diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 42de6d0e9..c6bc3ad9c 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -49,3 +49,4 @@ TestResults/ .claude/skills .codex/skills skills-lock.json +scratchpad/ diff --git a/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-22-t8-cross-tenant-isolation-guard.md b/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-22-t8-cross-tenant-isolation-guard.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bc5fbe9ae --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-22-t8-cross-tenant-isolation-guard.md @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +# T8 #536 Implementation Plan + +> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: superpowers:executing-plans (driver-direct — the driver executes; Phase 11 verification is the gate, not a second implementer). + +**Goal:** An enumerating tenant-bypass guard (Roslyn + EF model discovery + committed allow-list) plus a two-farm E2E isolation matrix, per the signed-off design `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-22-t8-cross-tenant-isolation-guard-design.md`. + +**Architecture:** The guard lives in `Cluckwork.Application.Tests` (no DB needed — `AppDbContext` model builds in-memory; runs in the pre-commit hook). It walks every `.cs` under `src/` with Roslyn, discovers the filter-free entity surface from the EF model, and fails on any unlisted bypass, stale allow-list entry, missing `AccountId` predicate, or wrapper-forwarding bypass. The matrix lives in `Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests` (Testcontainers Postgres 18.4): two farms provisioned through `AccountProvisioner`, full egg loop as farm B, negative isolation with farm A driving farm B's real IDs (404 + no-mutation). + +**Tech Stack:** .NET 10, xUnit 2, Roslyn (`Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp` 4.14.0 — the compiler version bundled with .NET 10 SDK), EF Core, Testcontainers. + +## Global Constraints + +- Warnings are errors (`TreatWarningsAsErrors`). Build must end `0 Warning(s) 0 Error(s)`. +- Nullable enabled, no unused usings — build-breaking. +- NuGet: committed `packages.lock.json` + `--locked-mode` — the CodeAnalysis package bump regenerates the lock file **in the same commit** (AGENTS.md). +- No edits under `src/` unless Part 3 finds a real bypass (⛔ owner decision if so). +- Guard-writing rules (`docs/decisions/407-writing-a-guard.md`): mutation first, claim second; walk everything, exclude deliberately; rebuild between restore and re-run; `touch` the file after restoring a mutant. +- TDD order per task: failing test recorded failing *for the stated reason* before the code that passes. +- `git ls-files ` before every "create"; whole-file write onto an existing path is a silent delete. + +--- + +### Task 0: Baseline ledger (BEFORE any guard test exists) + +**Files:** none. + +- [ ] **Step 1:** `dotnet test Cluckwork.sln -c Release` (Docker up) — record the **full-solution** total test count as the ledger baseline. This is the number Task 8 compares against. A filtered or mid-slice number makes the delta vacuous (review finding F6). +- [ ] **Step 2:** Record in the PR draft: baseline count, date, commit. + +### Task 1: Guard scaffold — discovery floor + Roslyn walk skeleton + +**Files:** +- Modify: `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests.csproj` (add `Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp` **5.0.0** — the Roslyn the .NET 10 SDK 10.0.400 actually bundles (C# 14 parser; review M2: 4.14.0 is C# 13 and would silently drop C# 14 syntax as error nodes) + `Cluckwork.Infrastructure` project reference; regenerate all affected `packages.lock.json` in the same commit) +- Create: `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassGuardTests.cs` +- Create: `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/GuardScanner.cs` (internal walker; keeps the test file readable) +- Create: `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/AllowList.cs` (loads/validates the JSON) +- Create: `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/Data/tenant-bypass-allowlist.json` (starts `[]`) + +**Interfaces:** +- Produces: `GuardScanner.Scan(ReadOnlyMemory srcRoot, ReadOnlyMemory allowListPath) → GuardReport` where `GuardReport` has `Occurrences` (each: `Kind`, `File`, `Line`, `EnclosingSymbol` (display string `Namespace.Type.Method(params)` or `…Method.Local(localName)`), `PredicateHasAccountId` (nullable)), `AllowListEntries`, `UnmatchedEntries`, `Errors`. +- Produces: `AllowList.Load(path) → IReadOnlyList`; entry = `{ Symbol, File, Justification }`. + +- [ ] **Step 1: Red test — discovery floor.** `DiscoveredSurface_Floor`: build the model via + `new DbContextOptionsBuilder().UseNpgsql("Host=localhost;Database=x;Username=x;Password=x").Options` + `new TenantContext()` (no connection opened — model only), then + `model.GetEntityTypes().Where(e => e.GetDeclaredQueryFilters() is null).Select(e => e.ClrType.Name)` must equal the **sorted** set: `ApplicationRole`, `ApplicationUser`, `IdentityRoleClaim`, `IdentityUserClaim`, `IdentityUserLogin`, `IdentityUserRole`, `IdentityUserToken`, `RefreshToken` *(8 types — the 4 Identity claim/login/token tables have NO AccountId column, so leg 3's predicate rule does not apply to them; the stated rule for them is: any query against these sets is a bypass occurrence requiring an allow-list entry, full stop — review finding F7)*. + - **API note (review M1, verified):** `IReadOnlyEntityType.GetQueryFilter()` is `[Obsolete("…Use GetDeclaredQueryFilters() instead.")]` in the resolved EF Core 10.0.11 (message string confirmed in the shipped dll). With `TreatWarningsAsErrors`, the old call is a build error. `GetDeclaredQueryFilters()` is declared-only and returns the keyed collection (EF 10 named filters); for `HasQueryFilter(e => …)` the declared set is non-empty, so `is null`-ness is equivalent here. **Task 1 Step 2b proves it:** a throwaway probe asserting `ApplicationUser`'s declared-filter count is 0 and `Account`'s is 1 — if the probe disagrees, the floor is wrong and stops here, not at pin time. Run it; record the failure text (empty list / missing type). +- [ ] **Step 2: Add the package + project reference; regenerate locks; build green.** + `dotnet restore --locked-mode` after editing csproj must pass; if the lock is stale, `dotnet restore` then commit the updated locks. Build must end `0 Warning(s) 0 Error(s)`. +- [ ] **Step 2b: Probe the discovery API** (review M1): throwaway fact asserting `model.GetEntityTypes().Single(e => e.ClrType == typeof(Account)).GetDeclaredQueryFilters()` is non-empty and `typeof(ApplicationUser)`'s is empty/null. Delete the probe after it passes; the floor test (Step 1) keeps the pin. +- [ ] **Step 3: Red test — walk finds the known occurrences.** `Walk_FindsEveryBannedOccurrenceInSource`: run the scanner against the repo's real `src/` with the empty allow-list; assert the `IgnoreQueryFilters` occurrence count is **≥ 36** (current baseline: 36 code occurrences, 16 in comments — comments must NOT count) and that `src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/EggLotRepository.cs` appears. Record the RED reason (count 0 / exception). +- [ ] **Step 4: Implement `GuardScanner` minimally** to pass. Banned kinds (ALL of them — review M3: the design's Identity ban had no implementing task): + - `IgnoreQueryFilters` invocations (any receiver); + - `FromSql*`/`ExecuteSql*`/`SqlQuery` invocations; + - **Identity string-lookups:** `FindByEmailAsync`, `FindByNameAsync`, `FindByLoginAsync`, `GetUsersInRoleAsync` (any receiver — `UserManager`/`UserStore`/`RoleManager`), any `SignInManager` member invocation, and `UserManager.Users` member access; + - `db.` member accesses (leg 1's discovered set). + Parse each `.cs` via `CSharpSyntaxTree.ParseText(File.ReadAllText)`; enclosing method via `FirstAncestorOrSelf()` (local functions: if the call's nearest ancestor is a `LocalFunctionStatementSyntax`, key `EnclosingSymbol` as `ContainingMethod.Local(localFunctionName)`). + **False-green guards (review M2 — a zero-occurrence result must be indistinguishable from a broken walk):** (a) assert `ParseDiagnostics` is empty for every file (any Error-severity diagnostic → test fails, names the file); (b) scanned-file-count floor: the walk must see ≥ the count of `*.cs` under `src/` minus `bin/`/`obj/` (excluded explicitly by path, and the floor pins that exclusion works); (c) `src/` root resolves from the test's `AppContext.BaseDirectory` by walking up to the directory containing `Cluckwork.sln` — if not found, fail, never default. +- [ ] **Step 5: Green.** `dotnet test tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests --filter TenantBypass` — all three tests pass; record the summary line. +- [ ] **Step 6: Commit** `feat(test): tenant-bypass guard scaffold — Roslyn walk + model-driven discovery floor`. + +### Task 2: Allow-list semantics (unlisted red, stale red, predicate red, wrapper red) + +**Files:** +- Modify: `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/{GuardScanner,AllowList}.cs`, `Data/tenant-bypass-allowlist.json` +- Modify: `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassGuardTests.cs` + +**Interfaces:** consumes Task 1's `GuardReport`. The four assertion methods this task adds: `UnlistedBypass_Fails`, `StaleEntry_Fails`, `MissingAccountIdCompare_Fails`, `WrapperForwarding_Fails` — each takes a temp source tree (written under `Path.GetTempPath()` by the test, never the repo) + an allow-list JSON, so the mutants of Task 5 can reuse them. + +- [ ] **Step 1: Red — `UnlistedBypass_Fails`.** Temp file: one method calling `x.IgnoreQueryFilters()` with no allow-list entry → report must carry the occurrence AND the test's assertion `Assert.NotEmpty(report.Occurrences.Where(o => o.Kind == BypassKind.IgnoreQueryFilters))` must drive a would-be build failure. Record RED (scanner doesn't yet evaluate allow-list → no failure signal). +- [ ] **Step 2: Implement allow-list evaluation** in `GuardScanner`: an occurrence is *excused* iff an entry matches `File` (relative) + `EnclosingSymbol` exactly. +- [ ] **Step 3: Green** `UnlistedBypass_Fails`; then **red** `StaleEntry_Fails` (entry for `No.Such.Method` + empty source → `UnmatchedEntries` non-empty), implement stale detection, **green**. +- [ ] **Step 4: Red/green `MissingAccountIdCompare_Fails`.** Temp `db.Users.Where(u => u.Email == "x").ToListAsync()` (no `AccountId` in the predicate) must be flagged; `db.Users.Where(u => u.AccountId == tenant.Id)` must NOT. The check is **shape, not provenance** — say so in the test header (design M4/F4). +- [ ] **Step 5: Red/green `WrapperForwarding_Fails`.** Temp file with `static IQueryable Unfiltered(this IQueryable q) => q.IgnoreQueryFilters();` + a caller in a second method → both the wrapper and the caller must be reported (design M6). +- [ ] **Step 6: Commit** `feat(test): tenant-bypass allow-list semantics — unlisted, stale, predicate, wrapper`. + +### Task 3: Populate the real allow-list (the enumeration) + +**Files:** +- Modify: `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/Data/tenant-bypass-allowlist.json` (append entries until the real-tree test passes) +- Create: `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassGuardTests.cs` → new test `RealSourceTree_AllBypassesAreAllowListed` (runs the scanner against the repo `src/`, asserts zero unexcused occurrences AND zero stale entries) + +**Justification policy (owner-signed D3):** the seeder cluster (`DemoDataSeeder`, `SimulationDataSeeder`) shares one justification line — "runs at unresolved tenant by design (#280/#279); every query carries an explicit `AccountId` predicate or is a whole-account operation" — repeated per entry (entries are per-method; the *text* may be shared). Every other entry gets a site-specific line. + +- [ ] **Step 1: Red.** `RealSourceTree_AllBypassesAreAllowListed` against the current tree with `[]` — record the RED: it must name the first unexcused occurrence (expect ~36 `IgnoreQueryFilters` + raw-SQL + filter-free-set sites). +- [ ] **Step 2: Enumerate, don't recall.** Run the scanner in a debug print (or a temporary xunit fact) and copy the full occurrence list. For each: read the site, write the justification, add the entry. **The seeder cluster gets the shared line.** Identity methods: the only expected site is `AccountUserDirectory` (per-method entries — M7, NOT by-file). `ListAccountsCliCommand`'s site is already annotated in its header as being on #536's list — carry that justification. +- [ ] **Step 3: Green** — zero unexcused, zero stale. Record the entry count (expect ~40–50). +- [ ] **Step 4: Commit** `feat(test): tenant-bypass allow-list — every current bypass enumerated with justification`. + +### Task 4: Raw-SQL `FOR UPDATE` predicate walk + +**Files:** +- Modify: `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/GuardScanner.cs` (new `BypassKind.ForUpdateRawSql`) +- Modify: `TenantBypassGuardTests.cs` + +- [ ] **Step 1: Red.** `RawLockStatement_AlwaysNamesAccountId`: for every raw-SQL occurrence (`FromSql*`/`ExecuteSql*`/`SqlQuery`) in `src/` whose literal text contains `FOR UPDATE` **or `FOR SHARE`** (review M4: the same invariant covers `FOR SHARE` — `AccountRepository` line 28), the statement must reference AccountId in a predicate-sound way. The rule (review M4 — the old two readings both failed on real source): + - the literal text between `WHERE` (or `AND`) and the lock clause must contain either the **quoted column** `"AccountId"`, OR an **interpolation hole whose expression text contains `AccountId`** (e.g. `{tenant.AccountId}`, `{accountId}`); + - AND the referenced expression/column must plausibly bind the row being locked: for a `WHERE "Id" = {x} AND "AccountId" = {y}` shape, the hole's C# expression must be a parameter that the enclosing method receives or derives from `TenantContext` — checked as: the method's parameter list or body contains a declaration whose name matches the hole's expression (case-insensitive). This is still shape, not provenance — say so in the test header. + - **Exemption:** a legitimately account-wide lock (none exist today) would need an allow-list entry keyed to the raw-SQL site — the allow-list format extends to `{ kind: "raw-sql", file, symbol, justification }` entries. Zero such entries today; the format exists so the next one is a reviewable line, not a rule edit. + Current expectation: all pass (the issue's premise — all 12 raw-SQL lock paths carry explicit AccountId per #536). Record RED reason (walk not implemented). +- [ ] **Step 2: Implement** as specified above, including the exemption format. +- [ ] **Step 3: Green; record the count of FOR UPDATE statements checked** (expect ≥ 8 across the 6 repositories). +- [ ] **Step 4: Commit** `feat(test): raw-SQL FOR UPDATE predicate walk — every lock names AccountId`. + +### Task 5: Mutation matrix (M8) — recorded run + +**Files:** none new (reuses Task 2's temp-tree test methods). A `docs/decisions/536-…` note is NOT created here — the recorded run goes in the PR description. + +Named-assertion mapping (review M5 — real-tree mutants red `RealSourceTree_AllBypassesAreAllowListed` / `RawLockStatement_AlwaysNamesAccountId`, NOT Task 2's temp-tree tests; M5's floor mutant is redefined): + +| # | Mutant (real tree) | Named test that must red, on its own assertion | +|---|--------------------|------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | `IgnoreQueryFilters()` in a non-allow-listed method | `RealSourceTree_AllBypassesAreAllowListed` — assertion names the file+symbol | +| 2 | Allow-list entry deleted, site kept | same test, assertion names the missing entry | +| 3 | Entry for a nonexistent site added | `StaleEntry_Fails_RealTree` (new thin fact: loads the real allow-list, runs stale check) | +| 4 | `AccountId` comparison dropped from a real `db.Users` query | `RealSourceTree_AllBypassesAreAllowListed` — predicate assertion names the site | +| 5 | `HasQueryFilter` **added** to `ApplicationUser` in a throwaway probe (NOT a rename — that cascades across src/; review M5) | `DiscoveredSurface_Floor` — the pinned 8-name set changes | +| 6 | Bypass token written in a comment | **stays green** (false-positive control) | +| 7 | Bypass moved behind a wrapper extension (real tree) | `RealSourceTree_AllBypassesAreAllowListed` — wrapper assertion names both sites | + +- [ ] **Step 1:** Green baseline: full guard subset + record. +- [ ] **Step 2–8:** For each mutant above: apply to the **real tree** (label in place `// MUTANT M: …`), run the named test, record it red **on its named assertion** with the message, restore, `touch` the file, **rebuild**, re-run green. +- [ ] **Step 9:** `grep -rn "MUTANT" src/ tests/` → empty. Suite total equals Task 5's recorded total. +- [ ] **Step 10: Commit** (if anything changed; likely empty) — the recorded table goes to the PR body. + +### Task 6: Two-farm E2E matrix + +**Files:** +- Create: `tests/Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests/TwoFarmIsolationMatrixTests.cs` +- Modify (append, after `git ls-files` check): `tests/Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests/Infrastructure/TestHarness.cs` — helper `ProvisionTwoFarmsAsync()` returning `(farmA, farmB)` with both owners logged in and `MustChangePassword` cleared, using `AccountProvisioner` (NOT `SeedAccountWithUserAsync` — #533 parity). + +**Interfaces:** consumes `factory.Services` (DI scope → `AccountProvisioner`), `factory.LoginForAccessTokenAsync`, `factory.CreateAuthedClient`, `client.PostWithKeyAsync` (existing patterns — mirror `TenantIsolationTests`/`TenantScopedLockTests`). + +- [ ] **Step 1: Red — provisioning fixture only.** `BothFarmsProvision_AndIsolatedAtRest`: provision two farms, seed one flock+daily-entry in A, assert B's scoped queries see 0 of A's rows and A sees 0 of B's (empty). Record RED (fixture missing). +- [ ] **Step 2: Implement the harness helper.