtocols(s) {
// another protocol name (e.g. "ttps://" inside "https://…").
// (?!https://) — negative lookahead: explicitly excludes https://, which is
// passed through to sanitizeUrlDomains for domain filtering.
let result = normalized.replace(/(?<![a-z0-9])(?!https:\/\/)([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*)(:\/\/)([\w.-]*)([^\s]*)/gi, (_match, scheme, _slashes, domain, _rest) => {
// URL redaction must leave HTML attribute quotes and tag boundaries intact:
// attribute stripping has already run, so deleting them could pull prose into a tag.
let result = normalized.replace(/(?<![a-z0-9])(?!https:\/\/)([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*)(:\/\/)([\w.-]*)([^\s"'<>]*)/gi, (_match, scheme, _slashes, domain, _rest) => {
const fullMatch = _match;
if (!domain) {
// No host present (e.g. "file:///path" or bare "http://"). Use the scheme
Expand All @@ -407,7 +409,7 @@ function sanitizeUrlProtocols(s) {
// For schemes that do not use "//", a targeted blocklist is used because a
// fully general single-colon pattern produces too many false positives
// (e.g. "key:value" in YAML, "std::vector" in C++, "C:\path" on Windows).
return result.replace(/(?:data|javascript|vbscript|about|mailto|tel|magnet):[^\s]+/gi, match => {
return result.replace(/(?:data|javascript|vbscript|about|mailto|tel|magnet):(?=[^\s])[^\s"'<>]*/gi, match => {
const protocolMatch = match.match(/^([^:]+):/);
if (protocolMatch) {
const protocol = protocolMatch[1] + ":";
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -441,7 +443,7 @@ function sanitizeUrlDomains(s, allowed) {
// 3. Allow optional port (:8080)
// 4. Allow optional path and query string (but not trailing commas/periods)
// 5. Stop before another https:// URL in query params (using negative lookahead)
const httpsUrlRegex = /https:\/\/([\w.-]+(?::\d+)?)(\/(?:(?!https:\/\/)[^\s,])*)?/gi;
const httpsUrlRegex = /https:\/\/([\w.-]+(?::\d+)?)(\/(?:(?!https:\/\/)[^\s,"'<>])*)?/gi;

/**
* Shared domain-allowlist check and redaction logic.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -542,7 +544,7 @@ function sanitizeUrlDomains(s, allowed) {
// 2: separator (// or a backslash variant)
// 3: hostname (and optional port)
// 4: optional path
const protoRelativeUrlRegex = new RegExp(`(^|${URL_START_DELIMITERS})([/\\\\]{2})([\\w.-]+(?::\\d+)?)((?:/(?:(?![/\\\\]{2})[^\\s,])*)?)`, "gi");
const protoRelativeUrlRegex = new RegExp(`(^|${URL_START_DELIMITERS})([/\\\\]{2})([\\w.-]+(?::\\d+)?)((?:/(?:(?![/\\\\]{2})[^\\s,"'<>])*)?)`, "gi");

s = s.replace(protoRelativeUrlRegex, (match, prefix, _separator, hostnameWithPort, path = "") => {
// Normalize the separator to "//" so a backslash form can never survive as
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -604,6 +606,39 @@ function sanitizeUrlDomains(s, allowed) {
const urlOrWwwRegex = /https:\/\/|(^|[^a-z0-9])(www\.)/gi;
const parts = [];
const authorityUserinfoAt = new Uint8Array(s.length + 1);
const htmlTagAt = new Uint8Array(s.length);
const htmlTagQuotedAt = new Uint8Array(s.length);
const maxHtmlTagLength = 4096;
let inHtmlTag = false;
let htmlQuote = "";
let htmlTagStart = -1;
for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {
const character = s[i];
if (inHtmlTag && ((/\r|\n/.test(character) && htmlQuote) || i - htmlTagStart >= maxHtmlTagLength)) {
inHtmlTag = false;
htmlQuote = "";
htmlTagStart = -1;
}
if (!inHtmlTag && character === "<" && /[a-z]/i.test(s[i + 1] || "")) {

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The scanner enters inHtmlTag for any <letter... prefix and never recovers when the tag is malformed or has an unterminated quote. For example, <b don't leaves htmlQuote set through the remainder of the string, so later (www/redacted). candidates are parsed with HTML-tag termination rules and can have their URL boundary changed by unrelated prose. Since this state is attacker-controlled input, please bound/reset malformed tag state (for example at a newline or a conservative maximum) and add a regression for an unclosed tag before a later URL.

