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2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions docs/architecture/software-factory-design.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2234,6 +2234,8 @@ it observed as a recorded fixture, which is what the simulator's fake GitHub is
| P-56 | Can the Controller's installation token, narrowed to `pull_requests: read` on the canary alone, read a pull request's comments, `GET /repos/{repo}/issues/{n}/comments`, as the seen port reads them; and what is a token, narrowed to `metadata: read` alone, answered for the same read? (decision 0061) | The narrowed token is answered 200 with the comments, each with an id and a user with an id and a type, and GitHub's `x-accepted-github-permissions` names `pull_requests=read`; otherwise the need moves to what it names. **Passed** on 2026-11-01 (`trials/P-56.json`): 200 with five comments, and the header says `issues=read; pull_requests=read`. Recorded, deciding nothing: the `metadata: read` token is answered 200 too, since the canary is public (decision 0068). The private-repo case stays open until a private Consumer repo exists (slice 3) |
| P-57 | Does the merge queue refuse an enqueue whose `expectedHeadOid` is not the pull request's head, and accept one whose is, as the queue step asks it? | Yes: the queue step names the head the Kernel admitted, so a push between the admission and the enqueue makes the enqueue fail and nothing enters the queue (issue 381). A push while the pull request is queued is not asked here: an App's push through the contents API was refused then, 409 (`trials/P-2.queue.json`), and a git push is not recorded. **Passed** on 2026-11-03 (`trials/P-57.json`), in the canary, through the Maintainer's login, the ruleset's approval set aside for the trial and restored: an enqueue naming the head before a push was refused, "Failed to add PR #93: expected head oid does not match the current head oid", with no queue entry, and one naming the current head was queued, then dequeued. GitHub checks the head before the review: unapproved, the stale enqueue was refused for its head and the current one for the code owner's review. The queue App's own token was not used, so its leg is owed |
| P-58 | Does a pull request's `lastEditedAt` move when its description is edited, and not when only its title is, or when its head is pushed; and does an edit by a bot or an App move it? | It moves on a description edit alone, so an enqueue can be held when the description changed after the approval (issue 519). **Passed** on 2026-11-03 (`trials/P-58.json`), in the canary: a title-only edit and a push moved neither `lastEditedAt` nor `userContentEdits`; the Maintainer's description edit moved both, and so did a workflow's bot's, `github-actions`, and the cubic App's own, 23 seconds after the pull request opened. CodeRabbit's summary was an edit too, seen in `userContentEdits` alone, no read falling before the next. `editor` names only the last edit, and `userContentEdits` each, with its `editedAt`; the entry for the opening text takes its `createdAt` from the first later edit. An editor's kind does not make an edit safe: an App's summary is written from the pull request's own text. Whether the reader App's token reads these the same is not asked: that leg is owed, and a rule that reads them waits on it |
| P-59 | On a GitHub-hosted Linux runner, with bubblewrap and the subprocess scrub as the run job has them, is the pinned model CLI, given the read tools alone, held to its working folder: is every read outside it refused, do the folder's own settings or CLAUDE.md take effect, and does any write land? | Yes, held, with the flags a review Run would be given, or the review Role is not given the head to read. **Passed** on 2026-11-04 (`trials/P-59.json`), at 2.1.306, in the canary, with a stand-in model on the runner and no secret: given `--tools Read,Grep,Glob --allowedTools Read,Grep,Glob --permission-mode dontAsk --restricted --setting-sources ""`, each of 18 calls outside the folder was refused, by an absolute path, a `..`, three links, `/proc/self/environ` and its parent's environ, `/proc/self/cwd` through a link, `/proc/self/root` and the home directory, by Read, Grep and Glob alike; no marker from outside reached the model by any route; Bash and Write were no tools; the folder's `.claude` settings, which allowed every path, bypassed every permission and held two hooks and a key helper, did nothing, and its CLAUDE.md and AGENTS.md were not sent. `--restricted` alone held the same. `--setting-sources ""` alone kept the settings and instructions out but held no read: with the scrub set the CLI forces the permission mode to its default, so the allowed tools, named without a path, read anywhere, and Grep read the CLI's own environment and its parent's, which in a Run hold its credential. With neither flag, the settings also ran both hooks and the key helper and the CLAUDE.md was sent. So `--restricted` is what confines and `--setting-sources ""` keeps the head's settings out beside it. Grep does not follow a link inside the folder. The design of the review Role reading the head rests on this; how the head is fetched is P-60 |
| P-60 | Does GitHub serve a commit's tarball as one redirect from api.github.com to codeload.github.com, which answers it with no Authorization header, and does codeload redirect again? | One redirect, so the transport may follow it to codeload alone and refuse any second (the Maintainer's "Tarball, allow codeload", 2026-11-04). **Passed** on 2026-11-04 (`trials/P-60.json`), on the canary, asked with no credential: the API answered 302 to `https://codeload.github.com/<owner>/<repo>/legacy.tar.gz/<sha>`, with no token in it, and codeload answered that with no Authorization header 200, a gzip with no `content-length`, whose tar opens with a pax global header naming the whole commit and holds one folder of directories and regular files. No address on codeload over HTTPS redirected; over plain HTTP it answered 301 to the same address over HTTPS. For a commit the canary does not hold the API still answered 302, and codeload 404. What codeload's Location holds for a private repo, read with an App's token, is not asked: it is owed before a live Run reads a private head |

### 6.1 The order to run them in

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7 changes: 6 additions & 1 deletion sonar-project.properties
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Expand Up @@ -10,9 +10,14 @@ sonar.coverage.exclusions=**/*
# One rule set aside for one file: python:S5332 (clear-text HTTP) on tools/trial_p50_stub.py, P-50's stub of the model's
# API. It serves the pinned CLI on 127.0.0.1 alone, in the canary's workflow and this repo's tests, and HTTPS would need a
# local CA the CLI does not trust. tools/check_repo.py holds it to loopback; decision 0044's Boundaries row says why.
sonar.issue.ignore.multicriteria=p50stubhttp,contexttest,trialapptest
sonar.issue.ignore.multicriteria=p50stubhttp,p50stubxss,contexttest,trialapptest
sonar.issue.ignore.multicriteria.p50stubhttp.ruleKey=python:S5332
sonar.issue.ignore.multicriteria.p50stubhttp.resourceKey=tools/trial_p50_stub.py
# One rule set aside for one file: pythonsecurity:S5131 (reflected XSS) on tools/trial_p50_stub.py. The stub answers the
# pinned CLI on 127.0.0.1 alone, and what it writes is a json.dumps body sent as application/json, never a page. Set aside
# here, not in SonarCloud, by the Maintainer's ruling of 2026-11-04; P-59's fixture holds the stub's bytes, so it is not edited.
sonar.issue.ignore.multicriteria.p50stubxss.ruleKey=pythonsecurity:S5131
sonar.issue.ignore.multicriteria.p50stubxss.resourceKey=tools/trial_p50_stub.py
# One rule set aside for two scripts: shell:S7688 (`[[` in place of `[`). It is style alone, and no finding of it is a
# defect. tools/trial_as_app.sh holds a credential's path and CI cannot run it for real, so it is not edited for style.
sonar.issue.ignore.multicriteria.contexttest.ruleKey=shell:S7688
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