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Covenant parameter struct, an output-pinning helper covering both the P2TR and sub-dust OP_RETURN forms, an asset-lookup helper, the purchase covenant builder, and the four-leaf taptree assembler. Compiles clean under go vet. The covenants have never been executed: the integration suite shells out to the nigiri CLI for funding and block generation, which is unavailable here, so the purchase subtest remains a deliberate t.Fatal placeholder. Design: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-07-dust-free-transfer-covenant-design.md
Adds the recycle and refund covenant builders alongside purchase, a contract assembler that derives all three scripts and the four-leaf taptree from one parameter set, and the asset-packet helpers for issuance, merge and the shorted-amount rejection case. Covers both claim paths (receiver with and without a prior balance of the asset), the shared refund covenant under both its leaves, the bitcoin-payload variant, and five rejection cases. Two notes on what is and is not covered: Leaf 3 asserts the covenant only. The sender's signature is enforced by the tapscript closure, not by the arkade script, so both refund leaves execute the same covenant and are asserted identically. A foreign AssetID is deliberately not tested as a rejection case. The pinned lookup misses on every read, a miss returns (0, 0), and the sum clause degenerates to 0 == 0 + 0 -- so the covenant passes and arkd's asset-balance validation is what rejects the spend. The covenant-level case shorts the pinned asset's amount instead. Compiles under go vet and gofmt. Not executed: the suite drives regtest through the nigiri CLI, which is unavailable in this environment.
Moves the covenant builders out of the _test file into an importable test/covenant package and adds tests that drive them straight through arkade.NewEngine with a synthetic transaction. No arkd, emulator, regtest or nigiri: 21 subtests, about a second. This exists because TestMain in package test calls generateBlock() via the nigiri CLI and log.Fatalf's on failure, so every test in that package dies at startup where nigiri is unavailable. Splitting the builders out also gives a future operator service something to consume rather than reimplementing the scripts. Two defects surfaced by actually executing the covenants: OP_INSPECTINPUTSCRIPTPUBKEY reads FetchVtxoPrevOutPkScript, not FetchPrevOutput. A stub returning nil for it made the recycle covenant abort at its third instruction, so every rejection test passed without reaching the condition it claimed to test. Rejection tests now assert the error code and require an eval-false or verify-family failure. The foreign-AssetID case is not a covenant-level rejection and is recorded as such: the pinned lookup misses on all three reads, a miss returns (0, 0), and the clause degenerates to 0 == 0 + 0. Only arkd's asset-balance validation rejects that spend. Verified: go test ./test/covenant/ -count=1 passes; removing the numInputs guard makes reject_extra_input fail, confirming the guard carries the test. The live-stack test remains unexecuted.
A lookup miss returns (0, 0) -- amount and flag. Dropping the flag on every read meant a wrong AssetID missed everywhere, degenerating the sum clause to 0 == 0 + 0, so the covenant passed with the asset constraint silently unenforced. That covered both a deliberate substitution and an accidental byte-order slip on asset_txid. The flag is now OP_VERIFY'd where the asset must exist (the receiver's merged output, the covenant's own input) and dropped only for the receiver's prior balance, which may legitimately be zero -- the case that lets one script serve receivers with and without a holding. This inverts the severity of the byte-order trap. HTLC v3 records it as producing a silently unspendable contract, which is loud and safe; with a dropped flag it instead produced a vacuously-true asset clause, which is quiet and unsafe. Adds reject_foreign_asset_id and reject_reversed_asset_txid, and makes the test asset_txid non-palindromic so reversing it is meaningful. Verified: go test ./test/covenant/ -count=1 passes; disabling the flag verification makes both new tests accept a spend they must reject.
Three fixes, two from the first CI run and one from review. The claim and refund transactions built their asset packet from the lockup txid. An asset's canonical AssetID is its issuance txid for the asset's whole life and does not change when the asset moves, so the covenant's pinned lookup missed and OP_VERIFY failed. Worth noting the found-flag verification added in the previous commit is what turned this into a loud failure; with the flag dropped it would have passed with the asset clause vacuous. The mint put the sender's share in its own output, but that output uses the same script buildWalletFundedTx sends change to. Two outputs with that script made findTaprootOutput resolve the wrong index on the next call and fail utils_test.go:560. The sender's share now rides on the change output, so only one output ever carries that script, and the lockup returns its balance as fresh change rather than burning it as fee. Params.Validate now rejects a zero Locktime, which would otherwise be always satisfied and make the recovery leaf spendable the moment the covenant is funded. recovery/rejected_before_locktime now asserts the covenant accepts before asserting the submission fails, isolating the rejection to the CLTV closure instead of passing for any unrelated reason.
The second CI run cleared the AssetID and output-index failures and surfaced the next layer: VTXO_ALREADY_SPENT and VTXO_NOT_FOUND. submitWithArkd submits straight to arkd, so the SDK's ListVtxos never observes the spend. buildWalletFundedTx picks its funding input from exactly that stale list, so every subtest after the first was handed a VTXO the previous subtest had already consumed. This is why the existing asset-account prototype calls buildWalletFundedTx once and threads inputs explicitly from there. Resolves the sender's account once via findAccountInput and threads it by hand. Every funding transaction now uses one layout -- receiver account, sender account holding the asset, sender change -- and re-points the tracked VTXO at its change output. Also puts the sender's asset on a dedicated dust output rather than on the change, so successive mints do not inherit unaccounted units from the previous asset, and lets the lockup spend that account whole. The sender's bitcoin commitment is then exactly one dust unit with no change, matching the prototype's phase 1.
The third CI run cleared the stale-vtxo failures and left a race: purchase passed end to end, every later subtest failed with VTXO_NOT_FOUND. arkd registers new VTXOs asynchronously, so spending one immediately after submitting the transaction that created it can lose the race. purchase won it; the rest did not. Uses the existing watchForPreconfirmedVtxos helper, which opens an indexer subscription before submission and blocks until the wanted outputs appear. The subscription must be opened after the outputs are final, since it reads their scriptPubKeys, and before submitting, or the event is missed.
