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#2582, Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#548) Trinity Rule #1 — the docs land before the code. - requirements/core-agent.md: new §5.30 (the six ACs, the permission matrix, the storage decision, the stated limits); §5.20 AC-2/AC-4 amended — the Files signal now covers uploads and the refresh triggers widen. - requirements/content-files.md: §13.10's flat "Content-Disposition: attachment" bullet was stale against shipped ent#461; rewritten as the server-decided allowlist plus the one-way ?download=1. - architecture/integrations.md: the ent#461 delivery-policy paragraph records the one-way flag, why it is applied in the handlers, why it is parsed tolerantly, and that sig is a stored bearer token rather than an HMAC over the URL — so appending the flag cannot invalidate it. - architecture/api-endpoints.md: GET row updated, the missing HEAD row added, and the three new client-portal routes catalogued. - architecture/workspace.md + database.md: the upload announcement, the session-type-dependent matrix, and portal_file_dismissals with the three reasons its shape is what it is. - feature-flows: workspace-rail.md gains Slice 3; file-sharing-outbound.md corrected on three counts that were stale since ent#461 and #568; workspace-agents-at-the-centre.md and the index updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
…, Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#548) A Workspace viewer needs to remove an agent-shared file from THEIR list without revoking the share. agent_shared_files has no audience column, so portal_documents lists every active share of an agent to every rostered client; and the one generic per-user preference store is FK'd to users.id, which a portal principal has no row in. So: new storage. - tables.py / schema.py (DDL + the sweeper's file_id index) / migrations.py (SQLite) / migrations/versions/0058 (PostgreSQL) — Invariant #9, both tracks, single head confirmed by scripts/ci/check_alembic_heads.py. - agent_name is on the table FOR the AgentRef registration: agent_shared_files is a CASCADE ref, so deleting an agent hard-deletes its shares without going through the revoke sweeper — every dismissal keyed on those ids would be orphaned forever, and a table with no agent column would sidestep the parity guard that exists to catch exactly this. - Both purge paths in db/agent_shared_files.py delete the matching dismissals in the same transaction. - PK leads with client_email (the read is WHERE client_email = ?, once per participant per turn end); the file_id index serves the sweeper. test_agent_cleanup_parity + test_schema_parity: 8 passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
…bs (#2582, Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#548) routers/files.py - GET and HEAD accept `download`, which may only ever force `attachment`. There is no ?disposition= and no way to force `inline` — that direction is ent#461's XSS allowlist. `_format_disposition`'s docstring now records the asymmetry, so the next reader does not resolve the apparent contradiction in the wrong direction. - Typed Optional[str] with a truthy check, NOT bool: a bool query param 422s on ?download= or ?download=x, and this is the public link opened from Telegram / WhatsApp / iOS — a malformed query it ignores today must keep being ignored. - Applied in the handlers, never in _validate_download_request, whose arg list is AST-pinned by test_file_download_no_session_gate. - A ranged PREFIX read no longer bumps download_count. The Workspace preview reads from byte 0, so without this every preview would inflate the owner's numbers and bury the audit log. The audit row is kept and made separable instead: details.ranged_prefix. - `# mcp: none` header (Invariant #13). client_portal - portal_owns_agent + `owned` on the roster row and the card: the SAME membership the card renders, so the UI's "Delete for everyone" and the service's gate cannot disagree. - Three routes: read one of your own uploads back (attachment, nosniff, no-store), delete one (idempotent), and remove/revoke an agent share. Each is _require_roster -> rate_limiter -> service -> audit. - TWO limiter tiers, env-tunable, per router.py's own stated rule — and the burst tier is 20, tighter than upload's, because this is the first time a rostered client can reach extract_from_agent (sync docker-py iteration on the global 4-worker pool, ~3x file size resident). Delete gets its own looser counter; an rm is not a get_archive. - portal_revoke_shared_file is access-first (roster 404 -> owner 403 -> row 404), never existence-then-access (Invariant #8), and 404s where its operator sibling 204s — enumeration-uniformity on an external surface, stated in the docstring so nobody aligns it. - portal_dismiss_shared_file