Skip to content

block roots from ca-certs - #2215

Merged
bobcallaway merged 1 commit into
GoogleContainerTools:mainfrom
bobcallaway:block-compromised-roots
Oct 20, 2026
Merged

bobcallaway merged 1 commit into
GoogleContainerTools:mainfrom
bobcallaway:block-compromised-roots

Conversation

@bobcallaway

@bobcallaway bobcallaway commented Oct 20, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Collaborator

Due to a security incident with a third-party CA, we are proactively removing two roots from the cacerts bundle out of an abundance of caution.

Signed-off-by: Bob Callaway <bcallaway@google.com>
@bobcallaway
bobcallaway merged commit d7c7b24 into GoogleContainerTools:main Oct 20, 2026
15 checks passed
m1sk9 added a commit to m1sk9/chime that referenced this pull request Oct 21, 2026
The debian12 distroless images are no longer updated upstream and still
ship ca-certificates 20250419~deb12u1, which trusts "AAA Certificate
Services", the Sectigo root that cross-signed the eMudhra intermediates
whose private keys were compromised on 2026-10-17. chime verifies TLS
against the system store, so staying on debian12 would keep trusting
certificates forged with the leaked keys. The debian13 images drop that
root (GoogleContainerTools/distroless#2215).

The builder moves to trixie to stay on a maintained Debian release.
rustls-webpki 0.103.16 rejects chains containing the compromised
intermediates, which covers a stale root store too.

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

2 participants