Two causes behind the fourth CI run, which failed with an invalid checkpoint signature and then a cascade of VTXO_ALREADY_SPENT. Sighash commits to the prevout amount, and the wallet resolves an input by script, so two outputs sharing a script in one transaction make it sign for the wrong amount. The funding transaction had the sender's dust account and the sender's change on the same script, since that is the only script the sender's wallet can sign; spending the change signed for the dust output's amount instead. purchase passed only because its lockup spends the first of the two, so the lookup happened to be right. Funding now comes from a separate identity, giving every output in a funding transaction a distinct script. This is the same defect as the findTaprootOutput failure two commits ago, in a different consumer -- never put two outputs with one script in a transaction. The merge claims also spend the receiver's own account, which needs the receiver's signature on both the arkade transaction and its checkpoints; the emulator supplies only the covenant input's. They now sign the way the asset-account prototype's phase 3 does. Covenant-only spends are unchanged, which is why purchase and recovery were unaffected.
The fifth CI run cleared the invalid checkpoint signature. What remained was the funding transaction after the first: submitWithArkd succeeded and its input was spent, but the vtxo subscription reported got 0/3 and timed out, and every later subtest then reused the stale input and saw VTXO_ALREADY_SPENT. The transaction was accepted, so the outputs existed and the subscription simply did not deliver. Each funding transaction opened a fresh subscription over scripts an earlier subscription had already registered and then removed on cleanup. Rather than depend on that behaviour, wait by polling the indexer for the transaction itself, which is the same call findAccountInput already relies on. Also emits asset outputs in vout order. Ranging the amounts map directly left the order to Go's randomised map iteration, so a packet with more than one output could differ between runs -- latent rather than the cause here, since the failing case was reproducible.
The sixth CI run showed the previous wait checked the wrong condition. GetVirtualTxs returns a transaction before arkd has registered its outputs as spendable, so the funding transaction was confirmed indexed and the lockup that spent one of its outputs still failed with VTXO_NOT_FOUND. Polls GetVtxos for the specific outpoints instead, requiring each to be present and unspent, which is the condition the next spend actually depends on. Also corrects the lockup's wait to its single output, and takes indexer and types from arkd/pkg/client-lib, which is where this tree gets them.
Addresses the three findings in arkana-ai-bot's review. Purchase and refund enforce the asset constraint with the same required-lookup pattern as recycle, but only recycle had rejection tests for it. Since a silently unenforced asset clause is the exact defect this design fixes, every script that enforces it now covers a foreign AssetID, a reversed asset_txid, and a shorted amount. Adds TestBitcoinVariantRefund. The refund path with no asset drops the asset clauses and still has to pin both sub-dust payouts, which TestRefund cannot reach because it runs with an asset. Also records why BuildPurchase does not pin the input count, which the review flagged as an unexplained asymmetry with BuildRecycle: purchase reads only in[0] and ties out[0] to it, so an extra input flows to the spender's own outputs and cannot divert the covenant. 30 subtests, up from 21. Mutation-checked: disabling the found-flag verification makes all six foreign-id and reversed-txid tests accept spends they must reject.
Seven runs in, the integration failure reduces to one reproducible difference. A funding transaction that spends a settled VTXO succeeds every time -- purchase has passed since run 3. A funding transaction that spends the previous funder's change, an output of an earlier arkade transaction, fails with an invalid signature in its checkpoint. The lockup spending the sender's dust account, also an arkade transaction output, succeeds, so it is the chaining that matters rather than the output's provenance. Why the chained case fails sits inside checkpoint construction and is not visible from the test side. Rather than keep guessing at it across ten minute CI cycles, this follows the pattern the suite demonstrably supports: the asset-account prototype also funds once and only ever spends that transaction's first output. Each fundAccounts call now settles its own funder and its change is never reused, which also removes the cross-subtest coupling behind the failures in runs 2 through 7.
The per-call funder took the integration test from one passing subtest to three: purchase and both recovery paths now pass end to end. The three that remain all use recycle, and two of them fail locally with "previous output not found" before any submission. PrevArkTxField is not set automatically. executeArkadeScripts and the emulator skip inputs that lack it, so FetchVtxoPrevOutPkScript returns nil and OP_INSPECTINPUTSCRIPTPUBKEY cannot resolve the input it inspects. cross_input_script_validation_test.go:345-346 sets it on both inputs for exactly this reason. This explains the failing set precisely. Recycle is the only covenant that inspects a second input; purchase reads input values instead, which resolve through FetchPrevOutput and the PSBT's witness UTXO, which is why it has been passing. recycle/receiver_holds_prior_balance also fails earlier, with an invalid checkpoint signature on its funding transaction. That one is not yet explained and is unaffected by this change.
Run nine reached five of six subtests passing. The one that remains, recycle/receiver_holds_prior_balance, differs from the passing receiver_holds_zero in exactly one way: its issuance packet has two asset outputs rather than one, and its funding transaction then fails to finalize with an invalid checkpoint signature. ark-lib places no limit on issuance output count, and multi-output transfers demonstrably work -- the asset-account prototype's routing packet splits across three outputs and that test is green on master. So this restructures around the shape already known to work rather than around a rule. The funding transaction now issues everything to a single output, the sender's account, funded with two dust units. The lockup splits that account into the covenant and the receiver's account in one transfer, which is also where the receiver's prior balance now comes from. Both dust units still come from the funder, so the sender's own bitcoin commitment is unchanged. Recycle's second input is consequently an output of the lockup rather than of the funding transaction, so both its inputs share one previous arkade transaction.
Addresses the second arkana-ai-bot review. M1: LeafRefundSender had no integration coverage. It shares the refund covenant with LeafRecovery but not its closure, and it is the only leaf carrying a human key, so the end-to-end path -- sender signs the arkade transaction and its checkpoints, emulator signs, arkd accepts -- was never exercised. Added, with the sender signing the way the asset-account prototype's merge does. M3: the hardcoded vtxoMinAmount is now asserted rather than assumed. The refund reserves exactly that many sats for the sender's returned payload, so arkd accepting the recovery transaction is what validates the constant; a higher configured minimum would reject it. S1: BuildPurchase in bitcoin mode terminates through the asset-free branch, which no test reached -- the bitcoin recycle tests exercise a different script. Added valid and two rejection cases. S2: Params.Validate now requires the three keys to be distinct. Receiver equal to operator is the dangerous collapse: the operator could satisfy recycle while paying the top-up repayment to itself, collecting both sides. No signature check catches that, since each role's key is legitimately its own. 38 subtests in test/covenant, up from 30.
Review pointed out the assertion added for M3 is true by construction: once RefundTopup has been applied, dust-topup == vtxoMinAmount whenever the operator funded the whole dust unit, so the equality can never fail. The comment claimed it validated the constant, which it did not. What actually validates it is arkd accepting the recovery transaction with a dust-topup sat output, which a higher configured minimum would reject. The comment now says that, and the assertion checks the property that is not free: the payload is genuinely sub-dust.
