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[static-analysis] RGS-012: Secret Exfiltration via Outbound HTTP Request in visual-regression-checker.lock.ymlΒ #54157
Runner-Guard flagged a run:-adjacent block containing an outbound HTTP request targeting a non-GitHub domain in a job context with secrets/publishing access, a pattern generally associated with credential exfiltration.
Impact
If a job triggered by an untrusted event makes an outbound request carrying secrets to an attacker-controlled domain, it can exfiltrate CI credentials.
Investigation notes (manual review before this run)
The flagged line is a comment listing the Copilot CLI's allowed tool invocations, not executable exfiltration code:
Both targets (host.docker.internal and localhost) are loopback/local-network addresses used to let the agent curl a local dev server (consistent with a visual-regression workflow that screenshots a locally-running app), not an external domain capable of receiving exfiltrated secrets. This looks like a likely false positive: the non-GitHub-domain heuristic doesn't currently special-case loopback/link-local addresses.
Remediation
If confirmed as a false positive, consider excluding loopback addresses (localhost, 127.0.0.1, host.docker.internal) from the "non-GitHub domain" exfiltration heuristic, or suppress this specific rule for comment-only lines (# --allow-tool ...) rather than executable run: content.
Re-verify that no other step in this workflow actually issues an outbound curl to host.docker.internal/localhost carrying secret values as payload β the allow-list only bounds what the agent may call, not proof of what it does call.
Same pattern as previously investigated: the flagged line is a comment listing the Copilot CLI's allowed tool invocations (--allow-tool shell(curl (host.docker.internal/... / localhost/...), not executable exfiltration code β both targets are loopback/local-network addresses. This remains a likely false positive in the non-GitHub-domain heuristic (it doesn't special-case loopback/link-local addresses yet).
This issue remains open. Consider applying the remediation already proposed here (exclude loopback addresses from the heuristic, or suppress the rule for comment-only lines) to stop the recurring alerts.
Activity
github-actions commentedon Aug 20, 2026
πͺ Issue Monster selected this for Copilot
I've identified this issue as a good candidate for automated resolution and requested assignment to the Copilot coding agent.
If assignment succeeds, the Copilot coding agent will analyze the issue and create a pull request with the fix.
Om nom nom! πͺ
github-actions commentedon Aug 21, 2026
π Recurring Finding β 2026-08-21
This finding was detected again in today's static analysis scan.
Workflow run: https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/32448392658
File:
.github/workflows/visual-regression-checker.lock.ymlLine: 879
Same pattern as previously investigated: the flagged line is a comment listing the Copilot CLI's allowed tool invocations (
--allow-tool shell(curl (host.docker.internal/.../localhost/...), not executable exfiltration code β both targets are loopback/local-network addresses. This remains a likely false positive in the non-GitHub-domain heuristic (it doesn't special-case loopback/link-local addresses yet).This issue remains open. Consider applying the remediation already proposed here (exclude loopback addresses from the heuristic, or suppress the rule for comment-only lines) to stop the recurring alerts.
github-actions commentedon Aug 21, 2026
This issue is being closed as outdated. A newer issue has been created: #54435
View newer issue
This action was performed automatically by the
Static Analysis Reportworkflow.