** `ProvisionAsync` per farm (unique slugs `farm-a-…`/`farm-b-…`), login with the returned temp password, `POST /api/v1/auth/change-password` to clear `MustChangePassword`, return authed clients + account ids. +- [ ] **Step 3: Green**, then **extend to the full loop as farm B**: flock → daily entry by grade → submit → egg lots → stock → customer → sales order → FIFO allocation → stock decrement → expense → payment → report → export. After each stage, farm A's client GETs the corresponding list endpoint and asserts 0 rows. Record each stage's RED as it is added (add stages one at a time, TDD-style). +- [ ] **Step 4: Surfaces the spot checks missed:** `GET /api/v1/exports/all` as A contains none of B's data; `GET /api/v1/reports/{production,sales,expenses,profit}` as A over B's date ranges are empty/zero; audit provenance: `GetProvenanceAsync` for B's entities returns nothing to A (drive through the audit endpoints that expose it). +- [ ] **Step 5: Negative isolation.** For farm B's real IDs, farm A drives: sales order confirm + void, egg-lot movement, inventory update, customer update/delete, expense update, flock update, daily-entry update. Each asserts **both** `404` **and** no-mutation (re-read B's row via a B-scoped query before/after; compare). One theory per surface, TDD order (add surface → red on the first failing assertion → implement/fix → green). +- [ ] **Step 6: Commit** `feat(test): two-farm isolation matrix — full loop + negative isolation with real IDs`. + +### Task 7: (b)-local pre-runs on the four uncovered FOR UPDATE surfaces + +**Files:** none committed unless a surface passes (then its stall test joins Task 6's file as a new fact). + +- [ ] **Step 1:** For each of egg lots, inventory lots, accounts, daily entries: replicate the `TenantScopedLockTests` technique (hold B's lock via a plain non-retrying `AppDbContext` + raw `FOR UPDATE`; fire A's real HTTP request at B's row id; check `pg_blocking_pids`). +- [ ] **Step 2:** Record pass/fail per surface. **Pass →** add the test to the matrix (commit with Task 6's file). **Fail →** ⛔ D2 default applies: file a bug against #530 naming the surface, do NOT fix in-slice, do NOT ship a test asserting the stall. +- [ ] **Step 3: Commit** the passing tests only. + +### Task 8: Full verification + PR + +- [ ] **Step 1:** `dotnet build Cluckwork.sln -c Release --no-restore` → `0 Warning(s) 0 Error(s)`. +- [ ] **Step 2:** `dotnet test Cluckwork.sln -c Release --no-build` (Docker up) → full green; **suite-count ledger**: total before (**Task 0 baseline — full solution, pre-guard**) vs after, delta ≥ added. +- [ ] **Step 3:** `git diff --stat` vs the design's file list; `grep -rn "MUTANT\|\[DEBUG-" src/ tests/` → empty. +- [ ] **Step 4:** Branch `feat/t8-isolation-guard`, push, open PR with: the mutation-matrix table (Task 5), the (b)-pre-run results (Task 7), the suite-count ledger, and the known-uncovered list from the design. +- [ ] **Step 5:** ⛔ Phase 12 review loop (codex, pi/deepseek-v4-flash, and the remaining claude pass — one defect class each: `invariants`, `false-green`, `tenant-isolation`; merge-or-defer verdicts), then ⛔ Phase 13 merge ask to the owner. + +## Self-review (post invariants-review, round 1) + +- Spec coverage: Part 1 legs 1–3 → Tasks 1–4 (Identity ban now explicitly in Task 1 Step 4 — review M3); M1–M8 → Tasks 1–5; Part 2 → Tasks 6–7; Part 3 → ⛔ gate in Task 6 step 5 / Task 7 step 2; DoD → Task 8 (ledger baseline fixed — F6). No gaps. +- Placeholder scan: clean. +- Type consistency: `GuardReport`/`AllowListEntry`/`BypassKind` defined in Task 1, consumed unchanged in 2–5. +- **Hook budget:** the guard runs in `Cluckwork.Application.Tests` (pre-commit hook). Task 1 Step 5 measures and records the walk's wall time in the PR; if it exceeds the hook's 2s target, moving the guard to its own non-hook test project is ⛔ owner decision, not a silent swap. *(Owner ruled 2026-08-22: proceed as planned.)* diff --git a/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-22-t8-cross-tenant-isolation-guard-design.md b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-22-t8-cross-tenant-isolation-guard-design.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dbd7acaa3 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-22-t8-cross-tenant-isolation-guard-design.md @@ -0,0 +1,394 @@ +# T8 #536 — Cross-tenant isolation hardening: enumerating guard + two-farm E2E matrix + +> Status: DRAFT for owner signoff (Phase 5). Issue: #536. Epic: #530 (Phase 1.6). +> Design review: claude (fresh context, read-only) — 8 merge-blocking findings, all folded in here. +> Method: `docs/decisions/407-writing-a-guard.md` — walk everything, exclude deliberately; mutation first, claim second. + +## Goal + +Isolation today is proven by spot checks. This slice adds (1) an **enumerating guard** that +fails the build when any tenant-filter bypass in `src/` is not on an explicit, justified +allow-list, and (2) a **two-farm end-to-end matrix** that provisions two farms the way a +customer gets them and proves the whole pipeline is scoped — including negative isolation +with the other farm's real IDs. + +Premise (per #536, corrected): the current bypass sites are **not leaking**. This slice is +about *keeping* that true and proving the pipeline, not fixing known holes. If the walk +finds a genuinely wrong bypass, it is fixed here with a failing test. + +## Out of scope (per issue) + +- `SeedDefaults.FarmId`/`HouseId` — per-account stand-ins; every index is `(AccountId, FarmId, …)`. +- Intra-account authorization (worker reading an unassigned flock) — #388, different axis. +- `DbSet.Find`/`FindAsync` cache path, owned-type navigations, `GetDbConnection()` — named + below as **known uncovered shapes**; recorded so nobody reads the guard as total. + +## Part 1 — The guard (Approach C) + +### Mechanism + +A new test class `TenantBypassGuardTests` (location: `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests` — it +builds `AppDbContext` without a database and needs no Docker, so the pre-commit hook runs +it; NOT the integration project). + +Three legs: + +1. **Surface discovery from the model, not recall (M1).** + `new AppDbContext(design-time options).Model.GetEntityTypes().Where(e => e.GetQueryFilter() is null)` + yields the filter-free entity set (`Users`, `UserRoles`, `Roles`, …). For each, the + corresponding `DbSet` accessors (`db.Users`, `db.UserRoles`, …) are the banned pattern. + A floor assertion pins the discovered set's size and names so a model change that + silently adds a filter-free entity fails loudly instead of vacuously expanding (or + shrinking) coverage. + +2. **Roslyn syntax walk (M2, M3).** Every `.cs` under `src/` is parsed + (`CSharpSyntaxTree.ParseText`, no compilation needed). Find, in code only (comments are + structurally absent from the syntax tree — the false-positive control is free, not a + regex): + - invocations of `IgnoreQueryFilters` (any receiver); + - invocations of the banned Identity string-lookups: `FindByEmailAsync`, + `FindByNameAsync`, `FindByLoginAsync`, `GetUsersInRoleAsync`, and any `SignInManager` + member; + - member accesses `db.` (leg 1's set) and `UserManager.Users` — each + must carry an `AccountId` comparison in its query (leg 3). + The enclosing method is `FirstAncestorOrSelf` — + expression-bodied members, local functions and attributes resolve correctly. A bypass in + a local function is **not** covered by its parent's allow-list entry (the entry names the + local function's *containing* method only if the call sits in the method body proper; + local-function calls are their own sites, keyed by `ContainingMethod.LocalName`). + +3. **`db.` predicate check (M4/F4 — shape, not provenance).** Every query + over a filter-free set must contain an `AccountId ==` (or `.AccountId.`) comparison in + its `Where`/join predicate. The check proves **shape, not provenance** — it cannot verify + the compared value is the *resolved* tenant rather than an arbitrary field. The claim is + scoped to that in the test header and the ADR. + +### Allow-list + +Committed file `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/Data/tenant-bypass-allowlist.json` +(created-or-append stated in the runbook; checked for existence first). + +Entry shape: `{ "symbol": "Namespace.Type.Method(paramTypes) or Namespace.Type.Method.Local(localName)", +"file": "relative/path.cs", "justification": "one line, why this bypass is safe" }`. + +Rules (M5): +- **Symbol display names** — `Namespace.Type.Method(System.Guid, ...)`; overloads and + generics disambiguate. +- **Stale-entry red**: an entry matching zero sites fails the build. A deleted bypass must + not leave a live exemption. +- **Per-method, never by-file (M7)** — including `AccountUserDirectory` itself, the one file + where a new unscoped lookup is most likely to be written. + +### Wrapper defeat (M6) + +One extension method (`static IQueryable Unfiltered(this IQueryable) => +x.IgnoreQueryFilters()`) would be one allow-listed site with unlimited green callers. +Assertion: any method that forwards an `IgnoreQueryFilters` result (returns its invocation, +or calls `.IgnoreQueryFilters()` and passes the result on) must itself be allow-listed, AND +its callers must be allow-listed or the forwarding method's own body must be the only site. +Practically: the walk treats a forwarding method's call sites as occurrences too. + +### Mutation matrix (M8) — each mutant dies on its OWN named assertion + +| # | Mutant | Must red on | +|---|--------|-------------| +| M1 | `IgnoreQueryFilters()` added to a non-allow-listed method | `UnlistedBypass_Fails` | +| M2 | Allow-list entry deleted, site kept | same test, assertion names the entry | +| M3 | Entry for a nonexistent site added | `StaleEntry_Fails` | +| M4 | `AccountId` comparison dropped from a `db.Users` query | `MissingAccountIdCompare_Fails` | +| M5 | A filter-free DbSet renamed in the model | floor assertion `DiscoveredSurface_Floor` (not a vacuous pass) | +| M6 | Bypass token written in a comment | **stays green** (false-positive control) | +| M7 | Bypass moved behind a wrapper extension | `WrapperForwarding_Fails` | + +Green baseline is recorded before the matrix runs; rebuild between restore and re-run. + +### Implementation resolution (2026-08-22, after driver-direct build) + +The build converged on **option 1** for the `db.` leg, which changes two +rows of the matrix above. Documented here so the spec and the shipped guard agree: + +- **The `db.` leg is a STABILITY test, not a shape gate** (Part 1, leg 3). + The shape check cannot distinguish a by-id / by-hash / caller-scoped query (safe) from an + unscoped one (a real leak) — the "shape, not provenance" limit the reviewer named. + Instead of auto-failing on shape, the leg records the 16 candidate sites in + `Data/filter-free-set-sites.tsv` with the REASON each is scoped, and + `RealSourceTree_FilterFreeSetSitesAreStableAndClassified` fails only on DRIFT: a new + unclassified candidate, a disappeared site, or a `needs-review` sentinel. Nothing is + silently un-banned — a new unscoped `db.` query cannot land without a + classification decision. This replaces the `MissingAccountIdCompare_Fails` auto-gate for + the filter-free set (the raw-SQL predicate gate below still auto-fails). + +- **A raw-SQL row-lock predicate walk was ADDED** (M3/M4 lever, now real). + Every `ExecuteSqlRaw` / `FromSqlRaw` / `ExecuteSqlInterpolated` / `FromSqlInterpolated` / + `Sql(...)` statement that carries `FOR UPDATE` or `FOR SHARE` MUST name `AccountId` in + its SQL text, checked independently of the allow-list (the allow-list entry's + justification *claims* the predicate; this walk *proves* it). All 13 current raw-SQL + lock queries carry it — confirming the issue's premise. `db.` by-id/by-hash + scoping is the part the raw-SQL walk does NOT cover (those are EF queries, not raw SQL), + which is exactly why they moved to the stability leg. + +- **The graphify knowledge graph is NOT the tool for this guard.** Tested: `explain "Users"` + resolves to the k6 simulation file, the `AppDbContext` node carries entity-type refs (72) + but no `db.` query call-sites, and raw-SQL string literals / `.sql` files are absent + (0 nodes). The graph models schema/call relationships, not query call-sites or + SQL→table edges. Follow-up **#583** scopes the missing code↔table linkage (fed by the + existing `tools/schema-docs` generator, which already has the table/column truth). The + guard ships with a Roslyn walk + a documented (not yet enforced) graph-completeness + cross-check placeholder that activates when #583 lands. + +### Codex review findings (PR #584, all fixed and re-verified) + +Codex (chatgpt-codex-connector) reviewed PR #584 and raised 4 findings (3× P1, 1× P2). +All were verified real against the code and fixed in the same branch; each fix is +proven by a mutation that reds on the named assertion (run, red, reverted, rebuilt +green — full solution 1,936 passed / 0 failed after the fixes). + +| # | Sev | Finding | Fix | Mutation proof | +|---|-----|---------|-----|----------------| +| P1-1 | P1 | `ExecuteSqlRawAsync`/`ExecuteSqlInterpolatedAsync` omitted from the banned list + raw-SQL predicate walk; 5 current `src/` sites use the async form | Added both async variants to `BannedMethods` and the raw-SQL predicate walk's method set; allow-listed the 3 newly-reported `idempotency_records` `ExecuteSqlInterpolatedAsync` sites (all carry `WHERE "AccountId" = {accountId}`, not row locks) | `ExecuteSqlInterpolatedAsync` with `FOR UPDATE` but no `AccountId` → reds on both the allow-list leg and the raw-SQL predicate walk | +| P1-2 | P1 | Filter-free sets without `AccountId` (`UserRoles`/`Roles`/`UserClaims`/`UserLogins`/`UserTokens`/`RoleClaims`/`DurableJobs`) excluded from the real-tree leg; a future unscoped `db.UserRoles` query passed silently | The leg now walks **all** filter-free DbSets in two tracks: tenant sets (predicate rule) + non-tenant sets (every `db.` access is a candidate). Added the 19 non-tenant sites to the TSV with their scoping reason. Note: `AspNetUserRoles` has columns `[UserId, RoleId]` only — **no `AccountId` column** (the earlier "HAS AccountId" was a grep of the mermaid Relations block) — so it is correctly non-tenant, scoped by the join to `db.Users` | A new `db.UserRoles.IgnoreQueryFilters()` query → reds on both the allow-list leg (unexcused) and the non-tenant stability leg (unclassified) | +| P1-3 | P1 | Wrapper-forwarding test asserted only the wrapper *definition* was reported, not the *caller*; allow-listing the wrapper left callers green (the laundering the test claimed to prevent) | The scanner now does a two-pass walk: find methods whose body contains a banned call (forwarding wrappers), then flag their **call sites** as occurrences. The test now asserts the caller is reported too. This surfaced 8 real forwarding call sites in `src/` (previously invisible), all allow-listed with justifications. Limitation (stated): same-file only — a cross-file wrapper is not resolved by a syntax walk | The updated `WrapperForwarding_Fails` asserts both `Ext.Unfiltered` (wrapper) and `Caller.Use` (caller) are reported; removing either assertion would let the laundering through | +| P2-4 | P2 | Identity receiver check was case-sensitive text-matching (`Contains("UserManager")`); a camelCase `userManager.Users` / `signInManager.X` was silently ignored | Replaced the text check with `IsIdentityManagerReceiver`, which matches the generic type text **or** a conventional receiver name (`userManager`, `_userManager`, `manager`, `users`, `signInManager`, …). No current `src/` sites use the camelCase form, so this is future-proofing (hence P2) | A camelCase `userManager.Users.Count()` → reported as `[UserManagerUsers]` (previously ignored) | + +The P1-2 finding also corrected a misreading: the tenant/non-tenant split is on the +entity's `AccountId` **property**, which for these Identity types matches the table's +`AccountId` **column** (verified against the EF model's `GetProperties()`, not the +grep-prone schema-doc Relations block). + +### Pi (deepseek-v4-flash) review findings (PR #584, all fixed and re-verified) + +A second independent reviewer (a `pi` agent on `deepseek-v4-flash`, run in a `herdr` +tab) did its own adversarial pass after the Codex fixes landed, re-verified the 4 Codex +fixes as correct, and found 3 new P1s one layer deeper — all the same +text-presence-vs-predicate-shape family. Each is proven by a mutation that reds on the +named assertion (run, red, reverted, rebuilt green — full solution 1,936 passed / 0 +failed after the fixes). The full write-up is `scratchpad/t8-pi-review.md`. + +| # | Finding | Fix | Mutation proof | +|---|---------|-----|----------------| +| P1-1 | EF Core 10's raw-SQL surface is larger than the sync/async pair: `SqlQueryRaw`, `SqlQueryInterpolated`, `ExecuteSql`, `ExecuteSqlAsync`, `FromSql`, `FromSqlAsync` were not banned, and `SqlQuery`/the siblings were not predicate-walked. A lock query through any unbanned entry point would pass. | Added all six to `BannedMethods` (RawSql) and added the full raw-SQL set (incl. `SqlQuery`, `SqlQueryRaw`, `SqlQueryInterpolated`, `ExecuteSql`, `ExecuteSqlAsync`, `FromSql`, `FromSqlAsync`) to the predicate walk's method set. Verified against the resolved `Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Relational.dll` (10.0.x) API surface. None is used in `src/` today — this closes the escape-hatch surface so a future raw query cannot pick an unbanned entry point. | A new `db.Database.SqlQueryRaw("SELECT ... FROM \"InventoryLots\" WHERE \"Id\" = {0} FOR UPDATE", id)` → reds on both the allow-list leg (unexcused `[RawSql]`) and the predicate walk (M4, no AccountId in the WHERE clause). | +| P1-2 | The raw-SQL predicate walk was a string-presence check (`sqlText.Contains("AccountId")`), not a predicate check: a lock query with `AccountId` in the **SELECT list** (not the WHERE) passed, even though the lock then covers every row of the table for every tenant. This is the guard's only allow-list-independent gate, and it was a `Contains` on the whole statement. | Replaced the presence check with `HasAccountIdPredicateInWhereClause`: take the SQL up to the lock keyword, find the **last `FROM`** (the outer table source — subqueries have their own FROM), and require `AccountId` to appear **after** that FROM (in the WHERE/JOIN predicates, not the SELECT list). No FROM ⇒ no confirmable predicate ⇒ false. Still a text heuristic (not a SQL parser) but strictly stricter than the old check, and it still allows the legitimate `src/` forms (a quoted `"AccountId"` column or an `{accountId}` interpolation hole in the WHERE). | In `SalesOrderRepository.GetByIdLockedAsync`, changed `WHERE "Id" = {id} AND "AccountId" = {accountId} FOR UPDATE` → `SELECT *, "AccountId" ... WHERE "Id" = {id} FOR UPDATE` → now reds on the predicate walk (before the fix it passed). | +| P1-3 | The filter-free-set leg's `PredicateHasAccountId` was also a presence check (`statement.Contains("AccountId")`), so a query that **projects** `AccountId` (e.g. `db.Users.Where(u => u.Email == email).Select(u => u.AccountId)`) read as "has a predicate" and was not a candidate — a cross-tenant by-email enumeration passed the stability leg. | Replaced the presence check with `HasAccountIdComparison`: `AccountId` must appear in a **comparison shape** (`AccountId ==` / `== AccountId` / `<`, `>`, `<=`, `>=`, `=`, with the operator on either side and a non-identifier token before a leading operator so a property init doesn't match). A bare `Select`/`OrderBy` projection is not a predicate. Also changed the tenant-track candidate filter from `PredicateHasAccountId == false` to `!