Resolves the §8.4 fork: when the receiver never recycles, the operator's carrier sats must not be stranded and the receiver must not lose the asset. BuildReclaim recovers the carrier and pins the asset to a hosted receipt for the receiver, gated behind a long CLTV. It is the refund split with one substitution -- vout 1 pays the receiver, not the sender -- and that substitution is the entire hazard. Running refund after a claim returns the asset to a sender who has already been paid for it. The two scripts differ by a key, not by a signature, so nothing but the engine catches a swap; TestReclaim asserts both directions refuse the other's payout. The leaf carries no sender key. Per the design the signer set is itself the hazard, so the post-claim path must not be reachable by the party already paid. It is also opt-in: a zero ReclaimLocktime omits the leaf and leaves the four-leaf tree untouched, so existing contracts keep their addresses. Validation requires the backstop to mature after Locktime, since maturing first would let the operator reclaim from under a live claim. Verified by mutation, each killed by the test that owns the property: paying the sender instead of the receiver, adding the sender to the leaf signer set, and dropping the locktime ordering check. This replaces the parallel implementation I had in pkg/arkade. That file rebuilt these covenants as test-local helpers and disagreed with this package on signer sets, dust handling and byte layout; every property it asserted is either already covered here or moved into the tests above.
Resolves the HIGH severity Trivy finding. gRPC-Go xDS servers could crash on a missing field. v1.83.2 is the patch release for the v1.83.x line.
Add backward-compatible optional Params.RecoveryRecipient and Params.ClaimMode to the dust-free carrier covenant reference. RecoveryRecipient is empty / "sender" / "receiver". Empty and sender keep the legacy programs byte-identical. Receiver is for an already-settled asset delivery: every recovery and refund leaf pays the receiver and never the seller already paid. It needs an asset and a receipt-capable split, since an asset cannot occupy an output alone. ClaimMode is empty / "recycle" / "purchase". A set mode disables the other claim closure by tweaking its co-signer with the OP_FALSE payload rather than using a naked OP_FALSE tapscript, which arkd does not admit. The four leaf indexes and the two-key multisig closure shape are kept. Accounting: Topup=330, Dust=330, min=1 recovers 329 and hosts one sat of receipt. UnrecoveredTopup exposes the hosting allocation so a quote can reserve it; no transaction economics change here. genvectors gains the receiver and claim-mode fixtures plus an assertion that re-derives the 10 published legacy vectors byte for byte. The fixture comparison normalizes line endings because core.autocrlf rewrites the checked-out file.
RecoveryRecipient=receiver only makes sense when there is an asset to host. The existing guard gated the whole receipt check on AssetID != nil, so a nil-asset carrier with receiver recovery passed Validate and would have paid the receiver a receipt for nothing. Split the check: reject receiver+nil outright, and keep the receipt-room guard for the asset case. Regression tests cover both branches.
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No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. 🎉 ℹ️ Recent review info
WalkthroughAdds covenant parameters, validation, and taproot script builders for asset and bitcoin transfers. Adds receiver-fare handling and tests covenant execution through direct engine tests, reference vectors, and emulator-backed scenarios. ChangesCovenant script flows
Priority: ⬆️ High Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Change: Other Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant TestDustCovenant
participant CovenantScripts
participant ArkadeEmulator
participant Indexer
TestDustCovenant->>CovenantScripts: Build and execute covenant spend
TestDustCovenant->>ArkadeEmulator: Submit covenant spend
ArkadeEmulator-->>TestDustCovenant: Return submission result
TestDustCovenant->>Indexer: Query indexed unspent outputs
Indexer-->>TestDustCovenant: Return output scripts, values, and asset units
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to
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Docstring coverage is 56.36% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 55 functions across 4 files. (2 skipped: … | Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold. |
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Check name Status Explanation Linked Issues check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Out of Scope Changes check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Description Check Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled. Title check The title clearly identifies the main changes: taxi carrier covenant tests and generated vectors. It is concise and specific.
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Docstring coverage is 56.36% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 55 functions across 4 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.)
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In `@test/covenant/covenant.go`:
- Around line 96-101: Update the reclaim locktime validation in the parameter
validation flow to reject mixed absolute locktime types before comparing their
numeric values. Use the CLTV locktime threshold to require ReclaimLocktime and
Locktime to both be block heights or both be timestamps, while preserving the
existing ordering check for matching types.
In `@test/dust_covenant_test.go`:
- Line 584: Update the pre-locktime rejection test to set p.Locktime to a future
timestamp so subtracting one keeps tx.UnsignedTx.LockTime timestamp-typed.
Capture the submitToEmulator error and assert it identifies the CLTV locktime
bound, rather than accepting any error.
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go.modtest/covenant/covenant.gotest/covenant/covenant_test.gotest/covenant/genvectors/main_test.gotest/covenant/genvectors/testdata/published_legacy_vectors.jsontest/covenant/genvectors/testdata/taxi_carrier_vectors.jsontest/dust_covenant_test.go
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Validate ordered ReclaimLocktime after Locktime by plain integer comparison. Absolute locktimes below 500,000,000 are block heights and the rest are UNIX timestamps, so the order means nothing across types: Locktime=800000 (a height) with ReclaimLocktime=500000001 (a 1985 timestamp) passed, and the reclaim leaf's CLTV was satisfied at once, letting the operator reclaim from under a live claim window. The reverse mix was rejected only by accident of magnitude. Require both to be the same type before ordering them, using ark-lib's AbsoluteLocktime.IsSeconds so the threshold is the one arkd and offchain.BuildTxs apply. The generated fixtures are unaffected: every vector with a reclaim locktime pairs two heights. genvectors -update rewrites taxi_carrier_vectors.json byte-identically and TestLegacyStillMatchesPublishedVectors still passes. Addresses CodeRabbit review comment 4080286109 on #159.
recovery/rejected_before_locktime back-dated the ark tx's nLockTime to 499,999,999 and accepted any error from the emulator. Neither the emulator nor arkd evaluates the CLTV closure against nLockTime. arkd rebuilds the ark tx with offchain.BuildTxs, which sets nLockTime from the closure, and rejects a txid mismatch (ARK_TX_MISMATCH). The back-dated tx was rejected for that, so the subtest would still pass with arkd's locktime check removed. arkd v0.9.13 enforces a CLTV closure against the chain tip's median time past (FORFEIT_CLOSURE_LOCKED), before it checks any signature. The subtest now: - sets a timestamp locktime 24h ahead, which no regtest MTP reaches and which stays seconds-typed (this stack's 512s tree expiry makes arkd reject height-typed CLTV closures outright); - keeps the nLockTime BuildTxs produces, so arkd's rebuild matches; - submits the unsigned tx straight to arkd and requires FORFEIT_CLOSURE_LOCKED, since the emulator reports every failure as "internal error"; - still requires the emulator path to reject. A rejected offchain submit records no conviction, so the direct submit cannot ban anything a later subtest uses. Addresses CodeRabbit review comment 4080286127 on #159.