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Added recovery for unterminated quoted tags at line breaks and a 4096-character cap for tag state, with regressions for both recovery paths. The later URL boundary is preserved in b72ba7759f.

let tagNameEnd = i + 2;
while (/[a-z0-9:-]/i.test(s[tagNameEnd] || "")) tagNameEnd++;
if (/[\s/>]/.test(s[tagNameEnd] || "")) {
inHtmlTag = true;
htmlTagStart = i;
}
}
if (!inHtmlTag) continue;
htmlTagAt[i] = 1;
htmlTagQuotedAt[i] = htmlQuote ? 1 : 0;
if (htmlQuote) {
if (character === htmlQuote) htmlQuote = "";
} else if (character === '"' || character === "'") {
htmlQuote = character;
} else if (character === ">") {
inHtmlTag = false;
htmlTagStart = -1;
}
}
let hasAuthorityUserinfo = false;
for (let i = s.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
const character = s[i];
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -647,12 +682,22 @@ function sanitizeUrlDomains(s, allowed) {
const prefix = match[1];
const candidateStart = match.index + match[0].length - match[2].length;
const hasAuthorityUserinfo = authorityUserinfoAt[candidateStart] === 1;
const isHtmlTagCandidate = htmlTagAt[candidateStart] === 1;
let end = candidateStart;
let depth = 0;
let inAuthority = true;
for (; end < s.length; end++) {
const character = s[end];
if (character === "\\" && end + 1 < s.length) {
// GFM permits ">" inside a userinfo authority, but HTML tag candidates
// must stop there even when later prose contains "@".
if (
/[\s|\[\]]/.test(character) ||
(isHtmlTagCandidate && /["']/.test(character) && !hasAuthorityUserinfo) ||
(/[<>]/.test(character) && (isHtmlTagCandidate ? !htmlTagQuotedAt[end] : !inAuthority || !hasAuthorityUserinfo)) ||
(/["']/.test(character) && (!inAuthority || !hasAuthorityUserinfo))
) {
break;
} else if (character === "\\" && end + 1 < s.length && !/["'<>]/.test(s[end + 1])) {
end++;
} else if (character === "`" && (!inAuthority || !hasAuthorityUserinfo || prefix === "`")) {
break;
Expand All @@ -663,7 +708,7 @@ function sanitizeUrlDomains(s, allowed) {
depth--;
} else if (character === "/" || character === "?" || character === "#") {
inAuthority = false;
} else if (/[\s|\[\]]/.test(character) || (/[*_~]/.test(character) && s.slice(end + 1, end + 5).toLowerCase() === "www.")) {
} else if (/[*_~]/.test(character) && s.slice(end + 1, end + 5).toLowerCase() === "www.") {
break;
}
}
Expand Down
139 changes: 139 additions & 0 deletions actions/setup/js/sanitize_content_url_boundaries.test.cjs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { createRequire } from "node:module";

const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
const { sanitizeContentCore, sanitizeUrlProtocols, sanitizeUrlDomains, clearRedactedDomains } = require("./sanitize_content_core.cjs");
const { sanitizeContent } = require("./sanitize_content.cjs");

beforeEach(() => {
vi.stubGlobal("core", { info: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn(), warning: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn() });
vi.stubEnv("GH_AW_ALLOWED_DOMAINS", "github.com");
vi.stubEnv("GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS_URLS", "allowed-only");
vi.stubEnv("GITHUB_SERVER_URL", "");
vi.stubEnv("GITHUB_API_URL", "");
});

afterEach(() => {
clearRedactedDomains();
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
vi.unstubAllGlobals();
});

const urls = [
...["", "javascript:alert(1)", "vbscript:msgbox(1)", "about:blank", "mailto:test@example.invalid", "tel:123456", "magnet:?xt=fixture", "DaTa%253Aimage/png;base64,AAAA==", "file:///image.png"].map(url => [
url,
"(redacted)",
]),
...["http://", "ftp://", "https://", "//", "\\\\", "www."].map(prefix => [`${prefix}outside.invalid/image.png`, prefix === "www." ? "(www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)" : "(outside.invalid/redacted)"]),
];

const sanitizers = [
["core", text => sanitizeContentCore(text)],
["default", text => sanitizeContent(text)],
["selective mentions", text => sanitizeContent(text, { allowedAliases: ["synthetic"] })],
["deferred mentions", text => sanitizeContent(text, { deferMentions: true })],
];

describe.each(["allowed-only", "allowed-or-code-region"])("URL tag boundaries under %s", policy => {
describe.each(sanitizers)("%s sanitization", (_name, sanitize) => {
it.each(urls)("keeps %s redaction inside the original image", (url, redacted) => {
vi.stubEnv("GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS_URLS", policy);
for (const quote of ['"', "'", ""]) {
for (const tail of [' text "onerror=alert(1)>', '\n\nSteps: run "and check\nonerror=alert(1)>']) {
const tag = `<img src=${quote}${redacted}${quote}>`;
const input = `<img src=${quote}${url}${quote} onload="alert(2)" style="display:none">`;
const output = sanitize(input + tail);
expect(output).toBe(tag + tail);
expect(output.match(/<img\b[^>]*>/g)).toEqual([tag]);
expect(sanitize(output)).toBe(output);
}
}
});