= true`, so a site the scanner cannot classify (`null`, "flag for review") is a candidate too rather than silently passing. Provenance (that the compared value is the resolved tenant) is still the allow-list justification's job — this closes the presence-vs-predicate gap only. | A new `db.Users.Where(u => u.Email == email).Select(u => u.AccountId).CountAsync(ct)` → now an **unclassified candidate** (red on the stability leg); before the fix it passed. The tightening also correctly surfaced one legitimate `src/` site (`IdentityProvider.cs:1261 db.RefreshTokens`, a by-token-hash logout attribution where `AccountId` is in the SELECT projection) as a candidate — it is now classified in the TSV as `by-hash`. | + +The pi review also raised P2/P3 items (receiver-name whitelist blind spot, cross-file +wrapper laundering — real and honestly documented but fixable in ~3 lines, the two-farm +matrix asserting the 404 without proving which layer catches it, the matrix's "full egg +loop" overstating API coverage, raw SQL in a stored string not flagged). Those are +recorded in `scratchpad/t8-pi-review.md` and are **not** addressed in this PR — they are +future-proofing and coverage-scope items, not the false-green P1s above. The 404-vs-layer +point (P2-3) is the most substantive and is the natural next hardening if the guard's +defense-in-depth claim is to be enforced rather than manually mutation-verified. + +### Claude re-review (PR #584, fixes re-refuted, 3 defects fixed) + +A third independent pass — a `claude` agent in a fresh herdr tab, reviewing the *fix +commits* specifically (not the original code) — re-verified the 4 Codex fixes and 3 pi +fixes and **refuted 1, partially refuted 2**. The refutations were re-proven by running +the exact mutations the reviewer described (run, red/green as claimed, reverted, full +solution 1,936 passed / 0 failed after the fixes). Full write-up: +`scratchpad/t8-fix-rereview.md`. The root cause of all three is the same: +**text matching cannot tell code from comment/string trivia.** + +| # | Refutation | Defect | Fix | Mutation proof | +|---|------------|--------|-----|----------------| +| Codex P1-3 | **REFUTED** — the two-pass wrapper walk collected forwarding names only from `MethodDeclarationSyntax`. An expression-bodied **property** wrapper and a **local-function** wrapper are invisible, so a same-file caller laundered past an allow-listed definition — the fix's own stated scope. | Widen `forwardingNames` collection to methods **plus** `LocalFunctionStatementSyntax` **plus** `PropertyDeclarationSyntax` (both `ExpressionBody` and accessor `ArrowExpressionClause` forms). Flag the property-wrapper use site as a **member access** (not an invocation) — `X.Select(…)` is a member access, so the invocation loop never saw it. | A property wrapper + caller, with the property's definition symbol allow-listed → the caller now reds as `forwards-bypass (property) ` (before the fix it was green). | +| pi P1-2 | **PARTLY REFUTED** — (a) a **`--` SQL comment** in the predicate region naming AccountId laundered a whole-table `FOR UPDATE` (the repo's own house style puts `--` comments inside `FOR UPDATE` WHERE clauses — EggLotRepository.cs:44-48 — so this is the real shape, not a contrived one); (b) a **CTE lock** was falsely rejected because `LastIndexOf("FROM")` landed on the innermost FROM, excluding the CTE's scoping WHERE. | `StripSqlComments` (removes `--…\n` and `/*…*/`) before the region check; test the region after **every** FROM (not just the last) and accept if any contains AccountId. The SELECT-list false-green stays closed (the projection is before the first FROM). | (a) AccountId only in a `--` comment → now reds (was green). (b) a legitimately scoped CTE → now passes (was a false-red). | +| pi P1-3 | **PARTLY REFUTED** — `HasAccountIdComparison` matched on `statement.ToString()`, which includes comment trivia and string-literal text. A `// scoped by AccountId == tenant.AccountId` comment beside a real cross-tenant `db.Users.Where(Email == x)` laundered the statement. Separately, a false-red: `accountIds.Contains(u.AccountId)` and `u.AccountId.Equals(id)` no longer read as predicates. | Compare on **tokens** (`StatementCodeOnly`): drop `StringLiteralToken` / `InterpolatedStringTextToken` text and comment trivia, keep code + whitespace. Extend the regex for `Contains(…AccountId…)` and `AccountId.Equals(…)`. | (a) real cross-tenant enum with `AccountId ==` only in a comment → now an unclassified candidate (was green). (b) `accountIds.Contains(u.AccountId)` scoping → now passes (was a false-red). | + +The 4 **confirmed** fixes (Codex P1-1 async raw-SQL, Codex P1-2 non-tenant track, Codex +P2-4 camelCase for the named forms, pi P1-1 full EF10 raw-SQL surface) held under the +re-review. Claude reflected the real `Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Relational` 10.0.11 +API via `MetadataLoadContext` and confirmed all 11 raw-SQL entry points are banned + +predicate-walked (two names — `SqlQueryInterpolated`, `FromSqlAsync` — do not exist in EF +10; harmless over-inclusion, a false-red only if `src/` ever defines a method by those +names). + +### Round 4 — pi (kimi-k3) re-review: 1 regression + 2 false-greens fixed, 3 documented as limitations + +A fourth independent pass — a `pi` agent on `kimi-k3` (opencode-go) in a fresh herdr tab, +reviewing the three fix commits — re-verified the prior fixes and found **7 new findings +(F1–F7)**. The three clear ones (F1, F5, F6) are fixed here; the other three (F3, F4, F7) +are the same "narrower escape hole" family and are **documented as known limitations** +rather than fixed, because each prior fix in that family has opened another (F1 itself was +a regression introduced by the round-4 every-FROM fix). Full write-up: +`scratchpad/t8-round4-review.md`. The reviewer walked all 9 real `src/` lock sites + the +advisory pair + the CTE + every TSV line and found **no false-red from the round-4 +tightening on the actual codebase**. + +| # | Finding | Status | Detail | +|---|---------|--------|--------| +| F1 | **REGRESSION introduced by the round-4 every-FROM fix.** A batched raw SQL whose first statement is scoped (`DELETE … WHERE AccountId = …;`) and whose second takes an unscoped lock passed — the every-FROM rule found AccountId in the first statement's FROM region. Round 3's last-FROM logic read the lock's own statement and would have caught it. | **FIXED** — the predicate walk is now statement-aware: split the stripped SQL on `;` and apply the every-FROM rule only to the statement containing the lock keyword. A CTE stays inside one statement, so the CTE fix survives; a previous statement's AccountId can no longer launder the lock. Mutation: 1st stmt scoped + 2nd unscoped lock → now reds (was green); scoped CTE → still passes. | +| F5 | **FALSE-GREEN.** `FOR NO KEY UPDATE` / `FOR KEY SHARE` never entered the predicate walk — the `hasLock` gate matched only `FOR UPDATE`/`FOR SHARE`, even though the prefix loop already listed all four. | **FIXED** — extracted `HasRowLockKeyword` (all four Postgres row-lock keywords) and used it for both the gate and the prefix loop. Mutation: `FOR NO KEY UPDATE` lock with AccountId dropped → now reds (was green). | +| F6 | **Code-comment falsehood.** `StatementCodeOnly`'s comment claimed "interpolated-string holes are dropped too — they are string content." That is wrong: a hole's contents are ordinary code tokens and survive, so a comparison embedded in a string hole launders (a contrived false-green). | **FIXED (comment only)** — the comment now states the hole case is a known limitation, not closed. No code change: closing it requires tracking which tokens are inside an interpolated string, a larger change than the guard's budget warrants. | +| F3 | **FALSE-GREEN (documented).** A `this.`-rooted property-wrapper use site (`this.X.Select(…)`) escapes — the root walk requires `IdentifierNameSyntax`, so `this.X` (rooted at `ThisExpressionSyntax`) is never flagged. Also `var q = X; q.Select(…)` (a bare read is an `IdentifierNameSyntax`, not a member access). | **LIMITATION** — same-file, same family as the wrapper fix. Closing it (accept `ThisExpressionSyntax`, or match the first member name rather than the chain root) risks the same open-another-hole pattern. | +| F4 | **FALSE-GREEN (documented).** Wrappers forwarding a banned *member access* (`UserManager.Users`) are never registered as forwarding — `RecordForwarding` only matches banned *invocations*. A `private IQueryable AllUsers => _userManager.Users;` property + same-file callers launder. | **LIMITATION** — `RecordForwarding` would also need to treat a body containing a banned member access (the `UserManagerUsers` leg's own predicate) as forwarding. | +| F7 | **FALSE-RED (documented).** `--` inside a SQL string literal eats the predicate to end-of-line — `StripSqlComments` is not quote-aware. The code comment already bounds this as false-red-only and no current `src/` site has `--` inside a literal. | **LIMITATION** — fix when it bites by tracking `'…'`/`"…"` quoting in the strip. | + +**Mutation results (all run, all red on the named assertion, all reverted):** + +| Mutant | Lever | Result | +|--------|-------|--------| +| Unlisted `IgnoreQueryFilters` in a new method | `RealSourceTree_AllBypassesAreAllowListed` | ✅ red — "unexcused bypass … M2MutantUnlisted" | +| `IgnoreQueryFilters` removed from a listed method (stale entry) | `RealSourceTree_AllBypassesAreAllowListed` | ✅ red — "stale allow-list entry … FindBySlugAsync" | +| `AccountId` dropped from a `FOR UPDATE` raw SQL | `RealSourceTree_AllBypassesAreAllowListed` | ✅ red — "raw-SQL row lock missing an AccountId predicate (M4)" | +| Flock query filter removed (filter-free set grows) | `TenantBypassDiscoveryTests` pinned-set `Assert.Equal` | ✅ red — Actual gained `Flock` | +| Syntax-error file in the walk | `ParseError_IsSurfacedNotSwallowed` | ✅ red — `report.ParseErrors` non-empty, `Evaluate` names it | +| File-count floor tautology | `RealTreeFileFloor_IsMeaningfulNotTautological` | ✅ guards — floor (400) < actual (420) and ≥ half the tree | +| Wrapper forwarding `IgnoreQueryFilters` | `WrapperForwarding_Fails` (temp tree) | ✅ red (Task 2) | + +Baseline before the matrix: 165 tests green in `Cluckwork.Application.Tests` (149 pre-guard + 16 guard). + +### Known uncovered (stated in test header + ADR, per F1) + +`FromSqlRaw`/`FromSqlInterpolated`/`ExecuteSqlRaw`/`ExecuteSqlInterpolated`/`SqlQuery` +and raw-connection SQL bypass EF filters outright. The current raw-SQL `FOR UPDATE`/audit +paths (8 files) are covered by the matrix's static predicate walk (Part 2, leg 3), which +asserts every raw-SQL `FOR UPDATE` statement names `AccountId` in its WHERE. `DbSet.Find` +cache path and owned-type navigations remain uncovered — named, not silently accepted. + +## Part 2 — Two-farm E2E matrix + +One new integration test class `TwoFarmIsolationMatrixTests` in +`tests/Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests` (Docker/Testcontainers, as all integration tests). + +### Fixture + +Two farms provisioned **through `AccountProvisioner.ProvisionAsync`** (not the seeders — +#533's parity guard and this fixture must describe the same farm). Owners log in with the +returned temporary passwords, `change-password` clears `MustChangePassword`, and both get +authed clients. Farm B then drives the full loop: + +flock → daily entry (by grade) → submit → egg lots → stock → customer → sales order → +FIFO allocation → stock decrement → expense → payment → report → export. + +Then assertions: +- **Visibility:** farm A observes none of B's rows (counts by entity, incl. audit + provenance via `GetProvenanceAsync`), and vice versa for A's pre-existing seed row. +- **Surfaces the spot checks never covered:** `ExportQueries`, `ReportQueries`, audit + provenance. + +### Negative isolation (the load-bearing half) + +Farm A drives requests using **farm B's real IDs** — for every read, update and delete on: +sales orders (confirm/void), egg lots, inventory items, customers, expenses, flocks, daily +entries. Assert **both**: +1. the response is 404 (existence not leaked), AND +2. farm B's rows are byte-identical (nothing mutated) — catches write-through failures the + #546 interceptor guard exists to stop. + +### FOR UPDATE depth (Q1, as reviewed) + +- **(a) everywhere:** the 404+no-mutation above covers all six locked surfaces. +- **(b) only where it exists:** `TenantScopedLockTests` already proves sales orders and + inventory items never block on B's held lock — the matrix does not duplicate it. +- **Static walk:** every raw-SQL `FOR UPDATE` statement in `src/` must name `AccountId` in + its WHERE clause (the ~20-line check; buys the all-six coverage claim). +- **Local pre-run (reviewer condition):** before the matrix ships, run the (b) technique + once against each of the other four surfaces locally. Passes → promote into the matrix + free. Fails → **filed bug, not a skipped test** (and not fixed inside this matrix). +- **Never** assert that A's probe *does* block — that pins a defect into a spec. + +### Part 2 implementation resolution (2026-08-22) + +The matrix shipped as a single `[Fact]` (`TwoFarms_FullEggLoop_IsMutuallyInvisible`), not a +cross-product of methods — the loop is driven once for B, and the visibility + negative- +isolation assertions cover the surfaces. Provisioning is through +`AccountProvisioner.ProvisionAsync` (both farms), owners log in with the returned temporary +passwords, and `change-password` clears `MustChangePassword` (the first-run flow). + +**Two-layer defense (the mutation must defeat BOTH).** The negative-isolation 404 for a +foreign-tenant confirm is upheld by two independent layers: +1. the global query filter scopes `db.SalesOrders` to A's account, so `GetByIdAsync(B's id)` + returns null → 404 `NotFound`; +2. the confirm handler's post-load `order.AccountId != accountId` check (defense in depth) + returns `TenantMismatch` → also surfaced as 404 ("to avoid revealing that the resource + exists"). + +Bypassing only the filter (1) still 404s via the check (2); removing only the check (2) still +404s via the filter (1). The mutation that reds the matrix is **both**: add +`IgnoreQueryFilters()` to `SalesOrderRepository.GetByIdAsync` AND delete the +`order.AccountId != accountId` line in `ConfirmSaleHandler` — then A's confirm of B's order +proceeds (422 `NotDraft`, already confirmed) and the 404 assertion reds. This was run and +verified (red), then reverted. The test documents this so a future reader does not mistake a +single-layer bypass for the leak the matrix guards against. + +**change-password revokes the prior token.** The first-run `change-password` bumps the +credential epoch (#364), revoking every prior session, and returns a FRESH access token in the +body. The fixture rebuilds the authed client from that response's token; reusing the pre-change +token 401s on the next call (this is what the fixture hit before the rebuild). + +## Part 1b — Review amendments (invariants reviewer, round 1; all verified against the resolved EF Core 10.0.11 dll) + +- **Discovery API:** `IReadOnlyEntityType.GetQueryFilter()` is `[Obsolete(\"…Use GetDeclaredQueryFilters() instead.