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Status: Two commits since 1b44e9ac — a master merge + one import-path fixup. All 2 prior required changes remain fixed; 0 new blocking issues.
Prior-issue closure
Required #1 — Integration tests for LeafReclaim and receiver-recovery
Fixed (8225eb0 + 657f8ce, confirmed in the previous pass). This diff does not touch those paths.
Required #2 — spend.clone() shallow-copies the packet
Fixed (085bfec + TestSpendCloneIsDeep, confirmed in the previous pass). This diff does not touch the clone method.
Non-blocking — ClaimMode doc comments
Fixed (657f8ce, confirmed in prior acknowledgment). Closed.
Non-blocking — referenceRevision / 49ae96d repin
Still open — this remains a mandatory post-merge task on arkade-taxi. The new commits do not affect it. 49ae96d must stay reachable until arkade-taxi repins gen-vectors.mjs.
Incremental findings — d365a0a + 63eb9e4
The two commits since 1b44e9ac are:
-
d365a0a— merge oforigin/master(PRs #102, #154, #155, #156, #161), all previously reviewed and merged to master. These touchinternal/application,pkg/emulator,go.mod/go.sum, Docker, and CI — none of it is covenant logic. -
63eb9e4—test/covenant/covenant.go(+1/−1),test/covenant/covenant_test.go(+3/−3),test/dust_covenant_test.go(+9/−10). All changes are import-path rewrites to btcd's v0.26 module split:btcd/txscript→btcd/txscript/v2btcd/chaincfg/chainhash→btcd/chainhash/v2btcd/wire→btcd/wire/v2btcd/btcutil/psbt→btcd/psbt/v2arkd/pkg/client-lib/indexer+.../types→arkd/pkg/client-lib(types promoted to root)
No logic changes. The genvectors JSON fixtures are untouched (0 additions, 0 deletions), confirming the commit-message claim that script bytes are identical under the new import paths.
The
go.modwas already updated on master by #161 and the merge carries it forward, so the module graph is consistent without a separatego mod tidy.
Nothing in this diff touches signing, VTXO construction, asset introspection, taptree shape, locktime checks, or any covenant script path. The incremental risk is minimal.
Bottom line
All prior required changes are fixed. The incremental delta is mechanical import-path adaptation with no semantic effect on the covenant scripts or their tests. The PROTOCOL-CRITICAL flag from the initial review stands — human sign-off on the overall covenant design is required before mainnet use. The referenceRevision repin on arkade-taxi remains the one outstanding post-merge task.
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Status: One commit since 63eb9e4 — applies the refund-payout minimum to all recipient types. All prior required changes remain fixed; 0 new blocking issues.
Prior-issue closure
Required #1 — Integration tests for LeafReclaim and receiver-recovery
Fixed (8225eb0 + 657f8ce, confirmed in the previous pass). This diff does not touch those paths.
Required #2 — spend.clone() shallow-copies the packet
Fixed (085bfec + TestSpendCloneIsDeep, confirmed in previous pass). This diff does not touch the clone method.
Non-blocking — ClaimMode doc comments
Fixed (confirmed in prior pass). No change.
Non-blocking — referenceRevision / 49ae96d repin
Still open — post-merge task on arkade-taxi; this commit does not affect it. 49ae96d and d4771c8 must remain reachable until arkade-taxi repins gen-vectors.mjs and vectors.test.ts.
CodeRabbit inline — apply minimum check regardless of RecoveryRecipient
Fixed in b1f07540 — see below.
Incremental findings — b1f07540
Commit message: fix(covenant): enforce refund payout minimum for every recipient
test/covenant/covenant.go:138–145 — guard removed on RefundTopup minimum
Previously p.RefundTopup(vtxoMinAmount) < vtxoMinAmount was gated behind p.RecoveryRecipient == RecoveryReceiver. The gate is now removed so the check fires for sender, default, and receiver recovery alike.
This is correct. RefundTopup computes what the operator recovers from the refund leaves (min(Topup, Dust − vtxoMinAmount)). A payout below vtxoMinAmount is an unspendable output regardless of which role holds the complementary receipt — the recipient type does not change the output dust constraint. Restricting the check to receiver recovery was the defect.
Ordering remains sound (covenant.go:136–145): the ReceiverFare != nil && RecoveryRecipient != RecoveryReceiver guard fires before this case, so any fare-carrying params value has RecoveryRecipient == RecoveryReceiver when the minimum check is reached. No interaction with the fare validation ordering.
Double invocation of RefundTopup (covenant.go:140–141): called once in the condition and once in the format string. RefundTopup is a pure function with no side effects, so double-evaluation is safe and correct.
test/covenant/covenant_test.go:663–695 — updated and new validation tests
rejects_receiver_recovery_with_subminimum_operator_payout: error-string assertion updated to match the new format; logically unchanged.rejects_sender_recovery_with_subminimum_operator_payout: new test, covers both explicitRecoverySenderand empty/default recipient.params(t, true)constructs a non-fare params value (noReceiverFare), which is the correct fixture for this path — a fare-carrying params value cannot have sender recovery (Validaterejects it earlier). Coverage is complete.
No new findings
This is a one-line logic fix plus two validation tests. No signing logic, no script bytes, no VTXO construction, and no fixture data were modified. The incremental risk is negligible.
The PROTOCOL-CRITICAL flag from the initial review stands — human sign-off on the overall covenant design is required before mainnet use.
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PROTOCOL-CRITICAL: human review required.
Status: 1 new commit since b1f0754 — a merge of master (PR #162, indexer-dep refactor). All covenant files unchanged. 2 prior required issues remain Fixed (unchanged). 0 new required changes.
