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docs: answer the OpenSSF Best Practices criteria in .bestpractices.json - #370
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The Scorecard badge reports CII-Best-Practices as 0 because the project has never been registered. Registration needs a GitHub login and stays a human step, but the 67 criteria do not have to be typed into a web form: the BadgeApp reads a .bestpractices.json from the repository root and offers it as automation proposals, which its own documentation prefers over POSTing to the API. Nothing is stored until the maintainer reviews and saves. Every key was validated against the BadgeApp's own criteria.yml rather than a summary of it. That caught a real error in the working draft — the criterion is build_floss_tools, not build_floss — which matters because an unrecognised key is silently ignored, so the file would have looked complete and done nothing. 61 Met, 5 N/A, 1 Unmet. All 43 MUST criteria are answered. The five N/A answers were each checked against the na_allowed flag in criteria.yml, and release_notes_vulns additionally carries the justification its na_justification_required flag demands: - crypto_password_storage: no accounts, no login, no stored passwords - vulnerability_report_response: no report in the last six months - release_notes_vulns: no vulnerability has been fixed, so none has been named - dynamic_analysis_unsafe: C# is memory-safe, no unsafe blocks, no own native code - dynamic_analysis_fixed: no dynamic analysis runs, so it has no findings The single Unmet is dynamic_analysis, which is only SUGGESTED and does not block the passing badge. Its justification says where fuzzing would matter first rather than dressing the gap up: the .fwincident and master-data JSON parsers, the two components that read input the user did not author. Every URL cited in a justification was fetched and returns 200. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PXhXSh2pae9WnaACYUUe3V Signed-off-by: Thomas Müller <1005065+DeepDiver1975@users.noreply.github.com>
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Two points from the review on #370. The Dependabot claim was wrong. .github/dependabot.yml has five update blocks but only three distinct ecosystems: github-actions, docker, and nuget repeated across three package directories. Calling that "five package ecosystems" overstated the coverage to anyone checking, so it now says what is actually configured. crypto_password_storage stays N/A. The criterion's own rationale in the BadgeApp's criteria.yml is explicit that it covers storing passwords for authenticating external users, and credentials the software holds to authenticate itself elsewhere are deliberately out of scope. Lagebuch stores no passwords at all, so there is nothing for it to apply to. The review's point still stands that a human reviewer may read "authentication secret" more broadly and ask about the share PIN, so the justification now answers that before it is asked: generated per session with the platform CSPRNG, memory only, never written to disk, discarded with the session, carried only inside TLS, and brute force answered by per-source-IP exponential backoff ahead of routing. It links SECURITY.md, which says plainly that the PIN plus network reachability is the whole access-control boundary. No status changed. Still 61 Met, 5 N/A, 1 Unmet, re-validated against criteria.yml. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PXhXSh2pae9WnaACYUUe3V Signed-off-by: Thomas Müller <1005065+DeepDiver1975@users.noreply.github.com>
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Both points addressed in 8da4c14. The Dependabot nit was a real error, thank you.
The criterion is about storing passwords for authenticating external users. That said, your point stands that a human reviewer may read "authentication No status changed: still 61 Met, 5 N/A, 1 Unmet. On the cross-check you could not run. You flagged that That is also how the |
Summary
The second half of the OpenSSF work. The Scorecard badge reports
CII-Best-Practicesas 0 simply because the project has never been registered,and that check is worth 5 points on its own. More to the point, the badge is a
published checklist a Kreisbrandinspektion can actually read, rather than a
single number.
Registering needs a GitHub login and stays a human step. Answering the 67
criteria does not: the BadgeApp reads a
.bestpractices.jsonfrom therepository root and offers its contents as automation proposals, which its own
documentation prefers over POSTing to the API. Nothing is stored until you
review and save, so this file proposes, it does not assert on your behalf.
What is in the file
61 Met, 5 N/A, 1 Unmet. All 43 MUST criteria answered. Every justification
carries an evidence URL, and every one of those URLs was fetched and returns
200.
I validated every key against the BadgeApp's own
criteria.ymlrather than asummary of it. That caught a real error in my working draft: the criterion is
build_floss_tools, notbuild_floss. This matters more than a typonormally would, because an unrecognised key is silently ignored — the file would
have looked complete and quietly done nothing.
The five N/A answers
Each checked against the
na_allowedflag incriteria.yml, so none of them isan invalid answer:
crypto_password_storagevulnerability_report_responserelease_notes_vulnsna_justification_required, so the justification is mandatory and is present.dynamic_analysis_unsafedynamic_analysis_fixedThe one Unmet
dynamic_analysis, which is SUGGESTED and does not block the passing badge. Itsjustification names where fuzzing would matter first rather than dressing up the
gap: the
.fwincidentand master-data JSON parsers, the two components that readinput the user did not author.
Two answers that are yours, not mine
know_secure_designandknow_common_errorsare assertions about themaintainer, and neither permits N/A. I pre-filled both as Met with justifications
built from evidence that actually exists in the repo — the threat model in
SECURITY.mdthat names its own limitations, the deliberate removal of theaccept-any-certificate fallback, least-privilege workflow tokens, sanitised
attachment names, the scoped Android FileProvider. Please read those two
before you save them.
Your part, after this merges
https://github.com/CodeForFire/lagebuch.and fills the section in.
Scorecard one.
Expected effect on Scorecard:
CII-Best-Practices0 to 5, which together withMaintainedandSASTsettling on their own should take the aggregate from 6.3to roughly 7.4.
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