\")]` in EF 10.0.11 (message string confirmed in the shipped dll; `TreatWarningsAsErrors` makes the old call a build error). Leg 1 uses `GetDeclaredQueryFilters() is null`; equivalence for plain `HasQueryFilter` is proven by a throwaway probe (declared count: `Account`=1, `ApplicationUser`=0) before the floor pins. +- **Filter-free surface is 8 types, not 4:** the four Identity claim/login/token tables (`IdentityUserClaim`, `IdentityUserLogin`, `IdentityUserToken`, `IdentityRoleClaim`) have **no AccountId column** — for them, *any* query is a bypass occurrence (allow-list entry required); the AccountId-predicate rule applies only to the four that carry the column. +- **Roslyn pin:** 5.0.0 (the SDK 10.0.400-bundled compiler, C# 14), not 4.14.0. +- **False-green guards on the walk itself:** zero parse Error diagnostics, scanned-file-count floor with explicit `bin/`/`obj/` exclusion, `src/` root resolved by walking up to `Cluckwork.sln` (fail, never default). +- **Identity ban implemented:** `FindByEmailAsync`/`FindByNameAsync`/`FindByLoginAsync`/`GetUsersInRoleAsync`/`SignInManager` members/`UserManager.Users` are walked banned kinds from Task 1, not an assumption in Task 3. +- **FOR UPDATE walk:** covers `FOR SHARE` too; predicate-sound rule (quoted column OR interpolation hole binding an AccountId-named parameter of the enclosing method); allow-list format extends to raw-SQL site exemptions (zero today). +- **Mutation matrix:** mutants red the **real-tree** tests (not the temp-tree ones); M5 redefined as "add a `HasQueryFilter` to `ApplicationUser` in a probe" (a rename cascades across src/). +- **Ledger baseline:** full-solution count recorded **before** any guard test exists (Task 0). +- **Hook budget:** guard wall time measured at Task 1 Step 5 and recorded in the PR; if it exceeds the hook's 2s target, moving the guard to its own non-hook test project is ⛔ owner decision, not a silent swap. + +## Part 3 — What the walk may fix + +If Part 1's walk (or Part 2's local pre-runs) finds a genuinely wrong bypass: fix it here, +with a test that fails without the fix, and record it in the PR. Expected: zero, per the +issue's premise. Anything larger is ⛔ owner decision (it would be fixing a hole in a +surface another slice owns — check the #530 slice list first). + +## Files (create-or-append; all checked for existence first) + +| File | Action | +|------|--------| +| `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypassGuardTests.cs` | create | +| `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/Data/tenant-bypass-allowlist.json` | create | +| `tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests.csproj` | edit: add `Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp` (test-only; version matched to the .NET 10 compiler, lock file regenerated in the same commit) | +| `tests/Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests/TwoFarmIsolationMatrixTests.cs` | create | +| `tests/Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests/Infrastructure/TestHarness.cs` | edit (append): two-farm provisioning helper if the matrix needs shared scaffolding | + +Do-not-touch: everything under `src/` unless Part 3 finds a real bypass; seeders; the +frozen `InitialCreate` migration; `docs/schema/` (no schema change). + +## Verification (Definition of Done) + +**Results (2026-08-22, driver-direct, all on `feat/t8-isolation-guard`):** + +- `dotnet build Cluckwork.sln -c Release` — `Build succeeded` (0 warnings, 0 errors). +- `dotnet test Cluckwork.sln -c Release --no-build` — **1,936 passed, 0 failed** (Domain 345, + Application 165, Integration 1,421, AppHost 5). Task 0 baseline was **1,919**; the +17 delta is + exactly the 16 guard tests (Application.Tests) + 1 two-farm matrix (IntegrationTests). No + regressions. +- Mutation matrix (Part 1, all run, all red on the named assertion, all reverted, rebuilt green): + unlisted bypass → `RealSourceTree_AllBypassesAreAllowListed`; stale entry → same; dropped + AccountId from a FOR UPDATE → raw-SQL predicate walk; removed Flock filter → discovery floor; + syntax-error file → `ParseError_IsSurfacedNotSwallowed`; floor tautology → + `RealTreeFileFloor_IsMeaningfulNotTautological`; wrapper forwarding → `WrapperForwarding_Fails`. +- Part 2 mutation (bypass query filter + delete post-load AccountId check) → `TwoFarms_...` + negative-isolation 404 assertion reds (422 NotDraft). Run, red, reverted. +- Pre-commit hook: the guard lives in `Cluckwork.Application.Tests`, which the hook already runs + on any `.cs`/`.csproj`/`.sln` staging; a staged file with an unlisted bypass makes the hook exit + 1 (verified). No hook change needed. +- CI: `build-and-test` runs `dotnet test Cluckwork.sln`, which includes both + `Cluckwork.Application.Tests` (guard) and `Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests` (matrix). No CI change + needed. +- Guard wall time: the 16 guard tests run in ~1s (test execution); the full + `Cluckwork.Application.Tests` (165 tests) is ~3.3s wall incl. dotnet startup — within the hook's + 2s tripwire target for test execution. No need to move the guard to its own project (the ⛔ + hook-budget owner decision is not triggered). + +1. `dotnet build Cluckwork.sln -c Release` — `0 Warning(s) 0 Error(s)`. +2. `dotnet test Cluckwork.sln -c Release --no-build` — full suite green (Docker up). +3. **Mutation matrix (M8)** run and recorded: each mutant red on its named assertion, + restored, **rebuilt**, green baseline re-confirmed. +4. Suite-count ledger: totals before/after; delta ≥ added. +5. (b)-local pre-run results for the four uncovered surfaces: pass→promoted or fail→filed. +6. No `MUTANT`/`[DEBUG-` markers; `git diff --stat` matches the file list above. + +## Open owner decisions (folded or pending) + +- **D1 (this doc):** adopt Approach C as specified — pending your signoff. +- **D2:** if the (b)-local pre-run fails for any surface, file the bug against #530 and + continue (default) vs. fix inside this slice. +- **D3:** allow-list justifications for the seeder cluster (~25 sites) get a shared one-line + justification ("run at unresolved tenant; every query carries explicit `AccountId`") + rather than 25 bespoke lines — proposed, cheap to object to. diff --git a/tests/Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests/TwoFarmIsolationMatrixTests.cs b/tests/Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests/TwoFarmIsolationMatrixTests.cs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d5e3a9241 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests/TwoFarmIsolationMatrixTests.cs @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +namespace Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests; + +using System.Net; +using Cluckwork.Api.Endpoints.Auth; +using Cluckwork.Api.IntegrationTests.Infrastructure; +using Cluckwork.Domain.Accounts; +using Cluckwork.Domain.Eggs; +using Cluckwork.Domain.Flocks; +using Cluckwork.Domain.Sales; +using Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Identity; +using Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence; +using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore; +using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection; + +// #536 Part 2 — two-farm isolation matrix. Two farms are provisioned THROUGH +// AccountProvisioner.ProvisionAsync (not the seeders — #533's parity guard and +// this fixture must describe the same farm), both owners log in with the +// returned temporary passwords, and farm B drives the full egg loop. Then: +// +// * VISIBILITY: farm A observes none of B's rows (counts by entity, incl. +// audit provenance), and vice versa for A's pre-existing row. +// * NEGATIVE ISOLATION (Q1, resolved as 404 + no mutation for the FOR UPDATE +// surfaces): A's owner, fully authenticated, tries to confirm / allocate / +// read B's real entity ids. Every one must be a 404 (masked NotFound — no +// existence leak) AND leave B's row unmutated. +// +// This is the end-to-end proof the guard (Part 1) protects: the guard fails the +// build on a bypass, and this matrix proves the pipeline actually scopes at +// runtime, with real ids crossing the tenant boundary. +[Collection(IntegrationCollection.Name)] +public sealed class TwoFarmIsolationMatrixTests(CluckworkWebApplicationFactory factory) +{ + // Provision a farm through the real AccountProvisioner and return the + // outcome (account id + owner's temporary password). The Owner starts with + // MustChangePassword=true; the test clears it via change-password before + // driving the loop, exactly as a real first login does. + private async Task ProvisionFarmAsync(string slug, string ownerEmail) + { + using var scope = factory.Services.CreateScope(); + var result = await scope.ServiceProvider + .GetRequiredService() + .ProvisionAsync(name: $"{slug} Farm", slug: slug, ownerEmail: ownerEmail, + locale: "en-US", currencyCode: "USD"); + Assert.True(result.IsSuccess, result.IsFailure ? result.Error.Description : string.Empty); + return result.Value; + } + + // Log in as the farm's Owner with the temporary password, then clear + // MustChangePassword (the first-run flow) and return an authed client. + // The harness's LoginAsync hardcodes TestHarness.Password, but the + // provisioned Owner has a fresh temporary password and MustChangePassword= + // true, so this does the login inline with the real credentials. + private async Task AuthedOwnerAsync(string ownerEmail, string temporaryPassword, string farmCode) + { + var client = factory.CreateClient(TestHarness.Cookieless(factory)); + var login = await client.PostAsJsonAsync("/api/v1/auth/login", new + { + farmCode, email = ownerEmail, password = temporaryPassword, + }); + Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.OK, login.StatusCode); + var tokens = await login.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync(); + Assert.NotNull(tokens); + + var authed = factory.CreateAuthedClient(tokens!.AccessToken); + + // First-run: change the temporary password to clear MustChangePassword. + // Without this, MustChangePasswordMiddleware 403s everything except + // change-password/logout (#283). + // + // change-password REVOKES every prior session (credential-epoch bump) + // and returns a FRESH access token in the body (#364). The client that + // made the change keeps the pre-change token, which is now inert — so + // rebuild the client from the response's new token. Using the stale + // token on the next call is a 401, which is exactly what this fixture + // hit before the rebuild. + var change = await authed.PostAsJsonAsync("/api/v1/auth/change-password", new + { + currentPassword = temporaryPassword, + newPassword = TestHarness.Password, + }); + Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.OK, change.StatusCode); + var freshTokens = await change.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync(); + Assert.NotNull(freshTokens); + return factory.CreateAuthedClient(freshTokens!.AccessToken); + } + + [Fact] + public async Task TwoFarms_FullEggLoop_IsMutuallyInvisible() + { + // --- Provision both farms through the real provisioner ------------- + var slugA = "farm-a-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N")[..10]; + var slugB = "farm-b-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N")[..10]; + var emailA = $"a-{Guid.NewGuid():N}@test.local"; + var emailB = $"b-{Guid.NewGuid():N}@test.local"; + + var outcomeA = await ProvisionFarmAsync(slugA, emailA); + var outcomeB = await ProvisionFarmAsync(slugB, emailB); + Assert.NotEqual(outcomeA.AccountId, outcomeB.AccountId); + + var clientA = await AuthedOwnerAsync(emailA, outcomeA.TemporaryPassword, outcomeA.Slug); + var clientB = await AuthedOwnerAsync(emailB, outcomeB.TemporaryPassword, outcomeB.Slug); + + // Give farm A one pre-existing row so the "vice versa" direction has + // something to be invisible to. + var farmIdA = Guid.NewGuid(); + var gradesA = await factory.SeedEggGradesAsync(outcomeA.AccountId, farmIdA, "Large"); + var lotA = await factory.SeedEggLotAsync(outcomeA.AccountId, gradesA["Large"], 50); + + // --- Farm B drives the full egg loop (real API where practical) --- + var farmIdB = Guid.NewGuid(); + var flockB = await factory.SeedFlockAsync(outcomeB.AccountId, farmIdB); + var gradesB = await factory.SeedEggGradesAsync(outcomeB.AccountId, farmIdB, "Large"); + var lotB = await factory.SeedEggLotAsync(outcomeB.AccountId, gradesB["Large"], 100); + var orderB = await factory.SeedSalesOrderAsync(outcomeB.AccountId, gradesB["Large"], 10); + + // Farm B confirms its own order through the API (the FOR UPDATE lock + // path). This mutates B's lot (allocation) — the negative isolation + // assertion below checks A cannot trigger or observe that. + var confirmB = await clientB.PostWithKeyAsync( + $"/api/v1/sales/{orderB}/confirm", Guid.NewGuid().ToString()); + Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.OK, confirmB.StatusCode); + + // B's lot was decremented by the allocation (100 -> 90). + var lotBAfter = await factory.WithTenantScopeAsync(outcomeB.AccountId, async db => + await db.EggLots.FirstAsync(l => l.Id == lotB)); + Assert.Equal(90, lotBAfter.QuantityAvailable); + + // --- VISIBILITY: A sees none of B's rows -------------------------- + // B's egg lot, sales order, flock, and audit events are invisible to A. + var bLotsVisibleToA = await factory.WithTenantScopeAsync(outcomeA.AccountId, db => + db.EggLots.AnyAsync(l => l.Id == lotB)); + Assert.False(bLotsVisibleToA); + + var bOrdersVisibleToA = await factory.WithTenantScopeAsync(outcomeA.AccountId, db => + db.SalesOrders.AnyAsync(o => o.Id == orderB)); + Assert.False(bOrdersVisibleToA); + + var bFlocksVisibleToA = await factory.WithTenantScopeAsync(outcomeA.AccountId, db => + db.Flocks.AnyAsync(f => f.Id == flockB)); + Assert.False(bFlocksVisibleToA); + + // A's pre-existing row is invisible to B (the "vice versa" direction): + // B, scoped to its own account, sees none of A's lots by A's real id. + var aLotVisibleToB = await factory.WithTenantScopeAsync(outcomeB.AccountId, db => + db.EggLots.AnyAsync(l => l.Id == lotA)); + Assert.False(aLotVisibleToB); + + // B sees exactly its own lot (not A's): B's egg-lot count is 1. + var bLotCount = await factory.WithTenantScopeAsync(outcomeB.AccountId, db => + db.EggLots.CountAsync()); + Assert.Equal(1, bLotCount); + + // Audit provenance: B's confirm wrote an audit row for B's order. A must + // not see it. + var bAuditVisibleToA = await factory.WithTenantScopeAsync(outcomeA.AccountId, db => + db.AuditEvents.AnyAsync(e => e.EntityId == orderB)); + Assert.False(bAuditVisibleToA); + + // --- NEGATIVE ISOLATION (Q1: 404 + no mutation) ------------------- + // A's owner, fully authenticated, targets B's REAL ids. Every one must + // 404 (masked NotFound) AND leave B's row unmutated. + // + // TWO LAYERS uphold the 404, and the mutation proof must defeat BOTH: + // (1) the global query filter scopes db.SalesOrders to A's account, so + // GetByIdAsync(B's id) returns null → 404 NotFound; + // (2) the confirm handler's post-load AccountId check (defense in + // depth) returns TenantMismatch → also surfaced as 404. + // Bypassing only (1) still 404s via (2); removing only (2) still 404s + // via (1). The real leak is bypassing (1) AND removing (2) — then A's + // confirm of B's order proceeds (422 NotDraft, already confirmed), and + // this assertion reds. That is the mutation this matrix is proven against + // (run: IgnoreQueryFilters on SalesOrderRepository.GetByIdAsync + delete + // the `order.AccountId != accountId` check in ConfirmSaleHandler). + // + // 1. A tries to confirm B's (already-confirmed) order by B's real id. + // -> 404, and B's lot stays at 90 (no second allocation). + var aConfirmsBOrder = await clientA.PostWithKeyAsync( + $"/api/v1/sales/{orderB}/confirm", Guid.NewGuid().ToString()); + Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.NotFound, aConfirmsBOrder.StatusCode); + var lotBAfterAttack = await factory.WithTenantScopeAsync(outcomeB.AccountId, async db => + await db.EggLots.FirstAsync(l => l.Id == lotB)); + Assert.Equal(90, lotBAfterAttack.QuantityAvailable); + + // 2. A tries to read B's egg lot by B's real id. + // -> 404 (no existence leak). + var aReadsBOrder = await clientA.GetAsync($"/api/v1/sales/{orderB}"); + Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.NotFound, aReadsBOrder.StatusCode); + + // 3. A tries to create a daily entry against B's real flock id. + // -> 404 (masked NotFound — the flock is not visible to A's tenant, + // and the handler maps .NotFound errors to 404, not a 400). The + // payload is validation-valid (date = today, so it is not rejected + // by DailyEntry.Date.NotFuture before reaching the handler); the + // only rejection reason is the tenant boundary. And no entry row is + // created in B's farm. + var aEntryOnBFlock = await clientA.PostWithKeyAsync( + "/api/v1/daily-entries", Guid.NewGuid().ToString(), new + { + farmId = farmIdB, + houseId = Guid.NewGuid(), + flockId = flockB, + date = DateOnly.FromDateTime(DateTime.UtcNow.Date).ToString("yyyy-MM-dd"), + totalEggs = 5, + crackedEggs = 0, + dirtyEggs = 0, + discardedEggs = 0, + mortalityCount = 0, + grades = new[] { new { eggGradeId = gradesB["Large"], quantity = 5 } }, + }); + Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.NotFound, aEntryOnBFlock.StatusCode); + + // No B-farm daily entry was created by A's attempt. + var entriesOnBFlock = await factory.WithTenantScopeAsync(outcomeB.AccountId, db => + db.DailyEntries.CountAsync(e => e.FlockId == flockB)); + // B created none (the loop above seeded a lot, not a daily entry); A's + // attempt must not have added one either. + Assert.Equal(0, entriesOnBFlock); + } +} diff --git a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests.csproj b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests.csproj index b7816a875..6b5143763 100644 --- a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests.csproj +++ b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests.csproj @@ -17,9 +17,19 @@ + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/AllowList.cs b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/AllowList.cs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c92964041 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/AllowList.cs @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +namespace Cluckwork.Application.Tests.TenantBypass; + +using System.Text.Json; +using System.Text.Json.Serialization; + +// #536 Part 1 — the allow-list. One committed, reviewable line per excused +// bypass (design M5/M7): the exemption is a SEPARATE artifact from the code it +// excuses, so a bypass and its exemption are never the same keystroke. +// +// Rules: +// * Entries name the enclosing method in symbol display form +// (Namespace.Type.Method(paramTypes)); a call inside a local function keys +// as ContainingMethod.Local(localFunctionName) and is NOT covered by the +// parent's entry. +// * An entry matching zero sites is STALE and fails the build (a deleted +// bypass must not leave a live exemption). +// * Justification is mandatory and non-empty — an unexplained exemption is +// the thing the guard exists to prevent. +public sealed class AllowListEntry +{ + [JsonPropertyName("symbol")] + public required string Symbol { get; init; } + + [JsonPropertyName("file")] + public required string File { get; init; } + + [JsonPropertyName("justification")] + public required string Justification { get; init; } +} + +public static class AllowList +{ + private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions Options = new() + { + PropertyNameCaseInsensitive = true, + ReadCommentHandling = JsonCommentHandling.Skip, + AllowTrailingCommas = true, + }; + + public static IReadOnlyList Load(string path) + { + if (!File.Exists(path)) + { + return []; + } + + var json = File.ReadAllText(path); + var entries = JsonSerializer.Deserialize>(json, Options) ?? []; + return entries + .Where(e => !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(e.Symbol) + && !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(e.File) + && !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(e.Justification)) + .ToList(); + } +} diff --git a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/Data/filter-free-set-sites.tsv b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/Data/filter-free-set-sites.tsv new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c475bd6d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/Data/filter-free-set-sites.tsv @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +# #536 Part 1 — db. query-site classifications (two tracks). +# +# This file is the stability baseline for the filter-free-set leg. The leg +# (GuardScanner.ScanFilterFreeSet) walks EVERY db.
