Share files that delete themselves. Optionally end-to-end encrypted in your browser: the server never sees the files, their names or the key.
🌐 Try it at fileholder.app · 📦 Open a sample bundle: one click, nothing to upload, decrypted in your browser.
- One link for up to 50 files. The bundle deletes itself after the time or the number of downloads you choose, and its details go with it.
- End-to-end encryption, optional. Files, file names and the title are encrypted in the browser. The key travels in the link's
#fragment, which browsers never send to a server. For sensitive files, a passkey can be required as well, sent separately. - Photo metadata removed before upload. Location, camera and date details come out in the browser, without re-encoding the image.
- A QR code for opening the link on another device, drawn in the browser.
- On the demo: bundles up to 10 MB that live up to an hour. An access code unlocks 250 MB and 24 hours.
| Sharing | Receiving |
|---|---|
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File contents never pass through the API. Browsers upload and download straight to and from storage with short-lived presigned URLs: large files as parallel multipart uploads with retries. The API checks each stored file's size against what it approved before a bundle goes live. → How It Works
-
Encryption built on WebCrypto: AES-256-GCM in 4 MiB chunks, authenticated so they can't be reordered, dropped or added. Keys come from HKDF, and a passkey is stretched with Argon2id in a worker. The server checks a derived value on unlock, never the key. → How It Works, threat model
-
Streaming decryption, even on an iPhone. Downloads decrypt as they arrive and go straight to disk through a service worker, a "Save as" dialog or Safari's private storage (OPFS). A 1.5 GB encrypted file was checked on a real iPhone. → Encrypted Downloads
-
Deletion you can rely on: download limits are enforced with one conditional database update, however many recipients race. A background purge removes files and details. Storage's own lifecycle rule is a safety net in case the purge ever fails. → How It Works
-
Sized for a small server. On the production server's resources (2 vCPU, simulated with the production setup pinned to two cores): about 400 link opens a second with p95 under 5 ms, realistic mixed traffic at around 10% CPU, and 150 fifty-file bundles a minute. Because file contents bypass it, the server mostly answers small API requests. → Load tests
-
Tested from several sides:
- unit and integration tests (Testcontainers);
- property tests in C# and TypeScript, with the server's and browser's file-name rules checked against shared examples;
- Playwright in Chromium, Firefox and WebKit;
- network-fault tests that cut connections mid-upload;
- k6 load tests for the rules that only matter under concurrency.
→ Testing
-
Run like a real service:
- health checks, metrics and OpenTelemetry traces, with tokens and file names redacted;
- maintenance modes, takedowns and access codes, switched at runtime;
- release-please releases and one-command deploys with automatic rollback;
- hardened containers, pinned dependencies and image scanning;
- a written threat model.
flowchart LR
browser["🌐 Browser<br/>encrypts and decrypts"]
subgraph vps["One server · Docker Compose"]
caddy["Caddy<br/>HTTPS, HSTS"]
nginx["nginx<br/>UI, CSP, redacted logs"]
api["API<br/>.NET 10"]
db[("PostgreSQL 17")]
keeper["Sample keeper<br/>Node"]
obs["Prometheus · Tempo"]
end
storage[("Cloudflare R2<br/>EU bucket")]
browser -- "pages, /api" --> caddy --> nginx -- "/api" --> api --> db
browser == "file contents<br/>(presigned URLs)" ==> storage
api -- "presign, size checks,<br/>copies, purge" --> storage
keeper -- "uploads the sample<br/>like a browser" --> caddy
api -. "metrics, traces" .-> obs
Locally, storage is Silo (a MinIO fork) instead of R2: the same code runs against both, and a conformance suite checks each. Grafana runs on the owner's computer and reaches Prometheus and Tempo over an SSH tunnel.
| Tier | Technology | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Backend API | .NET 10, ASP.NET Core Minimal APIs | Route groups, typed results, FluentValidation, RFC 7807 ProblemDetails |
| API docs | Native OpenAPI + Scalar UI | Development only |
| Database | PostgreSQL 17, EF Core 10 (Npgsql) | Migrations applied at startup, filtered indexes |
| Object storage | Cloudflare R2 in production, Silo (pgsty/silo) locally |
Accessed with the AWS SDK for .NET. Silo is a community-maintained fork of the MinIO server (MinIO wound down its community edition); the compose service is still called minio |
| Caching | .NET HybridCache |
In-memory only (no shared L2 cache), with stampede protection |
| Background work | BackgroundService |
Storage purge every 30 minutes |
| Frontend | React 19, Vite 8, TypeScript 6, Tailwind CSS 4 | axios, react-hook-form, client-zip (ZIPs in the browser), qrcode.react |
| Observability | OpenTelemetry metrics → Prometheus → Grafana; OpenTelemetry traces → Grafana Tempo → Grafana; Serilog console logs with trace ids | |
| Tests | xUnit, FluentAssertions, NSubstitute, FsCheck, Testcontainers (PostgreSQL); Vitest + Testing Library, fast-check; Playwright (Chromium, Firefox, WebKit); k6 | |
| Hosting | Docker Compose behind Caddy, on one VPS | Multi-stage builds, hardened containers |
Make sure Docker Desktop is running. Then create a .env file next to docker-compose.yml with the stack's passwords, and start it. Compose refuses to start while any password is missing, and git ignores the file. .env.example lists what goes in it.
PowerShell:
function New-Secret { $b = New-Object byte[] 16; [Security.Cryptography.RandomNumberGenerator]::Create().GetBytes($b); ($b | ForEach-Object { $_.ToString('x2') }) -join '' }
@(
"GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD=$(New-Secret)"
"POSTGRES_PASSWORD=$(New-Secret)"
"STORAGE_ROOT_USER=fileholder-admin"
"STORAGE_ROOT_PASSWORD=$(New-Secret)"
"STORAGE_API_SECRET_KEY=$(New-Secret)"
"ADMIN_TOKEN=$(New-Secret)$(New-Secret)"
) | Set-Content -Encoding ascii .env
docker compose up --buildBash:
cat > .env <<EOF
GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 16)
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 16)
STORAGE_ROOT_USER=fileholder-admin
STORAGE_ROOT_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 16)
STORAGE_API_SECRET_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 16)
ADMIN_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
EOF
docker compose up --buildThen open http://localhost:3000. Grafana, the storage console and the health endpoints are listed in Development.
| Page | What's in it |
|---|---|
| How It Works | Uploading, downloading, self-destruction, the storage safety net, end-to-end encryption, photo metadata, limits |
| Security | Storage access, file names, passwords, rate limits, headers, what logs and traces leave out, dependency checks |
| Threat Model | What each party can see and do, the protections with their code, known gaps and accepted risks |
| Running FileHolder | Production setup, deploying, Cloudflare R2, maintenance modes, takedown, access codes, the sample bundle, tracing, releases |
| Development | Local endpoints, passwords, networking, every setting, the project's layout, running the API and UI outside Docker |
| Testing | Unit, property, browser, network-fault and load tests, the pre-deploy check, testing on a phone |
| Changelog | What each release changed |
Found a vulnerability? Please don't open a public issue; see SECURITY.md.
FileHolder is released under the MIT License. The libraries it uses keep their own licences (mostly MIT, Apache-2.0 and BSD). Local development runs Silo, licensed under AGPL-3.0, as a separate, unmodified service, so its licence doesn't extend to FileHolder's code.

