Ledgerline is a portfolio project running on fictitious money. If you find a vulnerability anyway, please report it privately through GitHub's Report a vulnerability button (Security tab) rather than in a public issue.
| Concern | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Authentication | Keycloak, OpenID Connect authorization code flow with PKCE; tokens in sessionStorage — ADR 0007 |
| Token validation | Every service validates issuer, audience and signature itself; HTTPS metadata required outside development |
| Authorization | customer / operator policies per endpoint; customers only see their accounts and transfers (404 otherwise: no existence oracle) |
| Payments safety | Idempotency keys scoped per user with request fingerprint; holds before any screening; double-entry invariants in the domain |
| Input validation | Domain Result rules (amount range and precision, IBAN checksum, SEPA label length), enums as names only |
| Abuse | Per-IP rate limiting at the gateway |
| Errors | RFC 9457 problem details with stable codes, no stack traces |
| Headers | nosniff, framing denied, referrer policy at the gateway; strict CSP on the SPA |
| Runtime | Chiseled non-root images; on Kubernetes: restricted Pod Security, read-only root FS, dropped capabilities, default-deny NetworkPolicies |
| Supply chain | Central package management, Dependabot, CodeQL, vulnerable-package audit in CI |
| Secrets | None in the repository: generated by kind.sh into a Secret, Terraform-generated and stored as Container Apps secrets, images pulled with a managed identity |
Demo-only: the realm's users share a published password, and Keycloak runs in dev mode.