access where
+# is a filter-free entity (no global query filter), in two tracks: +# +# TENANT track — sets whose entity carries an AccountId property (Users, +# RefreshTokens, IdempotencyRecord). Candidate = a site whose enclosing +# statement has no "AccountId" compare (the predicate rule applies). +# NON-TENANT track — sets with no AccountId column (UserRoles, Roles, +# UserClaims, UserLogins, UserTokens, RoleClaims, DurableJob). Candidate = +# EVERY db.
access. These sets have no AccountId to compare, so the +# predicate rule cannot apply; instead any query against them is a bypass +# occurrence that must be classified (scoped-by-join / scoped-by-user-id / +# global-reference / non-tenant-sweep). +# +# Review P1-2: the non-tenant track was added because the original leg walked +# only the tenant sets, leaving db.UserRoles / db.Roles / db.DurableJobs etc. +# invisible to the guard — a future unscoped query against them would pass +# silently. Walking all filter-free DbSets closes that. +# +# WHY A CLASSIFICATION FILE RATHER THAN A PURE SHAPE GATE: +# The shape check (does the statement name an AccountId compare) cannot +# distinguish a by-id / by-hash / caller-scoped query (safe) from an +# unscoped one (a real tenant leak). Reviewer M4/F4 named this: the leg +# proves "shape, not provenance." So instead of auto-failing on shape, the +# leg records each candidate here with the REASON it is scoped, and the +# stability test (TenantBypassRealTreeTests.RealSourceTree_FilterFreeSetStable) +# fails only when: +# * a NEW candidate site appears (someone added a db. query +# with no AccountId compare) — it is unclassified, so the build goes red +# until a human classifies it (safe-by-X or a real leak); +# * a classified site disappears (drift — the query moved or was deleted); +# * any site has no classification. +# Nothing is silently un-banned: a new unscoped query cannot land without a +# classification decision. +# +# FORMAT: one line per candidate: file:line detail reason +# The file:line + detail must EXACTLY match what the scanner reports; a line +# number shift breaks the match (the test re-derives the scanner's view). +# +# The `reason` is a human assertion, not a machine proof. It names the scoping +# mechanism. `needs-review` is the sentinel: a site marked needs-review fails +# the stability test until it is classified or the query is fixed. + +src/Cluckwork.Api/Middleware/IdempotencyMiddleware.cs:443 db.IdempotencyRecords by-key: unique index (AccountId, EndpointHash, IdempotencyKeyHash) is enforced by the DB; the method carries accountId and the record is written with it. The claim read is by (endpointHash, keyHash) within the caller's resolved account. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/AccountScopedUserValidator.cs:59 db.Users by-id: re-reads the current user by primary key (candidate.Id == user.Id) to compare against the persisted row; the user's account is already resolved by the caller. #529 legacy-import guard. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/AdminRecoveryService.cs:136 db.Users by-id+account: break-glass recovery looks up the user by email within the recovered account; the method takes accountId and the lookup is scoped to it. #265. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:126 db.RefreshTokens by-hash: login rotates the user's refresh tokens by user id (account-unique); the token hash embeds the account. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:176 db.RefreshTokens by-hash: refresh-token rotation reads by token hash; the hash is account-scoped by construction. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:299 db.RefreshTokens by-hash: same rotation path, second read by token hash. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:1107 db.RefreshTokens by-user: password change revokes the user's tokens by user id (account-unique). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:1261 db.RefreshTokens by-hash: logout attribution reads the token row by TokenHash == presentedHash (unique, account-scoped by construction); AccountId is in the SELECT projection (to attribute the logout to the right account), not a predicate. Review P1-3 surfaced this as a candidate because the old Contains("AccountId") read the projection as a predicate; the comparison-shape check correctly does not. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:1406 db.RefreshTokens by-user: revokes all active tokens for a user by user id (account-unique). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:1475 db.RefreshTokens by-hash: revokes by token hash (account-scoped). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:1501 db.RefreshTokens by-hash: checks a minted token's durability by hash (account-scoped). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/PersistentStepUpGrantRegistry.cs:53 db.Users by-id: reads the user's StepUpLogoutEpoch by user id (account-unique) to check the grant is not revoked; #338 shared-state. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/PersistentStepUpGrantRegistry.cs:92 db.Users by-id: records a logout by bumping the user's StepUpLogoutEpoch (account-unique). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/PersistentStepUpGrantRegistry.cs:104 db.Users by-id: checks revocation by the user's StepUpLogoutEpoch (account-unique). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Jobs/IdempotencyRecordPurgeSweep.cs:111 db.IdempotencyRecords non-tenant sweep: purges expired records across all tenants (runs under the single-leader gate #271 with no tenant resolved); scoped by expiry, not by account. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Jobs/IdempotencyRecordPurgeSweep.cs:130 db.IdempotencyRecords non-tenant sweep: second purge query in the same sweep; scoped by expiry. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Jobs/RefreshTokenPurgeSweep.cs:80 db.RefreshTokens non-tenant sweep: purges expired refresh tokens across all tenants (single-leader gate #271); scoped by expiry. + +# --- NON-TENANT track (no AccountId column; every db.
access is a +# candidate, classified by its scoping mechanism) --- +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/AccountUserDirectory.cs:65 db.UserRoles scoped-by-join: the role query joins db.Users (which carries AccountId) on user.Id, and the WHERE names user.AccountId == accountId; the UserRoles join is therefore tenant-scoped transitively. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/AccountUserDirectory.cs:66 db.Roles global-reference: AspNetRoles has no AccountId column — roles are farm-wide reference data (the four base roles are global); the query is scoped by the join to the tenant's UserRows, not by an account predicate. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/FirstRunStatusService.cs:91 db.UserRoles scoped-by-join: checks the Owner role by joining db.Users (carries AccountId) on user.Id; tenant-scoped transitively through the user row. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/FirstRunStatusService.cs:93 db.Roles global-reference: role lookup by name (AspNetRoles is farm-wide reference data); scoped by the join to the tenant's user rows. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:741 db.UserRoles scoped-by-user-id: checks the acting user's Owner role by userRole.UserId == actingUserId (the user id is account-unique); the Role join is to global reference data. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:742 db.Roles global-reference: role lookup by name in the Owner check (AspNetRoles is farm-wide reference data). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:756 db.UserRoles scoped-by-user-id: counts other active Owners by joining UserRoles on the user id (account-unique) and the user's AccountId == accountId. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:757 db.Roles global-reference: Owner-role filter by name in the owner-count (AspNetRoles is farm-wide reference data). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:809 db.UserRoles scoped-by-user-id: DisableUser revokes the user's roles by userRole.UserId == userId (account-unique). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:810 db.Roles global-reference: role lookup by name in the disable path (AspNetRoles is farm-wide reference data). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:1142 db.UserRoles scoped-by-account: lists the account's users with their roles; the query carries u.AccountId == accountId (the UserRoles join is scoped by the user rows). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:1143 db.Roles global-reference: role name resolution in ListUsers (AspNetRoles is farm-wide reference data). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:1187 db.UserRoles scoped-by-account: GetUser loads the user's roles; the method takes accountId and the user lookup is scoped to it. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs:1188 db.Roles global-reference: role name resolution in GetUser (AspNetRoles is farm-wide reference data). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Jobs/DurableJobWorker.cs:149 db.DurableJobs non-tenant table: DurableJob has no AccountId column by design (#271 at-most-one-leader lease, single-leader gate); the worker runs with no tenant resolved and polls by status/RunAfter. +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Persistence/DemoDataSeeder.cs:204 db.Roles global-reference: dev-only seeder ensures the base role rows exist (AspNetRoles is farm-wide reference data); runs at unresolved tenant by design (#280). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Persistence/SimulationDataSeeder.cs:455 db.Roles global-reference: simulation seeder ensures base role rows (AspNetRoles is farm-wide reference data); runs at unresolved tenant by design (#279). +src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Persistence/SimulationDataSeeder.cs:498 db.Roles global-reference: simulation seeder finds the Owner by joining global reference roles to the seeded account's users; scoped to the seeded account via the user rows. diff --git a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/Data/tenant-bypass-allowlist.json b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/Data/tenant-bypass-allowlist.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..40c210c45 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/Data/tenant-bypass-allowlist.json @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +[ + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Api.Cli.ListAccountsCliCommand.RunAsync(WebApplication app, string[] args)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Api/Cli/ListAccountsCliCommand.cs", + "justification": "Operator CLI lists ALL accounts (the whole point of list-accounts); no single tenant is resolved. Annotated in the file header as on #536's justified list." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Api.Cli.AccountSlugLookup.ResolveAsync(IServiceProvider services, string slug)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Api/Cli/SuspendAccountCliCommand.cs", + "justification": "Operator CLI resolves an account by its global slug (slugs are unique across farms); no tenant resolved at this point." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Api.Middleware.CredentialEpochMiddleware.InvokeAsync(HttpContext context, AppDbContext db)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Api/Middleware/CredentialEpochMiddleware.cs", + "justification": "DEFENSIVE bypass: reads the user's own account to check IsActive. The read is scoped to the JWT's account id; IgnoreQueryFilters makes it work even before TenantContext resolves. #364 fail-closed guarantee." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Identity.AccountProvisioner.ProvisionAsync(string? name, string? slug, string? ownerEmail, string? locale, string? currencyCode, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/AccountProvisioner.cs", + "justification": "Provisions a NEW account; checks the global slug for a collision before any tenant exists. Runs at unresolved tenant by design (#533)." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Identity.FirstRunAdminService.ProvisionAsync(string? email, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/FirstRunAdminService.cs", + "justification": "First-run admin bootstraps the DEFAULT account; checks for an existing Owner at unresolved tenant by design (#283)." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Identity.FirstRunAdminService.HoldsProvisioningLockAsync(CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/FirstRunAdminService.cs", + "justification": "Raw SQL advisory lock for first-run; not tenant-scoped (it is a process-level boot guard, #283)." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Identity.IdentityProvider.RefreshAsync(string refreshToken, CancellationToken ct, Guid? expectedAccountId)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs", + "justification": "Refresh-token rotation reads the account to verify it is active; scoped to the token's account id, IgnoreQueryFilters because TenantContext may be unresolved during the auth handshake." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Jobs.DailyEntryLockSweep.RunAsync(CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Jobs/DailyEntryLockSweep.cs", + "justification": "Background sweep releases stale locks across ALL tenants (it runs with no tenant resolved, under the single-leader gate #271). Every row it touches is re-checked against its own AccountId." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence.DemoDataSeeder.SeedAsync(CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Persistence/DemoDataSeeder.cs", + "justification": "Dev-only seeder runs at unresolved tenant by design (#280); every query carries an explicit AccountId predicate or is a whole-account operation." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence.DemoDataSeeder.MissingBaseDataAsync(Guid accountId, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Persistence/DemoDataSeeder.cs", + "justification": "Dev-only seeder runs at unresolved tenant by design (#280); scoped to the seeded account via explicit AccountId." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence.DemoDataSeeder.CleanupPartialSeedAsync(Guid accountId)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Persistence/DemoDataSeeder.cs", + "justification": "Dev-only seeder cleanup runs at unresolved tenant by design (#280); every ExecuteDelete is scoped to the seeded account via explicit AccountId." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence.SimulationDataSeeder.MissingBaseDataAsync(Guid accountId, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Persistence/SimulationDataSeeder.cs", + "justification": "Simulation seeder runs at unresolved tenant by design (#279); scoped to the seeded account via explicit AccountId." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence.SimulationDataSeeder.SeedSecondAccountAsync(CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Persistence/SimulationDataSeeder.cs", + "justification": "Simulation seeder creates a second account for the two-tenant simulation; checks the global account existence at unresolved tenant by design (#279)." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence.SimulationDataSeeder.ComputeCountsAsync(Guid accountId, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Persistence/SimulationDataSeeder.cs", + "justification": "Simulation seeder manifest counts run at unresolved tenant by design (#279); scoped to the seeded account via explicit AccountId." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.AccountRepository.GetCurrentSharedLockedAsync(CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs", + "justification": "FOR SHARE lock on the current tenant's account row; the raw SQL carries WHERE \"Id\" = {tenant.AccountId} (the lock must be inside the raw SQL or it would lock every tenant's row, #162)." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.AccountRepository.GetCurrentLockedAsync(CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs", + "justification": "FOR UPDATE lock on the current tenant's account row; the raw SQL carries WHERE \"Id\" = {tenant.AccountId} (#162)." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.AccountRepository.FindBySlugAsync(string slug, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/AccountRepository.cs", + "justification": "Resolves an account by its global slug (slugs are unique across farms); used by the operator CLI and provisioning where no tenant is resolved." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.AuditEventRepository.GetProvenanceChunkAsync(string entityType, Guid[] ids, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/AuditEventRepository.cs", + "justification": "Audit provenance reads across the tenant's own entities; the raw SQL carries WHERE \"AccountId\" = {accountId}. IgnoreQueryFilters because the provenance query joins across entities that the filter would otherwise scope to an unresolved tenant." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.EggLotRepository.GetAvailableFifoLockedAsync(Guid accountId, IReadOnlyList eggGradeIds, DateOnly allocationDate, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/EggLotRepository.cs", + "justification": "FIFO sale-allocation lock; the raw SQL carries WHERE \"AccountId\" = {accountId} and the lock is inside the statement so only this tenant's lots are locked (#313)." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.EggLotRepository.GetByIdsLockedAsync(Guid accountId, IReadOnlyList lotIds, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/EggLotRepository.cs", + "justification": "Void-restore lock on specific lots; the raw SQL carries WHERE \"AccountId\" = {accountId} and the lock is inside the statement (#60, #313)." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.EggLotRepository.GetByDailyEntryLockedAsync(Guid accountId, Guid dailyEntryId, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/EggLotRepository.cs", + "justification": "Locks the lots generated by a daily entry; the raw SQL carries WHERE \"AccountId\" = {accountId} and the lock is inside the statement." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.InventoryItemRepository.GetByIdLockedAsync(Guid accountId, Guid id, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/InventoryItemRepository.cs", + "justification": "FOR UPDATE on an inventory item; the raw SQL carries WHERE \"Id\" = {id} AND \"AccountId\" = {accountId} so a foreign-tenant id matches no row and the lock is never attempted against it (#313)." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.InventoryLotRepository.GetAvailableFifoLockedAsync(Guid accountId, Guid inventoryItemId, DateOnly asOfDate, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/InventoryLotRepository.cs", + "justification": "FIFO inventory-allocation lock; the raw SQL carries WHERE \"AccountId\" = {accountId} and the lock is inside the statement." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.InventoryLotRepository.GetByIdLockedAsync(Guid accountId, Guid lotId, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/InventoryLotRepository.cs", + "justification": "FOR UPDATE on an inventory lot; the raw SQL carries WHERE \"AccountId\" = {accountId} and the lock is inside the statement." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.SalesOrderRepository.GetByIdLockedAsync(Guid accountId, Guid id, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/SalesOrderRepository.cs", + "justification": "FOR UPDATE on a sales order; the raw SQL carries WHERE \"Id\" = {id} AND \"AccountId\" = {accountId} so a foreign-tenant id matches no row (#313)." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Api.Middleware.IdempotencyMiddleware.InvokeAsync(HttpContext context, AppDbContext db, TenantContext tenant, CurrentUserContext user)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Api/Middleware/IdempotencyMiddleware.cs", + "justification": "Raw-SQL UPDATE of idempotency_records on successful completion; the statement carries WHERE \"AccountId\" = {accountId} (the claim was scoped to this tenant on insert). Not a row lock, so the predicate walk does not flag it — allow-listed as a raw-SQL occurrence." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Api.Middleware.IdempotencyMiddleware.TryClaimOrInspectAsync(AppDbContext db, Guid accountId, string endpointHash, string keyHash, string requestHash, Guid ownerToken, DateTimeOffset leaseExpiresAt, DateTimeOffset now, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Api/Middleware/IdempotencyMiddleware.cs", + "justification": "Raw-SQL UPDATE that steals an expired idempotency lease; the statement carries WHERE \"AccountId\" = {accountId} AND (EndpointHash, IdempotencyKeyHash) — scoped to this tenant's claim. Not a row lock." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Api.Middleware.IdempotencyMiddleware.ReleaseClaimAsync(AppDbContext db, Guid accountId, string endpointHash, string keyHash, Guid ownerToken, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Api/Middleware/IdempotencyMiddleware.cs", + "justification": "Raw-SQL DELETE of the tenant's own idempotency claim; the statement carries WHERE \"AccountId\" = {accountId} AND (EndpointHash, IdempotencyKeyHash, LeaseOwner) — scoped to this tenant. Not a row lock." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Api.Cli.SuspendAccountCliCommand.RunAsync(WebApplication app, string[] args)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Api/Cli/SuspendAccountCliCommand.cs", + "justification": "Caller of AccountSlugLookup.ResolveAsync (a forwarding wrapper that carries the IgnoreQueryFilters). Operator CLI suspends an account by global slug; no tenant is resolved at this point. The caller is flagged by the wrapper-forwarding walk (review P1-3) — the wrapper and its caller both need entries." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Identity.FirstRunAdminService.ProvisionUnderLockAsync(Guid accountId, string email, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/FirstRunAdminService.cs", + "justification": "Caller of HoldsProvisioningLockAsync (a forwarding wrapper). First-run admin bootstrap runs at unresolved tenant by design (#283); the provisioning lock is a process-level advisory lock, not tenant-scoped." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence.SimulationDataSeeder.SeedAsync(CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Persistence/SimulationDataSeeder.cs", + "justification": "Caller of MissingBaseDataAsync / ComputeCountsAsync / SeedSecondAccountAsync (forwarding wrappers). Simulation seeder runs at unresolved tenant by design (#279); every wrapped query is scoped to the seeded account via explicit AccountId." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence.SimulationDataSeeder.EmitManifestAsync(Guid accountId, DateOnly today, SimulationOptions sim, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Persistence/SimulationDataSeeder.cs", + "justification": "Caller of ComputeCountsAsync (a forwarding wrapper). Simulation seeder manifest counts run at unresolved tenant by design (#279); scoped to the seeded account via explicit AccountId." + }, + { + "symbol": "Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Repositories.AuditEventRepository.GetProvenanceAsync(string entityType, IReadOnlyCollection entityIds, CancellationToken ct)", + "file": "src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/AuditEventRepository.cs", + "justification": "Caller of GetProvenanceChunkAsync (a forwarding wrapper). Audit provenance reads across the tenant's own entities; the wrapped raw SQL carries WHERE \"AccountId\" = {accountId}. IgnoreQueryFilters because the provenance query joins across entities that the filter would otherwise scope to an unresolved tenant." + } +] diff --git a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/GuardScanner.cs b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/GuardScanner.cs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e518ad3a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/GuardScanner.cs @@ -0,0 +1,1018 @@ +namespace Cluckwork.Application.Tests.TenantBypass; + +using Microsoft.CodeAnalysis; +using Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp; +using Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp.Syntax; + +// #536 Part 1 — the scanner. Walks every .cs under src/ with Roslyn and +// reports every tenant-bypass occurrence. A GREEN result from this scanner is +// only as trustworthy as its inputs, so the false-green guards are part of the +// scanner, not an afterthought (review M2): +// +// * any Error-severity parse diagnostic fails the scan (a C#-14 syntax the +// parser cannot read would otherwise silently drop occurrences); +// * a scanned-file-count floor proves the walk actually saw the tree; +// * bin/ and obj/ are excluded BY PATH, and the floor is computed from the +// same traversal so the exclusion cannot quietly swallow real files; +// * the src/ root resolves by walking up from the test's working directory to +// the directory containing Cluckwork.sln — if it cannot be found the scan +// FAILS, it never defaults to a wrong root. + +public enum BypassKind +{ + IgnoreQueryFilters, + RawSql, // FromSql*/ExecuteSql*/SqlQuery — raw SQL bypasses EF filters outright + IdentityLookup, // FindByEmailAsync/FindByNameAsync/FindByLoginAsync/GetUsersInRoleAsync + SignInManager, // any SignInManager member invocation + UserManagerUsers, // UserManager.Users member access + FilterFreeSet, // db. +} + +public sealed record BypassOccurrence( + BypassKind Kind, + string File, // repo-relative + int Line, + string EnclosingSymbol, + string Detail, + bool? PredicateHasAccountId = null, + string? RawSqlText = null); + +public sealed record AllowListMismatch(AllowListEntry Entry, string Reason); + +public sealed record GuardReport( + IReadOnlyList Occurrences, + IReadOnlyList Excused, + IReadOnlyList Unexcused, + IReadOnlyList StaleEntries, + IReadOnlyList ParseErrors, + int ScannedFileCount, + int ExpectedFileCountFloor, + IReadOnlyList RawSqlPredicateViolations); + +public static class GuardScanner +{ + // The real src/ tree must contain at least this many .cs files. The count + // is set below the current 456 (measured 2026-08-22) so that adding files + // does not break the gate, but a path-filter bug that silently excludes a + // subtree (e.g. a new top-level directory) drops the count below the floor + // and reds the build. Raise this when the tree grows substantially — the + // floor's job is to catch a walk that saw LESS than it should, not to track + // the exact count. + internal const int RealTreeFileFloor = 400; + + private static bool IsRealRepo(string srcRoot) => + FindRepoRoot(AppContext.BaseDirectory) is string root + && string.Equals(Path.GetFullPath(srcRoot), Path.Combine(root, "src"), StringComparison.Ordinal); + + // Banned method names by kind. Matched on the method name segment only + // (receiver-independent) — a bypass is a bypass on any receiver. + private static readonly Dictionary BannedMethods = new() + { + ["IgnoreQueryFilters"] = BypassKind.IgnoreQueryFilters, + ["FromSqlRaw"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + ["FromSqlInterpolated"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + ["ExecuteSqlRaw"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + ["ExecuteSqlInterpolated"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + // The async variants — the current source uses ExecuteSqlInterpolatedAsync + // (FirstRunAdminService, IdempotencyMiddleware), and a review found the + // sync-only list left them unreported. A new async raw-SQL query — + // including a tenant-unsafe lock — must not leave the guard green. + ["ExecuteSqlRawAsync"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + ["ExecuteSqlInterpolatedAsync"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + ["SqlQuery"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + // Review P1-1 (deepseek-v4-flash): the EF Core 10 raw-SQL sibling set is + // larger than the sync/async pair above. SqlQueryRaw/SqlQueryInterpolated + // (typed entity queries from SQL), ExecuteSql/ExecuteSqlAsync (non- + // interpolated, non-raw overloads), and FromSql/FromSqlAsync (the + // FromSql base forms) all bypass the query filters. A lock query written + // through any of these must not leave the guard green. Verified against + // the resolved Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Relational.dll (10.0.x) API + // surface. None is used in src/ today — this is the escape-hatch surface + // the guard must cover so a future raw query cannot pick an unbanned + // entry point. + ["SqlQueryRaw"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + ["SqlQueryInterpolated"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + ["ExecuteSql"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + ["ExecuteSqlAsync"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + ["FromSql"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + ["FromSqlAsync"] = BypassKind.RawSql, + ["FindByEmailAsync"] = BypassKind.IdentityLookup, + ["FindByNameAsync"] = BypassKind.IdentityLookup, + ["FindByLoginAsync"] = BypassKind.IdentityLookup, + ["GetUsersInRoleAsync"] = BypassKind.IdentityLookup, + }; + + public static GuardReport Scan(string srcRoot, string allowListPath) + { + // The root is the PARENT of the src root. For the real tree that is + // the repository (FindRepoRoot double-checks it holds Cluckwork.sln); + // for a temp test tree it is the temp root — the file-count floor and + // the parse-error guard are what make a temp tree trustworthy, not a + // solution file. + var srcFull = Path.GetFullPath(srcRoot); + var repoRoot = Path.GetDirectoryName(srcFull) + ?? throw new InvalidOperationException($"GuardScanner: cannot derive a root from '{srcRoot}'."); + + if (!File.Exists(Path.Combine(repoRoot, "Cluckwork.sln")) + && FindRepoRoot(AppContext.BaseDirectory) != repoRoot) + { + // Not the repo: this is a temp tree. Allowed, but the floor below + // must still hold against whatever was actually enumerated. + } + + var files = EnumerateSourceFiles(srcRoot); + // The floor is the caller's assertion about how many files the real + // tree MUST contain. A tautological floor (files.Count) would never + // fail — the reviewer named this as a false-green. The real-tree test + // passes a static minimum derived from the committed tree; a temp tree + // passes 0 (its floor is the parse-error guard, not a count). + var floor = files.Count; // overridden below for the real tree + if (IsRealRepo(srcRoot)) + { + floor = RealTreeFileFloor; + } + + var occurrences = new List(); + var parseErrors = new List(); + + foreach (var file in files) + { + var text = File.ReadAllText(file); + var tree = CSharpSyntaxTree.ParseText(text, path: file); + var root = tree.GetCompilationUnitRoot(); + + foreach (var diag in tree.GetDiagnostics().Where(d => d.Severity == DiagnosticSeverity.Error)) + { + parseErrors.Add($"{Relative(repoRoot, file)}:{diag.Location.GetLineSpan().StartLinePosition.Line + 1}: {diag.Id} {diag.GetMessage()}"); + } + + // Wrapper-forwarding detection (review P1-3): a method that + // CONTAINS a banned call (e.g. an extension method that forwards + // IgnoreQueryFilters()) is a laundering step — callers of that + // method are bypasses too, even though the caller's own text has no + // banned token. Find the forwarding method names in this file (a + // method body that contains a banned invocation) and flag their + // call sites. Same-file only: a wrapper defined in one file and + // called in another is not resolved by a syntax walk (no symbol + // binding) — a stated limitation, named in the ADR. The test's + // laundering case (wrapper + caller in the same file) is caught. + // Review (Claude re-review, refuting Codex P1-3): the original pass + // collected forwarding names ONLY from MethodDeclarationSyntax. A + // local function (LocalFunctionStatementSyntax — NOT a + // MethodDeclarationSyntax) and an expression-bodied property + // (PropertyDeclarationSyntax / AccessorDeclarationSyntax) were + // invisible, so a wrapper in either shape laundered a bypass past an + // allow-listed definition, same-file — the fix's own stated scope. + // Proven: a `private IQueryable X => db.T.FromSql(...).IgnoreQueryFilters();` + // property wrapper + a caller `X.Select(...)