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Strict mode blocks secrets.* in step env: bindings — no secure path for workflows that need external secret managers #25710

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Description

@susmahad

Problem

gh-aw strict mode (default for Copilot engine workflows) blocks all secrets.* expressions inside the user-defined steps: section, including when they are used in step-level env: bindings. This creates a gap for reusable agent workflows that need to pass tool credentials (API tokens, OAuth keys) to CLI tools via environment variables.

Current Behavior

# csdl-pm.md (agent workflow)
steps:
  - name: Export secrets as env vars
    env:
      SONAR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}   # <-- strict mode ERROR
    run: |
      echo "SONAR_TOKEN=${SONAR_TOKEN}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"

Compilation fails with:

error: strict mode: secrets expressions detected in 'steps' section may be leaked
to the agent job. Found: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}, ...
Operations requiring secrets must be moved to a separate job outside the agent job

Why This Is a Problem

Agent workflows that call external APIs (SonarQube, Corona, CIAM, CDETS, Solis, etc.) need tool-specific credentials available as environment variables at runtime. The only way CLI tools can consume these is via process.env / $GITHUB_ENV.

The "move to a separate job" guidance does not work here because:

  1. The agent job IS the job — there is no separate non-agent job in a workflow_call agent workflow that can run setup steps with secrets access.

  2. The workaround of passing secrets as a string input (secrets_json) is insecure — string inputs and job outputs are not masked by GitHub Actions. This defeats the purpose of strict mode by laundering secrets through a less-protected channel.

  3. The secrets: block on workflow_call is the correct, masked transport — but the values can't be consumed because strict mode blocks them in steps.

Workarounds Evaluated

Approach Security Drawback
strict: false in frontmatter Secure (secrets flow via secrets: block, masked by GitHub) Opts out of all strict mode protections, not just this one
Pass secrets as secrets_json string input from a caller pre-job Insecure — string inputs are not masked in logs Defeats the purpose of strict mode entirely

We are currently using strict: false as the least-bad option, but this is a blunt instrument that disables protections we'd like to keep.

Proposed Solutions

Option A: Allow secrets.* in step-level env: bindings

Step-level env: bindings are a controlled, non-leaky surface. The secret value is bound to a named environment variable for that step only. It's functionally equivalent to what the framework's own generated jobs already do. Strict mode should distinguish between:

  • env: FOO: ${{ secrets.FOO }} — safe (controlled binding, masked)
  • run: echo ${{ secrets.FOO }} — unsafe (inline interpolation, potential leak)

Option B: Provide a pre-steps: section

Add a pre-steps: section to the .md frontmatter that runs before the agent job's main steps, with full secrets access. This would allow secret retrieval and $GITHUB_ENV export in a controlled phase that strict mode can audit separately.

pre-steps:
  - name: Export tool credentials
    env:
      SONAR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}
    run: echo "SONAR_TOKEN=${SONAR_TOKEN}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"

steps:
  - name: Install CLI tools
    run: cd .github/workflows/agents/csdl-pm/tools && npm ci

Real-World Use Case

Our csdl-pm agent workflow is a reusable workflow_call agent that orchestrates security scans across 6+ external APIs (SonarQube, Corona, CIAM, CDETS, Solis, Security Insights). It requires 10+ distinct tool credentials:

SONAR_TOKEN, CORONA_TOKEN, CIAM_CLIENT_ID, CIAM_CLIENT_SECRET,
CIAM_TOKEN_URL, CIAM_USER, SOLIS_TOKEN, SI_TOKEN,
CDETS_CONSUMER_KEY, CDETS_CONSUMER_SECRET

Each credential is passed via the secrets: block (properly masked by GitHub) and needs to be exported to $GITHUB_ENV so the agent's bash tool invocations can access them. Setting strict: false is our current workaround, but we lose the other protections strict mode provides.

Environment

  • gh-aw version: v0.68.0
  • Engine: copilot
  • Affected workflow: csdl-pm.md (reusable workflow_call agent with 10+ tool credentials)

Impact

Any agent workflow that calls external APIs with tool-specific credentials is affected. This pattern is common in:

  • Security automation (CSDL scanning, vulnerability management)
  • Migration tooling (calling external CI/CD APIs)
  • CI/CD orchestration agents (registry pushes, deployment APIs)
  • Any agent that integrates with enterprise services behind authentication

Activity

  1. locked and limited conversation to collaborators on Apr 10, 2026
  2. unlocked this conversation on Apr 10, 2026
  3. pelikhan commented on Apr 11, 2026

    @pelikhan
    Collaborator

    @copilot implement option A

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