does NOT validate the file_id (an existence oracle over every share in the install) and caps rows instead — the same fork set_chat_star already resolved. - _inbox_path_for: `_safe_filename(name) == name` or a uniform 404. Every shell use is shlex.quote plus `--`, because _safe_filename admits a leading hyphen. - _read_inbox guesses mime_type, and PortalUploadItem declares it — the row's FileIcon has been rendering the generic icon since it shipped because the response model stripped the undeclared field. - portal_documents drops dismissed ids and appends &download=1. Only this base URL gets the flag; the agent's chat link is untouched. test_ent79_portal_exposure: the two download_url assertions updated (the AC changes the URL) and the fixtures gained the table portal_documents now reads. 71 passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
…te (#2582, Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#548) stores/clientPortal.js - uploadDocument queues the agent in a pending-agent SET. It is the ONE funnel all three upload surfaces already call, so notifying here makes "Files you sent" update before any agent reply WITHOUT touching PortalConversation.vue or PortalRoom.vue — the files the delivery sequence is serialized to protect. - A set, not a scalar, because both real gestures defeat a scalar: a sequential multi-file batch (a consumer joining the in-flight read gets a listing taken before the later files landed) and a room's fan-out across three DIFFERENT agents in one Vue flush window (only the last value survives). - fetchUploadBlob / deleteUpload / deleteDocument. stores/portalRailFeeds.js - noteUpload(agent): shares _fetchToken with refresh() (a refresh issued before the upload but resolving after it would otherwise silently clobber the fresh listing), coalesces leading AND trailing, and re-checks participation after the await. upload() now delegates to it rather than carrying a second read. portalRail.js / usePortalRailFeeds.js - filesSignalItems(documents, uploads) projects uploads onto the created_at key the Files dot already reads, and BOTH the signal and markSeen read it — one mechanism, or opening the tab would mark documents seen and leave the uploads' dot lit forever. The collections stay separate; only the signal merges them. - The pending set is drained by the owner: clear-then-read, so a note arriving mid-drain is a new entry rather than one this drain already claimed. portalFiles.js (new, pure — vitest pins environment: node) - flattenFiles owns BOTH render order and preview index; two orderings drift and the lightbox opens the wrong file, silently. `groups` is a parameter so ent#484's shared folder becomes a third entry with no structural change. - previewKind is extension-first for text: Python's mimetypes maps .ts to video/mp2t and .toml to nothing, and a shared .md arrives as text/plain. - neighbour skips non-previewable rows and stops at the ends. - errorDetail reads a Blob body first: with responseType 'blob' the usual err.response.data.detail idiom yields undefined, so the promised "server's named reason" would degrade to a generic line for exactly the new verbs. PortalFilePreview.vue (new) - Images ONLY through <img :src>, never inline <svg>, never v-html. - Text capped at 256 KB, fetched whole and sliced: CORS allow_headers omits Range, so a ranged preview dies silently cross-origin — and slicing keeps preview off the transfer-start counter path. The cap is stated in the UI. - Escape/arrows registered with { capture: true } + preventDefault, because the conversation's turn-cancel listener is on document in the BUBBLE phase. - v-if not v-show (the column and the mobile sheet are siblings), z-40 below ConfirmDialog's z-50, focus on the safe action, a Tab trap. - Never a blank modal: an unpreviewable type, an over-cap image AND a failed byte fetch all land on the same name/size/type + Download card. PortalRailFiles.vue - One v-for over the flat list; Download on both lists; the delete matrix mirrored off the roster card's `owned`; one ConfirmDialog with copy that restates the consequence per case; per-row InlineError with the server's reason. The dead single-file upload() (zero callers) is gone. - AC-3's `download` attribute is deliberately dropped: the control is a button driving a blob save and cannot carry it, and it is inert on a cross-origin anchor anyway — which is why the server-side flag exists. npm run test:unit: 101 files, 2238 passed. check:tokens OK. Both new files scan 0 raw_nongray / 0 hardcoded; loading gates total 70, equal to baseline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