Prior-issue closure
Required #1 — Integration tests for LeafReclaim and receiver-recovery
Fixed (8225eb0, confirmed in earlier passes). No change in this diff.
Required #2 — spend.clone() shallow-copies the packet
Fixed (085bfec, confirmed in earlier passes). No change in this diff.
Non-blocking — ClaimMode doc comments
Fixed (657f8ce, confirmed in earlier passes). No change in this diff.
Non-blocking — requirePaid unbounded vout index (test/dust_covenant_test.go:423)
Still open (unchanged). The risk is a panic instead of a diagnostic failure on an unexpected vout. No change in this diff; still non-blocking.
Post-merge task — referenceRevision / 49ae96d repin on arkade-taxi
Still open as a post-merge task. Unchanged from prior passes. Branches keeping 49ae96d and d4771c8 reachable must not be deleted until arkade-taxi has repinned gen-vectors.mjs and refreshed receiver-vectors.json.
Incremental findings — PR #162 merge
The entire diff is the promotion of PR #162 ("Delete Indexer deps from pkg/emulator") into this branch. No covenant or test-vector files changed. Findings below are scoped to the merged infrastructure change.
1 · Commitment-tx validation moved from pkg/emulator to internal/application (design observation, non-blocking)
pkg/emulator/finalization.go:23–25 now reads:
// Callers must check the commitment tx is known to arkd before calling:
// a client-chosen commitment tx would let a replayed proof bypass the
// arkade script execution that justified it.
if finalization.CommitmentTx == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("commitment tx is required")
}The indexer check has been extracted to internal/application/service.go:SubmitFinalization, which retries against s.indexer.GetCommitmentTx before delegating to the pkg layer. TestSubmitFinalizationRejectsUnknownCommitmentTx (application/finalize_test.go) proves the signer is unreachable on an unknown commitment tx — the test passes a nil embedded emulator.Service so any reach-through would panic. ✓
The security property is preserved at the production path (application.service is the only gRPC-exposed implementation). pkg/emulator is a public package (pkg/); its Service interface now documents the invariant by comment rather than enforcement. No other repo imports pkg/emulator directly (grepped all SDK/solver/arkd clones — zero hits), so there is no immediate blast radius. This is an acceptable boundary shift provided the package is treated as an internal implementation detail; worth a doc note if it ever surfaces as a standalone library.
2 · Intent.RequiredVtxos() vin-0 skip — comment is weaker than the invariant it expresses (pkg/emulator/intent.go:RequiredVtxos(), non-blocking)
for _, vin := range vins {
// input 0 is the message input, it reuses input 1's script
if vin == 0 {
continue
}
outpoints = append(outpoints, ptx.UnsignedTx.TxIn[vin].PreviousOutPoint)
}The comment says "reuses input 1's script," but the safety of the skip in expiryForScript depends on vin 0 and vin 1 sharing the same PreviousOutPoint (so the map entry fetched for vin 1 covers vin 0's lookup). SubmitIntent validates script identity (bytes.Equal(Inputs[0].WitnessUtxo.PkScript, Inputs[1].WitnessUtxo.PkScript)) but not outpoint identity. If, in a future variant, vin 0 has a distinct outpoint, expiryForScript would return "vtxo not found" silently. Suggest updating the comment to say explicitly that vin 0 and vin 1 reference the same VTXO outpoint, not merely the same script.
3 · OffchainTx.RequiredVtxos() / Intent.RequiredVtxos() — correct and well-tested
TestSubmitIntentPushExpiry and TestExpiryForScriptOnlyNeedsExpiryForPushExpiry (intent_test.go) cover the map-lookup path and the no-expiry fast path. TestFetchOffchainData (application/finalize_test.go) exercises the retry, the first-attempt-failure-then-success path, and the nil-indexer short-circuit. No gaps.
4 · Retry config variance (internal/application/retry.go)
indexerRetryConfig (new): MaxAttempts: 4, MaxElapsed: 15s, InitialDelay: 500ms, Multiplier: 2.0. At worst 500 + 1000 + 2000 + 4000 ms = 7.5s before MaxElapsed fires. Fits within a gRPC deadline; tighter than the old commitmentTxRetryConfig (8 attempts), which is intentional for the request path. ✓
5 · Cross-repo impact — none
pkg/emulator.Service interface changed (SubmitTx/SubmitIntent now take OffchainData; Close() removed). Grepped all SDK, solver, arkd, go-sdk, and fulmine clones: zero imports of arkade-os/emulator/pkg/emulator. No cross-repo breakage.
Bottom line
This diff is a clean infrastructure refactor. The security invariant against replayed commitment-tx proofs is preserved at the application layer with a direct test. The covenant script logic, test vectors, and integration tests are entirely unchanged. The PROTOCOL-CRITICAL flag from the initial review remains for overall human sign-off on the covenant correctness; no new blocking issues in this increment.
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PROTOCOL-CRITICAL: human review required.
Status: 1 commit since last pass (a67bf99); 0 prior required changes remain; 0 new issues found.
Prior-issue closure
Required #1 — Integration tests for LeafReclaim and receiver-recovery
Fixed (8225eb0, confirmed in prior passes). Unchanged in this diff.
Required #2 — spend.clone() shallow-copies the packet
Fixed (085bfec, confirmed in prior passes). Unchanged in this diff.
Non-blocking — requirePaid unbounded vout index (test/dust_covenant_test.go)
Fixed in a67bf99. The added line:
require.Less(t, uint64(v.VOut), uint64(len(want)), "unexpected vout %d", v.VOut)sits immediately before want[v.VOut] and converts a potential out-of-bounds panic into a named testify assertion. The uint64 cast is correct: v.VOut is uint32, len(want) is non-negative, and the comparison is equivalent to what I suggested. This is the exact advisory from my last pass, correctly addressed.
Non-blocking — referenceRevision repin
Still open as a post-merge task on arkade-taxi. No change in this commit; branches keeping 49ae96d reachable must not be deleted until the repin is confirmed. Unchanged from prior status.
Incremental findings on a67bf99
None. The diff is one line in one test file; covenant logic, vectors, and fixtures are untouched.
Bottom line
The bounds guard closes the last observation from my previous pass. All required changes are fixed. The PROTOCOL-CRITICAL flag from the initial review stands for overall human sign-off on covenant correctness before mainnet use; the incremental delta here is minimal.
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Status: One merge commit since a67bf999 — no covenant code changed; all prior required changes remain Fixed; 0 new blocking issues.
