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Description
Convergence latency (deterministic)
Workflow duration across 821 completed run(s) in the window — computed by pr_review_health.sh, not the model.
| Workflow | Runs | min | p50 | p95 | max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
pr-review-trigger.yml |
821 | 1s | 44s | 10m22s | 77m12s |
Run-outcome mix by triggering event
pr-review run conclusions over the window, split by the event that triggered each run — computed deterministically by pr-review-outcomes.sh, not the model. A high cancelled share means runs were evicted while PENDING (concurrency admits one running + one pending per group); a cancelled run is non-blocking but historically rendered as a failing check (#1421).
| Event | success | cancelled | skipped | failure | total | cancel % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
check_suite |
123 | 56 | 30 | 0 | 209 | 26% |
pull_request |
37 | 9 | 0 | 3 | 49 | 18% |
pull_request_review |
48 | 76 | 43 | 3 | 170 | 44% |
repository_dispatch |
120 | 124 | 0 | 2 | 246 | 50% |
workflow_dispatch |
145 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 153 | 5% |
| TOTAL | 473 | 273 | 73 | 8 | 827 | 33% |
Sweep hit-rate (deterministic)
How often the pr-review-sweep scheduled backstop actually had to re-review a PR — computed deterministically by pr-review-sweep-metrics.sh, not the model. The scheduled (cron) path re-dispatches only for genuinely un-eventable cases (GitHub-App / cross-repo checks like SonarCloud that emit no workflow_run); the workflow_run fast path handles every eventable case, so a scheduled re-dispatch is always a case the fast path did not cover.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Scheduled sweep ticks | 35 |
| Ticks that re-dispatched a review (hits) | 35 |
| Sweep hit-rate | 100% |
Interpretation: a low rate confirms the timer stays exception-only (the event fast path is carrying the load); a rising rate is a signal that an eventable case is leaking onto the timer — a hole in the narrowing worth investigating.
PR Review Agent — Health Report
Workflow: pr-review-trigger.yml | Repo: petry-projects/.github-private
Generated: 2026-08-20 | Window: 2026-08-19 → 2026-08-20
1. Executive Summary
Status: WARNING
Period: 2026-08-19T07:22Z → 2026-08-20T06:57Z (~24 h)
Result: 8 of 754 completed runs failed (1.1%) — excluding 73 skipped
Key findings:
- All 8 failures occurred in three tight temporal clusters (≤11 min each), indicating transient systemic events rather than persistent misconfiguration
- No failed-run log content was returned by the log fetcher — root causes cannot be confirmed from logs; assessment is pattern-inference only
- 273 of 827 runs cancelled (33%) — elevated but consistent with concurrency-group churn during high-event-volume windows (02:40–03:20 UTC burst shows ~80 cancellations in 40 min)
Action required: Retrieve and inspect logs for runs #66781, #66784, #66786, #66787 (the 4-failure burst at 19:12–19:13 UTC) to confirm root cause before the pattern recurs.
2. Failure Breakdown
| Failure Category | Affected Runs | Example Error Message |
|---|---|---|
| Transient cluster — 4 rapid failures | #66781, #66784, #66786, #66787 (19:12–19:13 UTC) | (log content not retrieved) |
| Transient cluster — 2 failures | #66746, #66754 (16:04–16:15 UTC) | (log content not retrieved) |
| Transient cluster — 2 failures | #66886, #66937 (02:27–02:33 UTC) | (log content not retrieved) |
| Unknown / unclassified | All 8 | Log fetch returned no content for failed runs |
Note: The
## Failed Run Logssection contained no log content. All category assignments below are inferred from timing patterns. The recommendations section includes steps to retrieve the actual logs.
3. Error Patterns
Pattern A — 4-failure burst (2026-08-19 19:12–19:13 UTC)
- Runs: #66781, #66784, #66786, #66787
- Duration: ~2 minutes, 4 consecutive failures
- Context: Surrounded by cancellations (#66779, #66778, #66782, #66783, #66785) and then immediate recovery (#66789, #66790 succeed at 19:14 UTC)
- Likely cause: A hard failure in the called reusable at
pr-review.yml@pr-review/v1-next— either the reusable itself errored (job-level failure, not step-level), a GitHub Actions infrastructure blip, or a brief token/API outage. The 2-minute total window and immediate recovery argue against a configuration regression.