#2582, Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#548) Three new files, registered in tests/registry.json, plus the ent#461 guard extended so the asymmetry is asserted where a future widening would be edited past. test_2582_download_flag.py (35) - Proves the ASYMMETRY, not the feature: the flag forces attachment and NO input forces inline (?download=0 on text/html stays attachment). - ?download= / ?download=x / a repeated pair never 422 — the regression a bool annotation would have shipped on the public link ent#461 exists to keep opening from a phone. - HEAD agrees with GET; the sig survives the extra query pair; every other ent#461 header is carried through; the flag rides the 206 branch. - A ranged prefix read is audited ranged_prefix:true and does NOT bump download_count; a full-file range and a plain GET do; a mid-file seek does neither. Mutation control: forcing is_ranged_prefix=False fails that test. test_2582_portal_uploads.py (28) - The traversal 404 asserted at the handler AND through the mounted route, with a positive control — %2F shapes never match the route while %2E%2E reaches the handler, and a status-only test cannot tell the two apart. - Gate order (off-roster before any docker work), ent#308's collision on the read side, the translated extract_from_agent exceptions (its 404 echoes the container path), the deliberate 409/502 on a stopped/missing agent, rm -f -- with quoting proven by a name that needs it, and both limiter tiers. test_ent548_portal_share_delete.py (23) - The matrix, including the two cases that read as bugs without the rule: a non-owner admin is a viewer, and so is an owner on a portal token. - Access-first revoke proven with a call-recording monkeypatch (the row must not be read before the caller is authorized). Mutation control: reordering to existence-then-access fails it. - The dismissal's non-validation and its row cap as a PAIR, both purge paths, the AgentRef registration, both migration tracks, the PK's leading column. Mutation control: dropping the delete_for_agent purge fails it. 218 passed across the plan's verification set; alembic heads still 1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
…iew rules (#2582, Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#548) portalRailFiles.spec.js (19) — and it found a real defect. The room fan-out test failed against my own first cut: `noteUpload` shared `_fetchToken` with `refresh()`, so three concurrent per-agent reads each invalidated the last and two of three listings were discarded. The two questions are different — "has the chat moved on?" is global, "is this agent's listing still the newest?" is per agent — so the store now carries a `_scopeToken` (participant changes and clear only) and a per-agent `_uploadEpoch` that `refresh()` snapshots before its awaits. That snapshot is also what stops a refresh issued before an upload and resolving after it from silently clobbering the fresh listing. Three mutation controls, each failing exactly its own test: - a shared counter instead of the per-agent epoch -> the fan-out test and the clobber test fail; - dropping the trailing re-fire -> the two-file batch test fails; - refresh ignoring the epoch snapshot -> the clobber test fails. The spec mounts the composable inside an effectScope stopped after each test: its watcher on the SHARED portal mock has no component to unmount it, so the oldest surviving watcher drained the queue against a previous test's Pinia store. Diagnosed from the symptom (uploads.scout undefined, a fan-out noting one agent), not guessed. Also pinned: the dot lights with Files CLOSED after one targeted read; opening the tab clears it (markSeen must read the same projection or the upload's dot stays lit forever); a non-participant bump does nothing; a hidden rail drops the note rather than queueing it; and source guards that PortalConversation.vue and PortalRoom.vue are untouched and know nothing of the rail. portalFiles.spec.js (47) — previewKind's extension-first rule with the three cases that motivate it (.md arriving as text/plain, .ts as video/mp2t, .toml as nothing), neighbour skipping and stopping, flattenFiles order equalling render order, the fileActions matrix failing closed, sameOriginPath on a RELATIVE url (the default install), the Blob error path, and the component's source guards: an <img> and no v-html, no Range, capture + preventDefault, revokeObjectURL, z-40 below ConfirmDialog, v-if not v-show, never a blank modal including on a failed fetch, zero raw palette classes and zero hex. portalRailFeeds.spec.js: the portal mock is now reactive() with the new fields, so the owner's watcher is not permanently inert there. 103 files, 2304 passed. check:tokens OK; loading gates 70 (= baseline); both new files 0 raw_nongray / 0 hardcoded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