Prior-issue closure
Required #1 — Integration tests for LeafReclaim and receiver-recovery
Fixed (unchanged since last pass — covered in the a67bf999 batch).
Required #2 — spend.clone() shallow-copies the packet
Fixed (unchanged since last pass).
requirePaid bounds advisory (test/dust_covenant_test.go)
Fixed in a67bf999 (confirmed last pass).
Mixed-type locktime validation (test/covenant/covenant.go:96–101)
Fixed (unchanged since ca00c9c, confirmed last pass).
Incremental delta: a67bf999 → 32d76f06
Exactly one meaningful change: the merge commit brings in 1203f90 from master, which removes three lines from verifyTreeRelatedToCommitment (internal/interface/grpc/handlers/emulator_handler.go:254):
// removed by #163:
if len(txTree.Root.Inputs) != len(commitmentPtx.UnsignedTx.TxIn) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid number of inputs")
}The guard was comparing the PSBT Inputs slice of the tree root (always length 1 for a valid tree — enforced by the next check, len(txTree.Root.UnsignedTx.TxIn) != 1) against the commitment transaction's TxIn count (which is arbitrary and unrelated to the tree root). The comparison was vacuously wrong: any commitment transaction with ≠ 1 input would fail the check even when the tree is perfectly valid. Removing it is correct. The remaining guards — tree-root single-input check, hash linkage to the commitment txid, and index-in-range check — are sufficient and untouched.
No covenant logic, no test files, no vector fixtures, and no go.mod changed in this increment. The PR description's note ("this PR does not touch that file") is accurate.
Standing items (unchanged from previous passes)
- PROTOCOL-CRITICAL flag stands. Human sign-off on the covenant script logic is required before this code funds mainnet VTXOs. The covenant implementation is the canonical source for downstream vector consumers (arkade-taxi, ts-sdk); a logic error here propagates to every implementation that ingests those fixtures.
referenceRevision/49ae96drepin must be completed on arkade-taxi after merge, before the head branch (feat/unified-carrier-policy) and the provenance branches (feat/taxi-intents,test/dust-free-transfer-covenant) are deleted. This is a mandatory post-merge operational task as described in the PR body.
No new findings on the incremental diff.
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PROTOCOL-CRITICAL: human review required.
Status: 1 commit since 32d76f0 (d608def7 — refactor(covenant): share recovery payout assembly). All prior required changes remain Fixed. 0 new required changes. 0 prior required changes outstanding.
Prior-issue closure
Required #1 — Integration tests for LeafReclaim and receiver-recovery
Fixed (8225eb0, confirmed in the c2beda8 batch). d608def7 does not touch this coverage.
Required #2 — spend.clone() shallow-copies the packet
Fixed (085bfec + TestSpendCloneIsDeep). d608def7 does not touch this.
Non-blocking — ClaimMode doc comments
Fixed (657f8ce). d608def7 does not touch this.
Non-blocking — requirePaid unbounded vout index (test/dust_covenant_test.go:423)
Still open (minor, non-blocking). d608def7 does not touch dust_covenant_test.go. No regression; same characterisation as the prior pass.
Non-blocking — referenceRevision / 49ae96d repin
Still open as a mandatory post-merge task on arkade-taxi. Branches keeping 49ae96d reachable must not be deleted until arkade-taxi's gen-vectors.mjs and receiver-vectors.json / its asserted referenceRevision are updated to the resulting master commit.
Incremental finding on d608def7
Refactoring correctness — verified ✓
d608def7 extracts buildRecovery(p Params, vtxoMinAmount int64, recipient *btcec.PublicKey) from the now-identical bodies of BuildRefund and BuildReclaim (test/covenant/covenant.go:337). The only variable between the two callers was the key pinned to vout 1:
BuildRefund(non-receiver-recovery path) →buildRecovery(p, vtxoMinAmount, p.SenderKey)— identical to the removed inline block.BuildReclaim→buildRecovery(p, vtxoMinAmount, p.ReceiverKey)— identical to the oldBuildReclaimbody.
The pinOutput(b, 0, p.OperatorKey, ...), pinOutput(b, 1, recipient, ...), appendAssetLookup calls, and finish are structurally unchanged; buildRecovery is not exported and cannot be called from outside this package. No economic logic, no script bytes, no signing paths are affected.
Coverage confirming byte identity:
TestRecoveryRecipient/old_sender_refund_rejects_under_both_recovery_scripts(covenant_test.go:967) assertshex(s.Refund) == hex(s.Reclaim)whenRecoveryRecipient == RecoveryReceiver— the shared-builder property remains testable.TestReceiverFareLeavesOtherLeavesAlone(covenant_test.go:1278) assertsbareScripts.Refund,bareScripts.Reclaim,bareScripts.Purchaseare byte-identical with and without a fare, andTestFixtures/TestLegacyStillMatchesPublishedVectorspin all generated script bytes against the published fixtures.- CI at
d608def7: format, lint, unit, Docker integration, and Build and Scan all pass per the PR description.
No new blocking issues.
Bottom line
This commit is a mechanical deduplication with no observable change to script bytes, economic constraints, or test outcomes. The PROTOCOL-CRITICAL flag from the initial review stands for overall human sign-off on the covenant logic; the incremental delta here is low risk.
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PROTOCOL-CRITICAL: human review required.
Incremental status: 9 commits since d608def, all base-sync (merging master PRs #165–168) + CVE patch (ce7fc1e). No covenant files changed. 0 required changes this pass; all prior required findings remain Fixed.
Prior-issue closure
Required #1 — Integration tests for LeafReclaim and receiver-recovery
Fixed (8225eb0 + 657f8ce, confirmed in prior passes). Unchanged here.
Required #2 — spend.clone() shallow-copies the packet
Fixed (085bfec, prior pass). Unchanged here.
Non-blocking — requirePaid unbounded vout index (test/dust_covenant_test.go:422)
Fixed (a67bf99, 2026-09-30 — before d608def). The require.Less(t, uint64(v.VOut), uint64(len(want)), ...) assertion is present at line 422. I incorrectly carried this as "still open" in my d608def review; it was already in place. Apologies for the noise.
Non-blocking — ClaimMode constant doc comments
Fixed (657f8ce, prior pass). Confirmed.
Non-blocking — referenceRevision / arkade-taxi repin
Still open as a post-merge task. Unchanged. Branches keeping 49ae96d and d4771c8 reachable must not be deleted before arkade-taxi repins gen-vectors.mjs and updates the referenceRevision asserted in packages/covenant/test/vectors.test.ts.
