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Description
Summary
Track the shared-runtime and cleanup problem from github/gh-aw-firewall#11130. Multiple runners on one native Linux VM share /tmp/gh-aw; setup and teardown can remove another active job's files. A no-sudo runner also cannot reclaim root-owned leftovers.
Reported environment
- gh-aw v1.0.1, emitting AWF v0.29.0.
- Multiple self-hosted runners with separate work directories on one Linux VM and one shared
/tmp. runs-on: linux64-selfhosted; not ARC/DinD, norunner.topology.- Docker available; no sudo; non-Debian image.
Release-source evidence
- setup.sh removes and recreates global
/tmp/gh-aw. It escalates tosudo -nwhen the directory or children cannot be removed as the runner. - post.js and clean.sh also clean the global directory.
- Runtime constants distinguish runner-local
${RUNNER_TEMP}/gh-awfrom hardcoded/tmp/gh-awpaths and mounts. Changing RUNNER_TEMP alone does not isolate the latter. - Copilot installation scans
/tmpand removes matching AWF chroot directories. Passing--rootlessremoves sudo but does not make this global cleanup run-scoped. Post-job cleanup also scans those patterns. - Gateway generation uses the fixed container name
awmg-mcpg; shared-daemon resource names also need review before claiming parallel-job support.
Current workaround
Reporter rewrites compiled paths and downloaded setup scripts to /tmp/gh-aw-<uid>-<runner name> and removes sudo calls. This is not a supported allocation contract and does not by itself scope all cleanup.
Requested outcome
- Allocate an owner-private runtime root per job/invocation, with collision-resistant identity across runners, jobs and retries; a runner-name-only suffix is insufficient for full isolation.
- Propagate the allocation through setup, generated paths, container mounts, gateway configuration, logs, detection, artifacts and teardown. Preserve required host/container path translation and visibility boundaries.
- Cleanup only resources belonging to that allocation. Do not delete another job's files or perform broad
/tmpchroot sweeps. Handle unreclaimable stale paths explicitly without requiring sudo on the supported unprivileged path. - Review fixed container names and other shared-daemon resources within the concurrency contract.
- Add a regression with two simultaneous jobs sharing
/tmpand a Docker daemon: setup/installation/cleanup of one must not remove or corrupt the other's active resources. Cover failed/interrupted runs and no-sudo cleanup.
No live run was supplied or executed for this diagnosis. Installer privilege selection and safeoutputs identity are separate issues; neither an AWF version bump nor simply deleting sudo calls resolves the runtime collision.
Reacted by Copilot
Activity