it("preserves allowed image URLs and layout attributes", () => {
vi.stubEnv("GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS_URLS", policy);
const input = '<img src="https://github.com/image.png" width="12" height="8" alt="image">';
expect(sanitize(input)).toBe(input);
});

it("retains the configured code-region URL policy", () => {
vi.stubEnv("GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS_URLS", policy);
const input = "```text\n\n```";
expect(sanitize(input)).toBe(policy === "allowed-only" ? "```text\n(redacted)\n```" : input);
});
});
});

describe("URL matcher structural delimiters", () => {
it("preserves the tag boundary in the reported minimal reproduction", () => {
expect(sanitizeContentCore('<img src=""> text "onerror=alert(1)>')).toBe('<img src="(redacted)"> text "onerror=alert(1)>');
});

it.each(["javascript", "vbscript", "about"])("redacts %s when a quote or angle bracket immediately follows the scheme", scheme => {
for (const delimiter of ['"', "'", "<", ">"]) {
expect(sanitizeUrlProtocols(`${scheme}:${delimiter}payload${delimiter}`)).toBe(`(redacted)${delimiter}payload${delimiter}`);
}
});

it("does not redact blocked-scheme prose when a space follows the colon", () => {
expect(sanitizeUrlProtocols("about: blank")).toBe("about: blank");
});

it.each(urls)("does not consume delimiters after %s", (url, redacted) => {
const filter = /^(?:https:|[/\\]|www\.)/.test(url) ? text => sanitizeUrlDomains(text, ["github.com"]) : sanitizeUrlProtocols;
for (const delimiter of ['"', "'", ">", "<"]) {
expect(filter(`${url}${delimiter}tail`)).toBe(`${redacted}${delimiter}tail`);
}
});

it.each(urls)("does not consume an adjacent tag after %s", (url, redacted) => {
expect(sanitizeContent(`<img src=${url}><b>next</b>`)).toBe(`<img src=${redacted}><b>next</b>`);
});

it("does not treat a backslash as escaping an HTML attribute quote", () => {
expect(sanitizeUrlDomains('www.outside.invalid/path\\"tail', [])).toBe('(www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)"tail');
});

it("keeps a bare www attribute candidate inside its HTML tag", () => {
const input = '<img src="safe" width=10 www.outside.invalid>text@outside.invalid/path';
const expected = '<img src="safe" width=10 (www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)>text@outside.invalid/path';
expect(sanitizeUrlDomains(input, ["github.com"])).toBe(expected);
expect(sanitizeContent(input)).toBe(expected);
});

it.each([
['"www.github.com"@outside.invalid/path', '"(outside.invalid/redacted)'],
['command=www.github.com"@outside.invalid/path', "command=(outside.invalid/redacted)"],
])("validates the full www authority in prose: %s", (input, expected) => {
expect(sanitizeUrlDomains(input, ["github.com"])).toBe(expected);
});

it.each([
['<img alt="www.github.com"@evil.example/x">', '<img alt="(evil.example/redacted)">'],
['<b www.github.com"@evil.invalid/x', "<b (evil.invalid/redacted)"],
['<b www.github.com"@-evil.invalid/x', "<b (evil.invalid/redacted)"],
["a <b www.github.com'@_evil.invalid/x", "a <b (evil.invalid/redacted)"],
])("validates the full www authority inside tag-like input: %s", (input, expected) => {
expect(sanitizeUrlDomains(input, ["github.com"])).toBe(expected);
});

it("recovers from an unterminated HTML quote before filtering later prose", () => {
const input = "<b don't\n www.outside.invalid/path>tail";
expect(sanitizeUrlDomains(input, ["github.com"])).toBe("<b don't\n (www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)>tail");
});

it("bounds scanner state for an excessively long unterminated tag", () => {
const prefix = `<b "${"x".repeat(4092)}`;
expect(sanitizeUrlDomains(`${prefix} www.outside.invalid/path>tail`, ["github.com"])).toBe(`${prefix} (www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)>tail`);
});

it.each(["", " ", "\n"])("does not consume an image boundary when userinfo-like prose follows an attribute with %j spacing", spacing => {
for (const [url, expected] of [
["www.github.com", "www.github.com"],
["www.outside.invalid", "(www[.]outside.invalid/redacted)"],
]) {
const tail = '>text@outside.invalid/path "onerror=alert(1)>';
expect(sanitizeContent(`<img src =${spacing}${url}${tail}`)).toBe(`<img src =${spacing}${expected}${tail}`);
}
});
});
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