…e third Escape owner (#2582, Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#548) Two corrections and one addition from the tail steps. The docs written before implementation said the drain "shares the feed store's _fetchToken with refresh()". That is no longer true and was never sufficient: the room fan-out test proved a shared counter makes three concurrent per-agent reads invalidate each other. The mechanism is a _scopeToken (chat identity) plus a per-agent _uploadEpoch that refresh() snapshots before its awaits. Corrected in requirements/core-agent.md §5.30, architecture/workspace.md, feature-flows/workspace-rail.md (Slice 3, with the finding recorded as the reason) and the feature-flows.md changelog row. /sync-feature-flows also surfaced one flow the docs commit missed: chat-turn-cancellation.md owns the "what may take Escape" rule, and this PR adds a THIRD way of owning it — a rail-mounted overlay with no ref the conversation could name, taking Escape in the capture phase with preventDefault() rather than joining the per-surface overlay list. The known residual (the voice-call branch above shouldCancelOnEscape never consults defaultPrevented) is recorded there too, with a revision-history row, and the index row now points at it. The Slice 3 Testing block names the effectScope the spec needs and the three mutation controls. NOTE: /update-tests also updated .claude/agents/test-runner.md, which lives in the private .claude submodule (detached HEAD in this worktree) — that edit is left UNCOMMITTED there rather than creating a dangling commit and dirtying the gitlink. It needs landing in trinity-dev separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
… blob (#2582) Self-review finding. The first cut fetched every row as a blob and handed it back through a synthetic <a download> — which made the one-way ?download=1 flag decorative on the one surface it was added for, pulled up to 50 MB into the tab to save a file the browser could stream itself, and used exactly the programmatic-blob-save path the plan's own risk register flags as the classic iOS Safari failure, on a surface whose primary form is a phone sheet. An agent share now saves by an anchor click on its already-attachment URL. A client upload keeps the blob path, because it has no URL at all — no DB row, no token — which is the whole reason that path exists. AC-3's `download` attribute rides on that anchor as belt-and-braces; a browser ignores it cross-origin, which is precisely why the server-side flag is the mechanism rather than the attribute. Pinned by a source guard with a mutation control (collapsing the branch fails it). 103 files, 2305 passed. Docs corrected in §5.30 and workspace-rail.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
… turn (#2582, Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#548) Review finding. The preview modal took Escape in the capture phase with preventDefault() so it could not reach the conversation's bubble-phase turn-cancel listener — but the ConfirmDialog it raises has no key handling of its own, and nothing was added for it. So Escape on an open delete confirm dismissed nothing and arrived at shouldCancelOnEscape with defaultPrevented still false: the dialog stayed up and an in-flight turn was destroyed. Same shape, same reason. And because two capture listeners on `document` fire in registration order — the tab body mounts before the modal it opens — the preview now returns early on event.defaultPrevented, so one keystroke closes one overlay rather than both. Also documents the three PORTAL_FILE_* limiters in .env.example, beside the PORTAL_CHAT_*/PORTAL_UPLOAD_* pair they were modelled on. They are the only bound on the newly-exposed extract_from_agent path, and an operator cannot tune a knob they cannot discover. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
…/trinity-enterprise#548) Review finding. `portalRailFeeds.upload()` awaited `noteUpload()` itself while `clientPortal.uploadDocument()` — which it calls one line earlier — already queued the same agent for the rail owner's drain. The drain's note therefore arrived while the store's own read was in flight, became its trailing re-fire, and every drop-zone upload cost two container execs: eight for a four-file batch, on the shared 4-worker executor. The funnel is the mechanism, so let it be the only one. `upload()` now just sends. The two specs that pinned "delegates to noteUpload / re-reads its own agent" pinned the redundancy, so they now pin ZERO reads from `upload()` and move the "skips a chat that moved on" property onto `noteUpload`, where it actually lives. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