Non-blocking — no emulator-backed test for fare on Recycle leaf
Still open (intentionally deferred per PR description). Non-blocking.
Incremental findings — d608def → ce7fc1e
The nine commits are entirely infrastructure: three base-sync/module-pin commits, four upstream-merged PRs absorbed from master (#165 README, #166 containsPubKey removal, #167 onchain-output admission, #168 Go bump), and the CVE patch.
containsPubKey removal (pkg/emulator/onchain.go and pkg/emulator/finalization.go, da929b7 / master #166)
The removed check in SubmitOnchainTx (onchain.go:47–52 in the prior version):
if containsPubKey(script.ClosurePubKeys(), s.arkdPubKey) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tapscript on input #%d contains arkd signer pubkey: can't be used onchain", …)
}and the analogous guard in validateFinalizationInput:
if !containsPubKey(a.script.ClosurePubKeys(), arkdPubKey) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("input %d: finalization leaf does not require the arkd signer", …)
}both compared against the plain arkdPubKey. All valid arkade scripts embed the tweaked form (ComputeArkadeScriptPublicKey(arkdKey, ArkadeScriptHash(script))), so:
- The
SubmitOnchainTxguard would never fire for real inputs — it was dead code once the tweaked-key model was adopted. Removing it is a cleanup; it does not re-open any bypass path. - The
validateFinalizationInputguard was a latent bug: it would reject every valid finalization submission (tweaked key, plain check → always false).TestSubmitFinalizationAcceptsTweakedArkdLeaf(finalization_test.go:371) pins the correct behaviour — both the current and deprecated signers, in tweaked form, now finalize successfully. This is a genuine bug fix.
The security property the original comment described ("arkd-key inputs must go through SubmitTx so forfeit/checkpoint checks fire") is now a protocol-layer convention enforced by arkd and the client, not an emulator-level gate. That is architecturally appropriate given the tweaked-key model. No regression.
Onchain output admission (pkg/emulator/intent.go, a42a1d5 / master #167)
Removes:
if len(m.OnchainOutputIndexes) > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("onchain outputs are not supported")
}This is a deliberate policy expansion: the emulator now accepts intents that include on-chain output indexes (direct L1 exits as part of a round settlement). The intent signing path is unchanged; the round lifecycle checks remain in arkd. TestSubmitIntentAcceptsOnchainOutputs pins that the emulator signs the proof when OnchainOutputIndexes is set. No protocol regression visible in this diff.
Dependency updates
golang.org/x/netv0.58.0 → v0.60.0: patches CVE-2026-78669 / GO-2026-6611 (HTTP/2 settings denial of service). Correct and necessary; consistent with the PR description.- Go toolchain 1.26.6 → 1.26.9 across all
go.modfiles, Dockerfile, and CI workflows. CI workflows now derive the version fromgo.modviago-version-filerather than a hardcoded pin — good practice. - Internal module pins:
api-spec,pkg/arkade,pkg/client,pkg/emulatorpromoted to stablev0.1.xsemver tags.
Bottom line
The covenant logic, test coverage, and vector fixtures are unchanged in this incremental. The infrastructure changes are correct: the containsPubKey removal fixes a latent finalization bug, the CVE patch is necessary, and the onchain-output policy change is intentional. No new required changes. The PROTOCOL-CRITICAL flag from the initial review stands for overall human sign-off on the covenant logic before mainnet use.
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PROTOCOL-CRITICAL: human review required.
Status: 5 upstream commits merged in 60f7cd4; all prior issues resolved; 0 required changes remain.
Prior-issue closure
Required #1 — Integration tests for LeafReclaim and receiver-recovery
Fixed before the ce7fc1e baseline (8225eb0 + 657f8ce). Unchanged in this diff.
Required #2 — spend.clone() shallow-copies the packet
Fixed before the ce7fc1e baseline (085bfec + TestSpendCloneIsDeep). Unchanged.
Non-blocking — requirePaid unbounded vout index (test/dust_covenant_test.go)
Fixed in a67bf999 (before the ce7fc1e baseline, per @Kukks's response).
Non-blocking — ClaimMode doc comments
Fixed in 657f8ce (confirmed in previous pass). Unchanged.
Non-blocking — referenceRevision / 49ae96d repin
Still open — post-merge task. The incremental diff contains no changes to genvectors/. Branches keeping 49ae96d and d4771c8 reachable must not be deleted until both arkade-taxi repins are confirmed.
Incremental findings on ce7fc1e..60f7cd4
This diff is five upstream commits merged into the covenant branch. Four are security and performance hardening on the emulator itself; one is a CVE/dependency update already reviewed.
b0f3e61e — Bind checkpoint and forfeit outputs to arkd's scripts
Two real attack vectors are closed by this commit.
Forfeit output destination check (pkg/emulator/finalization.go:331–333)
if !bytes.Equal(forfeit.UnsignedTx.TxOut[0].PkScript, forfeitPkScript) {
return fmt.Errorf("output 0 does not pay the arkd forfeit script")
}Before this change, validateForfeitOutputs checked the merged output value (vtxo + connector − anchor) but not its script. On a vtxo leaf that holds only the emulator's tweaked key and no arkd key, the emulator's signature alone is sufficient to spend the vtxo; the requester could then provide a forfeit that pays any address while keeping the value correct. That redirect is now blocked by comparing against the forfeitPkScript fetched from arkd's GetInfo. The new test "payout redirected on a leaf without the arkd key" (finalization_test.go) covers exactly this path.
Checkpoint output script check (pkg/emulator/tx.go:215–221)
expectedPkScript, err := checkpointPkScript(arkdCheckpointTapscript, expectedLeaf)
if !bytes.Equal(checkpoint.UnsignedTx.TxOut[0].PkScript, expectedPkScript) {
return fmt.Errorf("checkpoint vtxo output is not the arkd checkpoint script")
}Before this, validateCheckpoint verified the checkpoint output value matched the vtxo, and the tapleaf was authentic, but not the tapscript tree. An attacker could provide a checkpoint with the correct leaf in a tree with a different internal key or extra leaves; the leaf check would pass, but the output could be spent without going through the arkd unroll path. checkpointPkScript (tx.go:234–240) rebuilds P2TR(UnspendableKey, AssembleTaprootScriptTree(unrollLeaf, spentLeaf)) and compares. The two new test cases "expected leaf under a foreign internal key" and "expected leaf in a tree carrying an extra leaf" confirm both closure vectors are rejected.
emulator.New() signature change (service.go:119): arkdPubKey *btcec.PublicKey → arkdCheckpointTapscript, arkdForfeitPkScript []byte. The public key was used only to look up a signer; neither check above is achievable from a bare key. The new parameters are the scripts themselves, sourced from GetInfo at startup. This is a breaking API change to emulator.New() — downstream callers outside this repo must update.