Pattern B — 2-failure clusters (16:04–16:15 UTC and 02:27–02:33 UTC)
- Runs: #66746, #66754 and #66886, #66937
- Duration: 11 min and 6 min respectively
- Context: Each cluster is preceded and followed by successful runs; cancellations are interleaved (normal concurrency behavior).
- Likely cause: Same class as Pattern A — transient infrastructure or upstream API errors. The reusable call across the job boundary means the outer trigger job can fail with no step-level log if the inner workflow errors before producing output.
Pattern C — High cancellation volume (02:40–03:20 UTC)
- Runs: ~80 cancellations in 40 minutes
- Cause: Expected behavior. A high-volume push or rebase event flooded the trigger queue; the concurrency group cancelled superseded runs. This is not a failure mode — it is the intended behavior of the concurrency strategy.
4. Token Scope Analysis
Scopes granted by the trigger stub
From the workflow source:
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
checks: readThese are passed to the called reusable (pr-review.yml@pr-review/v1-next) via secrets: inherit.
| Scope | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
contents: read |
Present | Required for repo checkout and reading files |
pull-requests: write |
Present | Required for posting review comments |
checks: read |
Present | Required for reading check suite status |
statuses: read |
Not granted | May be needed if the engine reads commit status in addition to checks |
actions: read |
Not granted | May be needed if the reusable inspects other workflow runs |
Assessment
No permission errors are visible in logs (logs were not returned). The scope set matches the declared minimum. If failures are permission-related, the most likely gap is statuses: read (commit statuses vs. check runs are separate APIs). This cannot be confirmed without log content.
Recommendation: If log retrieval reveals 403 errors, add statuses: read to the permissions block. If the reusable calls gh api /repos/.../actions/runs, also add actions: read.
5. Recommendations
1. Retrieve failed-run logs immediately [HIGH]
- What: Run
gh run view <id> --log-failedfor #66781, #66784, #66786, #66787 (the 4-run burst) and #66746, #66754 - Why: All root-cause analysis in this report is inferred from timing. The actual error class (auth, rate limit, engine quota, infra) is unknown.
- Expected impact: Converts this WARNING report to a definitive diagnosis.
- Urgency: HIGH — the 4-failure burst is the largest single event; if it was a rate limit or token error it may recur.
2. Instrument the log fetcher to capture failed-run output [HIGH]
- What: The health-check script that produced this report returned no content for failed runs. Verify that
gh run view --log-failedis being called (not just--log) and that the output is piped into the report. - Why: A health report with empty failure logs cannot diagnose root causes. This is a gap in observability.
- Expected impact: Future reports will include actual error messages.
- Urgency: HIGH — the monitoring tool is partially blind.
3. Add a concurrency guard with a fail-fast timeout [MEDIUM]
- What: In
pr-review-trigger.yml, add atimeout-minutesto thereviewjob (e.g.,timeout-minutes: 20) matching or slightly above the p95 duration (10m22s observed; 20 min gives margin). - Why: Without a timeout, a hung run in the called reusable holds a concurrency slot indefinitely. The 77m12s max duration is an outlier worth bounding.
- Expected impact: Prevents slot starvation during outages; reduces blast radius of stuck runs.
- Urgency: MEDIUM.
4. Alert on cluster failures (≥3 failures within 5 minutes) [MEDIUM]
- What: Add a step in the health-check workflow that fires a notification (GitHub issue, Slack, etc.) when failure count exceeds a threshold within a rolling window.
- Why: The 19:12–19:13 UTC burst (4 failures in 2 min) was self-recovering but went unalerted. If the reusable at
pr-review/v1-nextis broken, the signal is 4 rapid failures — not 1. - Expected impact: Faster human response to systemic events.
- Urgency: MEDIUM.
5. Investigate the 02:40–03:20 UTC cancellation storm [LOW]
- What: Identify what event caused ~80 workflow triggers in 40 minutes (mass-push, rebase flood, or external dispatch).
- Why: The cancellation volume is not harmful but is noisy; if triggered by an automation loop it could mask real failures.
- Expected impact: Reduced noise in run history; cheaper GitHub Actions minutes.
- Urgency: LOW.
6. Health Score
Health: 7/10 — Failure rate is low (1.1%) and self-recovering, but undiagnosed root causes and a blind log fetcher leave the system flying partially instrumented.
Activity