` went green once the + // property's definition symbol was allow-listed. Collect from all + // three shapes and flag the caller as a member-access (property use + // is `X.Select(…)`, not an invocation). + var forwardingNames = new HashSet(StringComparer.Ordinal); + var forwardingMemberAccesses = new List(); + + // A declaration (method, local function, property/accessor) whose + // body contains a banned call is a forwarding wrapper. + void RecordForwarding(SyntaxNode? body, string name) + { + if (body is null) return; + var hasBanned = body.DescendantNodes().OfType() + .Any(InvokesBanned); + if (hasBanned) forwardingNames.Add(name); + } + + foreach (var method in root.DescendantNodes().OfType()) + { + RecordForwarding(method.Body, method.Identifier.ValueText); + RecordForwarding(method.ExpressionBody, method.Identifier.ValueText); + } + foreach (var lf in root.DescendantNodes().OfType()) + { + RecordForwarding(lf.Body, lf.Identifier.ValueText); + RecordForwarding(lf.ExpressionBody, lf.Identifier.ValueText); + } + // Expression-bodied properties (and accessors): the arrow body is + // the forwarding site. An expression-BODIED property (`private X Y + // => expr;`) carries the body on prop.ExpressionBody directly — it has + // NO AccessorList. A get-only accessor property (`private X Y { get + // => expr; }`) has the body on the accessor's ArrowExpressionClause. + // Check both. Record the property NAME so its member-access use sites + // can be flagged below. + foreach (var prop in root.DescendantNodes().OfType()) + { + RecordForwarding(prop.ExpressionBody, prop.Identifier.ValueText); + RecordForwarding( + prop.AccessorList?.DescendantNodes().OfType() + .Select(a => a.Expression).FirstOrDefault(), + prop.Identifier.ValueText); + } + + // Property-wrapper use sites: a member access whose ROOT name is a + // forwarding property name (e.g. `AllLotsUnfiltered.Select(…)` — the + // root `AllLotsUnfiltered` is the forwarding property). Collected + // here, flagged in the occurrence walk below. + if (forwardingNames.Count > 0) + { + foreach (var access in root.DescendantNodes().OfType()) + { + // The root of the member-access chain (leftmost identifier). + var rootExpr = access.Expression; + while (rootExpr is MemberAccessExpressionSyntax mroot) + { + rootExpr = mroot.Expression; + } + if (rootExpr is IdentifierNameSyntax rid && forwardingNames.Contains(rid.Identifier.ValueText)) + { + forwardingMemberAccesses.Add(access); + } + } + } + + foreach (var invocation in root.DescendantNodes().OfType()) + { + var name = invocation.Expression; + string? methodName = null; + string? receiverText = null; + + if (name is MemberAccessExpressionSyntax member) + { + methodName = member.Name.Identifier.ValueText; + receiverText = member.Expression.ToString(); + } + else if (name is IdentifierNameSyntax id) + { + methodName = id.Identifier.ValueText; + } + + if (methodName is not null && BannedMethods.TryGetValue(methodName, out var kind)) + { + occurrences.Add(MakeOccurrence(kind, repoRoot, file, invocation, $"{methodName}({receiverText})")); + continue; + } + + // Caller of a forwarding wrapper (review P1-3 + Claude re-review): + // the invocation's method name is not banned, but the method it + // calls forwards a banned call (found above in forwardingNames). + // Flag the CALL SITE so a wrapper that is allow-listed does not + // leave its callers green. Same-file only (see the limitation note + // above). A property wrapper's use site (`X.Select(…)`) is a + // member access, not an invocation, so it is flagged separately + // below (forwardingMemberAccesses). + if (methodName is not null && forwardingNames.Contains(methodName)) + { + occurrences.Add(MakeOccurrence(BypassKind.IgnoreQueryFilters, repoRoot, file, invocation, + $"forwards-bypass {methodName}({receiverText})")); + continue; + } + + // SignInManager: any member invocation on a receiver that is a + // SignInManager — either by its generic type text (the current + // code's SignInManager) or by a conventional + // camelCase receiver name (a future signInManager.X would + // otherwise be silently ignored by the old case-sensitive text + // match). Review P2: the type text alone missed camelCase + // receivers; the name set closes that without a full semantic + // model (kept a syntax walk for the hook's 2s budget). + if (IsIdentityManagerReceiver(receiverText, isSignInManager: true)) + { + var memberName = name is MemberAccessExpressionSyntax m2 ? m2.Name.Identifier.ValueText : "?"; + occurrences.Add(MakeOccurrence(BypassKind.SignInManager, repoRoot, file, invocation, $"SignInManager.{memberName}")); + } + } + + // Caller of a forwarding PROPERTY wrapper (Claude re-review, refuting + // Codex P1-3): the use site `AllLotsUnfiltered.Select(…)` is a member + // access, not an invocation, so the invocation loop above never sees + // it. Flag the member access whose root names a forwarding property so + // allow-listing the property's definition does not leave the caller + // green. Same-file only. + foreach (var access in forwardingMemberAccesses) + { + var rootName = access.Expression; + while (rootName is MemberAccessExpressionSyntax mr) rootName = mr.Expression; + var rootText = (rootName as IdentifierNameSyntax)?.Identifier.ValueText ?? "?"; + occurrences.Add(new BypassOccurrence( + BypassKind.IgnoreQueryFilters, Relative(repoRoot, file), + access.GetLocation().GetLineSpan().StartLinePosition.Line + 1, + EnclosingSymbolOf(access, file), + $"forwards-bypass (property) {rootText}", + PredicateHasAccountId: PredicateHasAccountId(access))); + } + + // UserManager.Users — a member access, not an invocation. The + // receiver is matched by type text OR conventional name (same + // review P2 fix as the SignInManager leg above): a camelCase + // userManager.Users must be reported, not silently ignored. + foreach (var access in root.DescendantNodes().OfType()) + { + if (access.Name.Identifier.ValueText == "Users" + && IsIdentityManagerReceiver(access.Expression.ToString(), isSignInManager: false)) + { + occurrences.Add(new BypassOccurrence( + BypassKind.UserManagerUsers, Relative(repoRoot, file), + access.GetLocation().GetLineSpan().StartLinePosition.Line + 1, + EnclosingSymbolOf(access, file), "UserManager.Users", + PredicateHasAccountId: PredicateHasAccountId(access))); + } + } + } + + // Raw-SQL predicate walk (M3/M4): every raw-SQL statement that carries + // a row lock (FOR UPDATE / FOR SHARE) must also name an AccountId + // predicate. This is checked on the SQL TEXT itself, independent of the + // allow-list — the allow-list entry's justification *claims* the + // predicate, but this walk *proves* it. Dropping the AccountId from a + // lock query (M4) goes red here even though the site is still + // allow-listed. + var rawSqlViolations = new List(); + foreach (var file in files) + { + var tree2 = CSharpSyntaxTree.ParseText(File.ReadAllText(file), path: file); + var root2 = tree2.GetCompilationUnitRoot(); + foreach (var invocation in root2.DescendantNodes().OfType()) + { + var name = invocation.Expression; + var methodName = name is MemberAccessExpressionSyntax m3 ? m3.Name.Identifier.ValueText + : name is IdentifierNameSyntax id3 ? id3.Identifier.ValueText : null; + // Every raw-SQL entry point must be predicate-walked, not just the + // ones src/ happens to use today. Review P1-1: the original list + // was the sync/async pair + FromSql* and omitted SqlQuery*, + // ExecuteSql/ExecuteSqlAsync, and FromSql/FromSqlAsync — a lock + // query through any of those would skip this walk and pass. + // Keep this in lockstep with BannedMethods' RawSql entries. + if (methodName is not ("ExecuteSqlRaw" or "ExecuteSqlInterpolated" or "ExecuteSql" + or "ExecuteSqlRawAsync" or "ExecuteSqlInterpolatedAsync" or "ExecuteSqlAsync" + or "FromSqlRaw" or "FromSqlInterpolated" or "FromSql" or "FromSqlAsync" + or "SqlQuery" or "SqlQueryRaw" or "SqlQueryInterpolated")) + { + continue; + } + + // The SQL text is the first argument, usually a string literal or + // interpolated string. Reconstruct its text and check the lock + // ⇒ AccountId implication. + if (invocation.ArgumentList.Arguments.Count == 0) + { + continue; + } + + var sqlArg = invocation.ArgumentList.Arguments[0].Expression; + var sqlText = ReconstructSqlText(sqlArg); + + // Round-4 finding F5: the gate matched only FOR UPDATE / FOR SHARE, + // but FOR NO KEY UPDATE and FOR KEY SHARE are row locks too (and + // HasAccountIdPredicateInWhereClause's prefix loop already listed all + // four — the gate just never reached it). A `FOR NO KEY UPDATE` lock + // with the AccountId predicate dropped must red, not pass. + var hasLock = HasRowLockKeyword(sqlText); + // Review P1-2: the old check was `sqlText.Contains("AccountId")` — + // a string-presence test, not a predicate test. `SELECT *, + // "AccountId" FROM t WHERE "Id" = {id} FOR UPDATE` names + // AccountId in the SELECT list and passes the old check, yet the + // lock covers EVERY row of the table for every tenant. The + // scoping predicate must live in the WHERE clause, so require + // AccountId to appear in the predicate portion (after the last + // FROM that precedes the lock), not in the SELECT list. + if (hasLock && !HasAccountIdPredicateInWhereClause(sqlText)) + { + var line = invocation.GetLocation().GetLineSpan().StartLinePosition.Line + 1; + rawSqlViolations.Add( + $"{Relative(repoRoot, file)}:{line} in {EnclosingSymbolOf(invocation, file)} — raw-SQL row lock without an AccountId predicate in its WHERE clause: {Truncate(sqlText)}"); + } + } + } + + var allowList = AllowList.Load(allowListPath); + + // Excuse matching: file (relative) + symbol must both match exactly. + var matches = (BypassOccurrence o, AllowListEntry e) => + string.Equals(o.File, NormalizePath(e.File), StringComparison.Ordinal) + && o.EnclosingSymbol == e.Symbol; + + var unexcusedOccurrences = occurrences + .Where(o => !allowList.Any(e => matches(o, e))) + .ToList(); + var excusedOccurrences = occurrences + .Where(o => allowList.Any(e => matches(o, e))) + .ToList(); + + var stale = allowList + .Where(e => !occurrences.Any(o => matches(o, e))) + .Select(e => new AllowListMismatch(e, "entry matches no occurrence in src/")) + .ToList(); + + return new GuardReport(occurrences, excusedOccurrences, + unexcusedOccurrences, + stale, parseErrors, files.Count, floor, rawSqlViolations); + } + + // Round-4 finding F5 — all four Postgres row-lock keywords. The predicate + // walk's gate and its prefix loop must agree on the set; a lock the gate + // misses never reaches the predicate check at all. + private static bool HasRowLockKeyword(string sql) => + sql.Contains("FOR UPDATE", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) + || sql.Contains("FOR SHARE", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) + || sql.Contains("FOR NO KEY UPDATE", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) + || sql.Contains("FOR KEY SHARE", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase); + + // Reconstruct the text of a raw-SQL argument. We only need to know whether + // the SQL names "AccountId", so the node's full source text is sufficient: + // a plain string literal, an interpolated string, or a C# 11+ raw string + // literal ($""" ... """) — all of which render their literal text (and the + // {…} holes) via ToString(). A pre-built variable (not a string literal in + // source) renders as its identifier, which contains no AccountId and so is + // conservatively flagged as a violation for manual review — those are out + // of scope for the text walk and named as a limitation. + private static string ReconstructSqlText(ExpressionSyntax expr) => expr.ToString(); + + // Review P1-2 — the predicate walk must prove AccountId is in the WHERE + // clause of a lock query, not merely present in the SQL text. The SELECT + // list (before the first FROM) is not a predicate: `SELECT *, "AccountId" + // FROM t WHERE "Id" = {id} FOR UPDATE` names AccountId but locks every row. + // Rule: take the SQL up to the lock keyword, find the LAST `FROM` in it (the + // table source of the locked statement — subqueries have their own FROM, so + // the last one is the outer table), and require AccountId to appear AFTER + // that FROM (i.e. in the WHERE clause / JOIN predicates, not the SELECT + // list). No FROM ⇒ no confirmable predicate ⇒ false (flag). This is a text + // heuristic, not a SQL parser; it is deliberately stricter than the old + // string-presence check and still allows the legitimate forms in src/ (a + // quoted "AccountId" column or an {accountId} interpolation hole in the + // WHERE clause). A lock whose AccountId is only in a comment or the SELECT + // list is correctly flagged. + private static bool HasAccountIdPredicateInWhereClause(string sqlText) + { + // Claude re-review (refuting pi P1-2): the original check did a + // substring test on the region after the LAST FROM, which left two + // defects. (a) FALSE-GREEN: a `--` comment in the predicate region that + // names AccountId launders the lock — the repo's own house style puts `--` + // comments inside FOR UPDATE WHERE clauses (EggLotRepository.cs:44-48), so + // this is the real shape, not a contrived one. Strip SQL comments first. + // (b) FALSE-RED: a CTE lock (`WITH scoped AS (SELECT ... WHERE AccountId = + // ...) SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`) has the scoping WHERE before the innermost + // FROM, so the last-FROM region excludes it. Test the region after EVERY + // FROM and accept if any contains AccountId. The SELECT-list false-green + // stays closed: the projection sits before the first FROM, so no region + // after a FROM contains it. + // + // Round-4 finding F1 (kimi-k3) — the every-FROM fix itself regressed + // MULTI-STATEMENT SQL: a batched raw SQL whose FIRST statement is scoped + // (`DELETE ... WHERE AccountId = ...;`) and whose SECOND takes an + // UNscoped lock (`SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`) passed, because the rule found + // AccountId in the first statement's FROM region. Round 3's last-FROM + // logic read the LOCK'S OWN statement region and would have caught it. + // Cure: split the stripped SQL on `;` and apply the every-FROM rule only + // to the STATEMENT that contains the lock keyword. A CTE stays inside one + // statement (its `;` is only at the end), so the CTE fix survives; a + // previous statement's AccountId can no longer launder the lock. (Npgsql + // batches multi-statement text, so this is a real execution shape.) + var noComments = StripSqlComments(sqlText); + var statements = noComments.Split(';', StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmptyEntries); + + // The statement carrying the lock keyword is the one whose predicate we + // must prove. (If the lock keyword appears in more than one statement — + // e.g. two locks in one batch — every such statement must be scoped; we + // return false if ANY lock statement lacks the predicate.) + var sawLockStatement = false; + foreach (var statement in statements) + { + if (!HasRowLockKeyword(statement)) + { + continue; // not a lock statement — no predicate obligation + } + + sawLockStatement = true; + if (!LockStatementHasAccountIdPredicate(statement)) + { + return false; // a lock statement without an AccountId predicate + } + } + + // A lock statement was found and every one of them carried the AccountId + // predicate — the implication holds. (The hasLock gate already established + // there IS a lock, so sawLockStatement is normally true here; if the lock + // keyword was only in a comment that StripSqlComments removed, no statement + // carries it and we flag (false).) + return sawLockStatement; + } + + // The every-FROM predicate rule applied to a SINGLE lock statement: take the + // text up to the lock keyword within this statement, and accept if the region + // after any FROM in that prefix contains AccountId. (Extracted from + // HasAccountIdPredicateInWhereClause for the statement-aware F1 fix.) + private static bool LockStatementHasAccountIdPredicate(string statement) + { + var prefix = statement; + foreach (var kw in new[] { "FOR UPDATE", "FOR SHARE", "FOR NO KEY UPDATE", "FOR KEY SHARE" }) + { + var idx = IndexOf(statement, kw, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase); + if (idx >= 0) + { + prefix = statement[..idx]; + break; + } + } + + // For every FROM in the prefix, the region after it (up to the next FROM, + // or end) is a predicate region. Accept if any contains AccountId. + var fromIdx = IndexOf(prefix, "FROM", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase); + while (fromIdx >= 0) + { + var regionStart = fromIdx + 4; // after "FROM" + var nextFrom = IndexOf(prefix[regionStart..], "FROM", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase); + var region = nextFrom >= 0 ? prefix[regionStart..(regionStart + nextFrom)] : prefix[regionStart..]; + if (region.Contains("AccountId", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) + { + return true; + } + fromIdx = nextFrom >= 0 ? regionStart + nextFrom : -1; + } + + // No FROM at all in the lock statement: a lock on a table must have one; + // without it there is no confirmable predicate region, so flag (false). + return false; + } + + // Strip `-- line` and `/* block */` comments from SQL text. A `--` runs to + // end of line; a `/* */` runs to the matching close. Quote-aware enough for + // the repo's SQL (double-quoted identifiers, single-quoted literals) — a + // `--` inside a literal is not present in the current src/ raw-SQL, and a + // mis-strip would only remove text, never add an AccountId, so the risk is a + // false-red, not a false-green. + private static string StripSqlComments(string sql) + { + var sb = new System.Text.StringBuilder(sql.Length); + var i = 0; + while (i < sql.Length) + { + var c = sql[i]; + if (c == '-' && i + 1 < sql.Length && sql[i + 1] == '-') + { + // line comment: skip to end of line (keep the newline) + while (i < sql.Length && sql[i] != '\n') i++; + } + else if (c == '/' && i + 1 < sql.Length && sql[i + 1] == '*') + { + // block comment: skip to matching */ + i += 2; + while (i + 1 < sql.Length && !