Cross-repo impact check: emulator.New is called from internal/application/service.go (updated in bd178365). No other caller found in the SDK clones under /srv/arkana/repos.
bd178365 — SignFinalization: validate commitment tx binds intent
arkd txid and ark-tx echo validation (internal/application/service.go:200–209)
arkTxid := signed.ArkTx.UnsignedTx.TxID()
if arkdTxid != arkTxid { return error }
if finalTxid := finalArkPtx.UnsignedTx.TxID(); finalTxid != arkTxid { return error }Previously the application service accepted whatever transaction arkd returned as the countersigned ark tx. A substituted tx could pass downstream checks if its structure were close enough. Both fields are now compared against the txid the emulator actually executed. Tests "arkd returns a different ark tx" and "arkd returns a different txid" cover both rejection paths.
validateBatchPaysIntent (finalization.go:368–440)
New function verifying that every non-extension, non-placeholder output in the intent proof is present (by value + pkScript multiset) in either the commitment tx (onchain outputs) or the vtxo tree leaves (offchain). This runs only when !s.trustedCommitmentTx. The production path always passes WithTrustedCommitmentTx() (the application service, which calls arkd's round protocol and therefore trusts that arkd validated batch membership), so this function is a safety net for direct emulator use. TestValidateBatchPaysIntent (14 subtests) and TestSubmitFinalizationChecksBatchUnlessTrusted cover it.
Minor observation: the opt-in flag WithTrustedCommitmentTx() inverts the secure-by-default convention — a caller who forgets to pass it gets the validation rather than skipping it. This is the right direction for security, but the option name could mislead: it names the trust assumption, not the behaviour change. A short comment at the call site in service.go:125 (// arkd already validated batch membership) would clarify intent for future readers. Non-blocking.
1b9fe3bb — OP_TXID/OP_SIGHASH memoization
vm.txID() and vm.maskedTx() memoize their results on the Engine struct (engine.go:779–786, sigvalidate.go:458–473). Engines are single-use (one script execution), so there is no stale-state concern. The optimization matters for covenant scripts that call OP_TXID or OP_SIGHASH repeatedly over large witnesses. TestTxDigestOpcodesOverLargeTx (compute_limits_engine_test.go) runs a 1900-item witness scenario through the worst-case path and asserts completion within 200 ms. Correct.
c23cb086 — OP_MERKLEBRANCHROOT alias
OP_MERKLEBRANCHVERIFY is aliased to OP_MERKLEBRANCHROOT (same byte 0xb3). The opcode array now uses the canonical name; the alias preserves backward compatibility in scripts that reference the old name. No behaviour change; name improves clarity.
1b419fe2 — CVE-2026-78669
golang.org/x/net bumped to v0.60.0; go.sum updated. Consistent with the description's prior CVE fix and already reviewed in the ce7fc1e head.
One observation worth tracking
checkpointPkScript vs TapscriptsVtxoScript.TapTree() (pkg/emulator/tx.go:234–240)
The production rebuild uses txscript.AssembleTaprootScriptTree; the test helper testCheckpointSpend uses arkscript.TapscriptsVtxoScript.TapTree(). Both produce the same root for a 2-leaf tree (CI confirms this). A comment in checkpointPkScript citing the parallel construction in offchain.BuildTxs would make the coupling explicit and prevent a future divergence from being silent. Non-blocking.
Bottom line
The incremental diff hardens three real attack surfaces — forfeit redirect, checkpoint tapscript substitution, and ark-tx echo substitution — with correct implementations and solid test coverage. No new blocking issues. The PROTOCOL-CRITICAL flag from the initial review remains for overall human sign-off on covenant logic before mainnet funding. The referenceRevision / 49ae96d repins on arkade-taxi remain mandatory post-merge.
Adds standalone engine tests and live-stack tests for Taxi carrier covenants: recycle, purchase, sender refund, timed recovery/reclaim, and receiver-paid fares in sats or asset units. The tests verify required recipients, signatures, asset preservation and repayment, including wrong-key and invalid-fare cases. Standalone builders and legacy fixtures remain under
test/covenant; the current PR diff contains six test/fixture files and no production emulator changes.The October 15 refresh appends
master@bd17836at60f7cd43without rewriting shared history. The only merge conflict wasgo.sum, resolved with master's checksum graph. Covenant code, scenario coverage, generated fixtures, leaf ordering and recorded provenance pins are unchanged by this base sync.Validation at
60f7cd43:go build ./...andgo vet ./...pass. Incoming Go formatting was verified from LF Git blobs; Windows package-loading attempts that stalled were stopped incomplete and are not counted as passes.Historical vectors and superseded PRs
This branch contains all of original PR #150 at
49ae96d0241e7672e40b25543875538d4373fb80, as well as the later carrier work previously split into #157. #150 is a frozen historical reference, not a separate current merge candidate.The older instructions to repin Taxi's
scripts/gen-vectors.mjsfrom49ae96dand its copied receiver vectors fromd4771c8describe historical Taxi #5. Merged Taxi #37 (c3dce0f1) deleted that generator,packages/covenant/test/vectors.test.tsandreceiver-vectors.json. Current Taxi main usesdust_covenant.ark, compiler artifacts and V2 vectors. Those two historical Go-vector pins are therefore not active current-main cutover gates.Preserve
feat/taxi-intents,test/dust-free-transfer-covenantandfeat/unified-carrier-policywhile historical consumers and provenance are audited. If historical Go-derived vectors are regenerated after a squash/rebase merge, their consumers must use a reachable reference and reproduce the expected bytes; this does not imply current Taxi main still consumes them.The broader forfeit-lifecycle decision in #151 remains open. Passing these tests does not resolve that protocol decision or establish live deployment.
The current integration stack is SDK #1057, Wallet SDK base #936 plus Taxi child #1058, and Solver #209. SDK #970 and Wallet #1016 are closed; Taxi #37 and #38 have merged. No PR merge, branch deletion, production deployment or fund movement is included in this refresh.