…nity-enterprise#548) The plan listed four things to file and the docs said "filed as a follow-up" while nothing existed on either tracker. Filed, and named where a reader lands: trinity#2598 Escape during a voice call ends the call even when an overlay already claimed the keystroke — PortalConversation.vue's voice branch sits above shouldCancelOnEscape and reads no defaultPrevented, so preventDefault() cannot reach it trinity#2599 the Workspace Files routes are uncatalogued in api-endpoints.md ent#549 shared files have no audience — every rostered client sees every share of an agent, ?sig= included; a dismissal is a preference, not authorization ent#550 a client upload has no DB row, which is why listing, download, delete, preview and MIME are five different mechanisms Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
An overlay that claims Escape must claim it for the dialogs it raises too — the 4.14 incomplete-fix class in UI clothes, and destructive-and-silent here because the wrong Escape kills billed work with no sign. Plus the two rules that fall out: capture listeners on `document` fire in registration order, not z-order; and a `preventDefault()` protocol is only as good as the consumer branch that reads it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxW9tCTd3RnrWrxN8Yk8Bq
…mid-call (#2598) ent#534 gave the voice call the first branch of `onEscapeKeydown` — correct, because while a call is up the composer and the picker are inert and there is no turn to cancel. What was wrong is that the branch re-decided the preconditions instead of asking for them: it tested `voiceCallActive && event.key === 'Escape'` and nothing else. `defaultPrevented` is the protocol on this surface. #2582's file preview and delete confirm claim Escape in the capture phase precisely so they cannot destroy an in-flight turn, and that works only because `shouldCancelOnEscape` reads it. It was invisible to the branch above it, so one keystroke closed the overlay AND ended the call. `preventDefault()` cannot help where nothing reads it. Fixed as a sibling rule rather than a guard clause. Both branches now start from one private `ownsEscape(event)` — is it Escape, is an IME composing, has something nearer already claimed it — and `shouldEndCallOnEscape(event, { callActive })` sits beside `shouldCancelOnEscape` in `utils/turnCancel.js`. The issue offered `if (event.defaultPrevented) return` at the top, which is smaller and worse twice over: it fixes the reported symptom while leaving the next Escape owner free to re-decide the preconditions the same way, and it keeps the decision inside an SFC that `vitest` cannot mount (`environment: 'node'`, no harness) — which is exactly how the original shipped able to ignore `defaultPrevented` and `isComposing` at once. That second one is a defect nobody reported and this closes with it: the old branch ignored `isComposing`, so abandoning an IME candidate with Escape ended the call. `portalVoiceMode.spec.js` pinned the literal old condition AND its ordering. The ordering is the property ent#534 actually cares about and is unchanged, so that assertion is re-pointed at the new spelling rather than dropped — and `turnCancel.spec.js` gains a source guard that the branch dispatches THROUGH the rule, because a predicate the branch bypasses passes its own tests. Frontend suite: 2254 passed (101 files). Related to #2598 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ
Self-review finding. `turnCancel.spec.js` reads sources RAW — fine for every guard that predates this change, and not fine for the two #2598 added: * the POSITIVE guard would pass on a comment alone if the call were deleted, which is a vacuous guard on the one assertion that proves the branch dispatches through the rule rather than around it; * the NEGATIVE guard asserts the old condition is gone, over a region whose comments now quote that condition verbatim to explain the fix — one explanatory sentence away from failing spuriously. Both now read a `stripComments` view. The comment guard keeps reading RAW on purpose: the comment IS the thing under test there. Mutation-checked rather than assumed: restoring the old inline condition turns the dispatch guard red, and reverting the mutation turns it green again. Related to #2598
… it is computed (#2582) `_apply_download_flag` is a pure function, and the existing test pins its asymmetry exactly. But a pure function cannot tell you the route handed it the right `inline=`. The plausible regression — a handler deriving the disposition from the query parameter instead of from `is_inline_safe(row["mime_type"])` — passes every helper-level assertion in this file and ships stored XSS on a public token-gated link. So the route fixture is now parametrized by type, and a `text/html` row is asserted `attachment` across every flag value, on GET and HEAD both. Verified by mutation: deriving the disposition from the parameter turns 6 tests red, 5 of them these. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
, Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#548) The three knobs were read by `client_portal/router.py` and documented in `.env.example` while being forwarded by NONE of the three compose files, and neither prod nor hosted uses `env_file:` — so the advertised `.env` lever was inert on every install. That is worse than an undocumented knob: the operator sets it, sees no effect, and has nothing to debug. The #1056 / trinity-enterprise#31 packaging-gap class, caught at the `/validate-pr` gate. Proven by render rather than grep — `docker compose config` showed NONE before and honours `PORTAL_FILE_HOURLY_LIMIT=7` over the 100 default after, on both dev and prod. Wiring prod also broke #2280's wholesale env parity against `docker-compose.hosted.yml`, which is the guard doing its job: the gap was three files wide, not two. Guarded so it cannot recur: the knobs must be forwarded by all three composes, with defaults agreeing across them AND with the module default. #2433's guard is scoped to its own two vars by a hardcoded tuple, so extending it would have been the wrong home. Mutation-verified — dropping one var from prod turns 2 tests red. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e-2582 # Conflicts: # docs/memory/feature-flows.md # docs/memory/learnings.md # docs/memory/requirements/core-agent.md
Multi-agent rooms went dead after ~6h. A room stores a `--resume` handle per (agent, room) in `enterprise_room_participants.cached_session_id` and passes it to `execute_task(resume_session_id=...)`, but the reaper's keep set was built from `agent_sessions` and `enterprise_portal_sessions` only. Every room handle was therefore an orphan by construction: kept until the 1h age guard, deleted on the next 6h sweep. The next mention of any agent in the room then failed with `No conversation found with session ID: <uuid>`. Reported from production as "the 3-agent room is dead, the 1-agent chat from the same day is fine" — the single-agent chat was a Workspace thread, and its ids were in the keep set. Same class as ent#358 one surface over, which that fix's own comment predicted. `shared_sessions.db.list_active_claude_session_ids` mirrors `_wake_agent`'s early returns rather than returning every stored handle, and the two must move together: `left_at IS NULL` and room `status = 'open'` are both permanent (`close_room` is a one-way CAS; `add_participant` is a no-op that never clears `left_at`), so those handles can never resume, and keeping them would trade this bug for an unbounded leak — every room eventually expires and closes. The `kind = 'agent'` filter is load-bearing, not decoration: `identity` is polymorphic (ent#443), so without it a human participant whose username equals an agent name would inject a handle into that agent's keep set. The union is read in its own try/except that ABORTS the sweep on failure, matching the ent#358 half: skipping a cycle costs disk, reaping against a partial keep set costs users their conversations. Two shipped occurrences means the mechanism is the defect, so the guard is anchored on the SCHEMA, not on the reaper: `test_2610_resume_surface_parity` fails when a table gains a resume-handle column that no keep-set accessor covers. A test asserting only "the reaper calls three accessors" would pass on the very next occurrence, because the new surface simply would not be in it. Verified on both backends: the unit suite on SQLite, and the accessor's exact SQL against a live PostgreSQL, which returns only the open room's agent handle (excluding a sibling agent, a `user`-kind row with the same identity, and a closed room). Each guard mutation-tested — removing the union kills the two reaper tests and the parity guard; dropping `kind='agent'` or the `left_at`/`status` filter each kills exactly its own test. The second half of the report — rooms lack the inline cold retry the other two resumable surfaces have, so a dead handle is user-visible — is split to #2613: it needs the working-state lifecycle restructured and `delta`/`top_seq` recomputed for the cold attempt, which does not belong in a P1 fix. Related to #2610 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ
`workspace-absorbs-session.md` still described the keep set as "the union of both tables". #2610 made it three, and the section's own warning — a live JSONL deleted an hour after it was written, no error anywhere — is exactly what happened to rooms. Point at the guard so the next resume surface is caught by CI rather than by a user reporting an agent that forgot. Related to #2610 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ
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Integration surface for #2614, #2601, #2608 (#2607 ejected: its own new test fails the sys.modules lint). Never merged; members merge individually once green.