(sql[i] == '*' && sql[i + 1] == '/')) i++; + i = Math.Min(sql.Length, i + 2); + } + else + { + sb.Append(c); + i++; + } + } + return sb.ToString(); + } + + private static int IndexOf(string haystack, string needle, StringComparison cmp) + => haystack.IndexOf(needle, cmp); + + private static int LastIndexOf(string haystack, string needle, StringComparison cmp) + => haystack.LastIndexOf(needle, cmp); + + private static string Truncate(string s) => + s.Length <= 160 ? s.Replace("\n", " ") : s[..160] + "…"; + + /// + /// Evaluates a report as a build gate. Every one of these must hold: + /// no parse errors, the file-count floor holds, nothing unexcused, no stale + /// entries. Returns the list of failure messages (empty = pass). + /// + public static IReadOnlyList Evaluate(GuardReport report) + { + var failures = new List(); + + if (report.ParseErrors.Count > 0) + { + failures.Add($"scan produced {report.ParseErrors.Count} parse error(s) — the walk cannot be trusted:\n " + + string.Join("\n ", report.ParseErrors.Take(10))); + } + + if (report.ScannedFileCount < report.ExpectedFileCountFloor) + { + failures.Add($"scanned {report.ScannedFileCount} files, expected at least {report.ExpectedFileCountFloor} — the walk saw less than it should"); + } + + foreach (var o in report.Unexcused) + { + failures.Add($"unexcused bypass [{o.Kind}] {o.File}:{o.Line} in {o.EnclosingSymbol} ({o.Detail}) — add an allow-list entry with a justification, or fix the bypass"); + } + + foreach (var s in report.StaleEntries) + { + failures.Add($"stale allow-list entry {s.Entry.File} :: {s.Entry.Symbol} — {s.Reason}"); + } + + foreach (var v in report.RawSqlPredicateViolations) + { + failures.Add($"raw-SQL row lock missing an AccountId predicate (M4): {v}"); + } + + return failures; + } + + // The db. leg: given the model-discovered filter-free + // property names (e.g. "Users", "UserRoles"), scans for member accesses + // whose name matches and reports whether the enclosing query carries an + // AccountId comparison in its predicate. Shape, not provenance (review + // M4/F4): this proves the predicate EXISTS, not that the compared value is + // the resolved tenant. + public static IReadOnlyList ScanFilterFreeSet( + string srcRoot, IReadOnlyCollection filterFreePropertyNames) + { + var repoRoot = Path.GetDirectoryName(Path.GetFullPath(srcRoot)) + ?? throw new InvalidOperationException("GuardScanner: cannot derive a root from the given src root."); + + var names = new HashSet(filterFreePropertyNames, StringComparer.Ordinal); + var results = new List(); + + foreach (var file in EnumerateSourceFiles(srcRoot)) + { + var tree = CSharpSyntaxTree.ParseText(File.ReadAllText(file), path: file); + var root = tree.GetCompilationUnitRoot(); + + foreach (var access in root.DescendantNodes().OfType()) + { + if (!names.Contains(access.Name.Identifier.ValueText)) + { + continue; + } + + // Only DbContext-shaped accesses: the receiver must be the + // conventional context variable (db / _db / context / ctx). + // A domain object named e.g. `user` or `actor` that carries an + // in-memory `Roles`/`Users` collection is NOT a DB access — + // `user.Roles` is a List on the actor, not a DbSet + // query. Without this the leg flags every in-memory collection + // named after a tenant-table filter-free property, which is why + // the naive `is IdentifierNameSyntax` receiver check produced + // 31 candidates of which ~25 were not DB queries at all. + if (access.Expression is not IdentifierNameSyntax ident) + { + continue; + } + + if (!IsDbContextReceiver(ident.Identifier.ValueText)) + { + continue; + } + + results.Add(new BypassOccurrence( + BypassKind.FilterFreeSet, Relative(repoRoot, file), + access.GetLocation().GetLineSpan().StartLinePosition.Line + 1, + EnclosingSymbolOf(access, file), + $"{access.Expression}.{access.Name.Identifier.ValueText}", + PredicateHasAccountId: PredicateHasAccountId(access))); + } + } + + return results; + } + + private static BypassOccurrence MakeOccurrence( + BypassKind kind, string repoRoot, string file, InvocationExpressionSyntax invocation, string detail) + { + var occurrence = new BypassOccurrence( + kind, Relative(repoRoot, file), + invocation.GetLocation().GetLineSpan().StartLinePosition.Line + 1, + EnclosingSymbolOf(invocation, file), detail); + + if (kind == BypassKind.RawSql) + { + var rawText = invocation.ArgumentList.Arguments + .Select(a => a.ToString()) + .Where(a => a.Contains("\"", StringComparison.Ordinal) || a.Contains("'''", StringComparison.Ordinal) || a.Contains("\"\"\"", StringComparison.Ordinal)) + .FirstOrDefault() ?? string.Empty; + occurrence = occurrence with { RawSqlText = rawText }; + } + + return occurrence; + } + + // The enclosing method in symbol display form. A call inside a local + // function keys as ContainingMethod.Local(localFunctionName) — it is NOT + // covered by the parent method's allow-list entry (design M7). + internal static string EnclosingSymbolOf(SyntaxNode node, string file) + { + var method = node.FirstAncestorOrSelf(); + if (method is null) + { + // Top-level statements or static initializers: name them as such + // rather than pretending a method exists. + return $"<{Path.GetFileName(file)}>."; + } + + var local = node.Ancestors().OfType() + .FirstOrDefault(lf => lf.Span.Contains(node.Span)); + if (local is not null) + { + return $"{SymbolPrefix(method, file)}.{MethodName(method)}.Local({local.Identifier.ValueText})"; + } + + return $"{SymbolPrefix(method, file)}.{MethodName(method)}({ParameterTypes(method)})"; + } + + private static string MethodName(BaseMethodDeclarationSyntax method) + { + if (method is MethodDeclarationSyntax m) + { + return m.Identifier.ValueText; + } + + if (method is ConstructorDeclarationSyntax c) + { + return c.Identifier.ValueText; + } + + // Conversions/operators: the IdentifierToken-less declarations still + // expose their name through the method's first token run. + return method.ToString()!.Split(' ', '\n', '\r').FirstOrDefault(t => !t.All(char.IsPunctuation) && t.Length > 0) ?? ""; + } + + private static string SymbolPrefix(BaseMethodDeclarationSyntax method, string file) + { + // Walk up to the enclosing type and its namespace. The test project + // does not compile src/, so no symbol info is available — the display + // is reconstructed from the syntax tree. + // Block namespaces are ancestors of the method; file-scoped ones are + // children of the compilation unit. Take whichever exists. + // Types are collected innermost-first by the upward walk, then + // reversed to outermost-first. The namespace goes LAST so the final + // order is Namespace.OuterType.InnerType. + var typeParts = new List(); + for (var node = method.Parent; node is not null; node = node.Parent) + { + // FileScopedNamespaceDeclarationSyntax IS a TypeDeclarationSyntax — + // skip it, its name is added as the namespace below. + if (node is FileScopedNamespaceDeclarationSyntax) + { + continue; + } + + if (node is TypeDeclarationSyntax td) + { + typeParts.Add(td.Identifier.ValueText); + } + else if (node is RecordDeclarationSyntax rd) + { + typeParts.Add(rd.Identifier.ValueText); + } + else if (node is StructDeclarationSyntax sd) + { + typeParts.Add(sd.Identifier.ValueText); + } + } + + typeParts.Reverse(); + + var parts = new List(); + string? nsName = method.Ancestors().OfType().FirstOrDefault()?.Name.ToString() + ?? method.Ancestors().OfType().FirstOrDefault() + ?.ChildNodes().OfType().FirstOrDefault()?.Name.ToString(); + if (nsName is not null) + { + parts.Add(nsName); + } + + parts.AddRange(typeParts); + return string.Join(".", parts); + } + + private static string ParameterTypes(BaseMethodDeclarationSyntax method) + { + // Parameter TEXT, not types — the test project cannot resolve types. + // Overload disambiguation still works because parameter names + + // declared types are in the text. Stated in the allow-list header. + return string.Join(", ", method.ParameterList.Parameters + .Select(p => p.Type!.ToString() + " " + p.Identifier.ValueText)); + } + + // Predicate shape check (review M4/F4 — shape, not provenance): does the + // query chain following this access contain an AccountId COMPARISON? + // Review P1-3 (deepseek-v4-flash): the old check was + // `statement.Contains("AccountId")` — a string-presence test. A projection + // like `db.Users.Where(u => u.Email == email).Select(u => u.AccountId)` + // names AccountId (in the Select) but does not scope by it — it enumerates + // every tenant's users by email. Presence is not a predicate; a comparison + // is. This now requires AccountId to appear in a comparison shape (AccountId + // on one side of ==, !=, <, >, <=, >=, =, or in a Where-clause lambda that + // compares it), not merely anywhere in the statement. A bare Select/OrderBy + // projection of AccountId is NOT a predicate and returns false (a candidate + // that must be classified or fixed). Provenance (that the compared value is + // the resolved tenant, not a literal) is still not proven — that remains the + // allow-list justification's job; this closes the presence-vs-predicate gap. + internal static bool? PredicateHasAccountId(SyntaxNode node) + { + var statement = node.AncestorsAndSelf().OfType().FirstOrDefault() + ?? node.AncestorsAndSelf().OfType().Select(m => m as SyntaxNode).FirstOrDefault(); + if (statement is null) + { + return null; // cannot tell — the caller treats null as "flag for review" + } + + // Claude re-review (refuting pi P1-3): the original check matched on + // statement.ToString(), which INCLUDES interior comment trivia and string + // literals. A `// scoped by AccountId == tenant.AccountId` comment beside + // a real cross-tenant `db.Users.Where(u => u.Email == email)` therefore + // laundered the statement — text matching cannot tell code from trivia. + // Compare on TOKENS, excluding string-literal text and comment trivia, so + // only actual code counts. + return HasAccountIdComparison(StatementCodeOnly(statement)); + } + + // The statement's code, with comment trivia and string-literal TEXT removed. + // A node's ToString() includes interior comments (trivia) and the text of + // string literals; both can name "AccountId" in a way that is not code. A + // log message `Log($"scoping by AccountId = {x}")` or a `// AccountId == ...` + // comment would otherwise read as a predicate. Removing the comment trivia + // and the literal TEXT leaves the code tokens. + // + // ROUND-4 F6 (kimi-k3) — corrected a FALSE claim in this comment. The + // original text said "interpolated-string holes are dropped too — they are + // string content." That is wrong: an interpolated hole's contents are + // ORDINARY CODE TOKENS (an `InterpolatedStringTextToken` is the literal + // text BETWEEN holes; the hole itself is an `InterpolatedStringExpression`) + // and they SURVIVE this filter. Consequence: a comparison embedded in a + // string hole — e.g. `Select(u => $"match: {u.AccountId == accountId}")` — + // still reads as a predicate (a false-green), because the hole's `u.AccountId + // == accountId` is real code text. This is a contrived shape (nobody scopes a + // query inside a log string), but the comment must not claim the hole is + // dropped, or a future reviewer will trust it. The legitimate code forms — + // `u.AccountId == x`, `accountIds.Contains(u.AccountId)` — are plain tokens + // and survive either way. Closing the hole case requires tracking which tokens + // are inside an interpolated string and dropping the hole EXPRESSIONS too, which + // is a larger change than this guard's budget warrants; it is recorded here as a + // known limitation, not silently claimed closed. + internal static string StatementCodeOnly(SyntaxNode statement) + { + var sb = new System.Text.StringBuilder(); + foreach (var token in statement.DescendantTokens()) + { + // Drop string-literal and interpolated-string text (string content). + // Drop string-literal text and interpolated-string text (string + // content). InterpolatedStringLiteralToken is not a token kind — an + // interpolated string is a run of InterpolatedStringTextToken / hole + // tokens, so dropping the text tokens is what removes the content. + if (token.IsKind(SyntaxKind.StringLiteralToken) + || token.IsKind(SyntaxKind.InterpolatedStringTextToken)) + { + continue; + } + // Drop comment trivia (leading/trailing) on the token; keep other + // trivia (whitespace) so the code's shape is preserved for the regex. + foreach (var trivia in token.LeadingTrivia) + { + if (trivia.IsKind(SyntaxKind.SingleLineCommentTrivia) || trivia.IsKind(SyntaxKind.MultiLineCommentTrivia)) continue; + sb.Append(trivia.ToString()); + } + sb.Append(token.Text); + foreach (var trivia in token.TrailingTrivia) + { + if (trivia.IsKind(SyntaxKind.SingleLineCommentTrivia) || trivia.IsKind(SyntaxKind.MultiLineCommentTrivia)) continue; + sb.Append(trivia.ToString()); + } + } + return sb.ToString(); + } + + // True if the code carries AccountId in a comparison or set-membership shape, + // not merely as a projection or member access. Claude re-review (refuting pi + // P1-3): the original regex missed two LEGITIMATE scoping forms — + // `accountIds.Contains(u.AccountId)` and `u.AccountId.Equals(id)` — causing a + // false-red (a correctly scoped query flagged as a candidate). Both are added + // here. A `Select(u => u.AccountId)` projection has no adjacent operator and + // is still correctly not a predicate. + internal static bool HasAccountIdComparison(string code) + { + // AccountId immediately followed by a comparison operator. + if (System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.IsMatch( + code, @"AccountId\s*(==|!=|<=|>=|<|>|=)")) + { + return true; + } + + // A comparison operator immediately followed by AccountId (e.g. `x == + // u.AccountId`). The operator must be a comparison, not an assignment to + // another identifier — the preceding token is checked to be a + // non-identifier character so `Foo = AccountId` (a property init, not a + // predicate) does not match. + if (System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.IsMatch( + code, @"(^|[^A-Za-z0-9_.])\s*(==|!=|<=|>=|<|>)\s*AccountId")) + { + return true; + } + + // Set-membership: accountIds.Contains(u.AccountId) — AccountId inside a + // Contains(…). The argument is the compared value. + if (System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.IsMatch( + code, @"Contains\s*\([^)]*AccountId")) + { + return true; + } + + // Equality via the member: u.AccountId.Equals(id). + return System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.IsMatch( + code, @"AccountId\s*\.\s*Equals\s*\("); + } + + // The conventional DbContext variable names in this codebase. Every tenant + // filter-free DbSet access is `db.
` (a 33-site grep across + // src/ confirmed `db` is the sole receiver for the tenant-table accesses); + // `user.Roles` / `actor.Roles` are in-memory collections, not DB queries, + // and are excluded by requiring the receiver to be one of these names. + private static bool IsDbContextReceiver(string name) => + name is "db" or "_db" or "context" or "ctx" or "_context"; + + // The receiver of a UserManager/SignInManager access, matched either by its + // generic TYPE text (UserManager, SignInManager<...> — the + // current code) or by a conventional camelCase receiver NAME (a future + // userManager.Users / signInManager.PasswordSignInAsync). The old check was + // a case-sensitive Contains("UserManager")/Contains("SignInManager") on the + // receiver text, which only caught the generic-type form and silently + // ignored camelCase variables — review P2. Matching the name set keeps this + // a syntax walk (no semantic model, for the hook budget) while closing the + // gap. `manager` is included because IdentityProvider's scoped-directory + // helper names its UserManager parameter `manager`. + // True if an invocation's method name is a banned bypass method — used by + // the wrapper-forwarding detection to decide whether a method body forwards + // a banned call. Matches the same BannedMethods set as the main walk. + private static bool InvokesBanned(InvocationExpressionSyntax invocation) + { + var name = invocation.Expression; + var methodName = name is MemberAccessExpressionSyntax m ? m.Name.Identifier.ValueText + : name is IdentifierNameSyntax id ? id.Identifier.ValueText : null; + return methodName is not null && BannedMethods.ContainsKey(methodName); + } + + private static bool IsIdentityManagerReceiver(string? receiverText, bool isSignInManager) + { + if (receiverText is null) + { + return false; + } + + // Type-text form: the receiver names the generic manager type. + if (receiverText.Contains(isSignInManager ? "SignInManager" : "UserManager", StringComparison.Ordinal)) + { + return true; + } + + // Conventional-name form: a simple identifier with a manager-ish name. + var trimmed = receiverText.Trim(); + if (isSignInManager) + { + return trimmed is "signInManager" or "_signInManager" or "signIn" or "_signIn"; + } + + return trimmed is "userManager" or "_userManager" or "manager" or "users" or "_users"; + } + + internal static IReadOnlyList EnumerateSourceFiles(string srcRoot) + { + var files = new List(); + void Walk(string dir) + { + foreach (var sub in Directory.GetDirectories(dir)) + { + var name = Path.GetFileName(sub); + if (name is "bin" or "obj" or "node_modules") + { + continue; + } + + Walk(sub); + } + + foreach (var f in Directory.EnumerateFiles(dir, "*.cs", SearchOption.TopDirectoryOnly)) + { + files.Add(f); + } + } + + Walk(srcRoot); + return files.OrderBy(f => f, StringComparer.Ordinal).ToList(); + } + + internal static string? FindRepoRoot(string startDir) + { + var dir = new DirectoryInfo(Path.GetFullPath(startDir)); + while (dir is not null) + { + if (File.Exists(Path.Combine(dir.FullName, "Cluckwork.sln"))) + { + return dir.FullName; + } + + dir = dir.Parent; + } + + return null; + } + + private static string Relative(string repoRoot, string file) => + Path.GetRelativePath(repoRoot, file).Replace('\\', '/'); + + private static string NormalizePath(string p) => p.Replace('\\', '/'); +} diff --git a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassAllowListTests.cs b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassAllowListTests.cs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..816423353 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassAllowListTests.cs @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +namespace Cluckwork.Application.Tests.TenantBypass; + +using System.Text; +using System.Text.Json; + +// #536 Part 1 — allow-list semantics. Each behaviour gets its OWN named +// assertion against a temp source tree (never the repo), so the mutation +// matrix (Task 5) can aim its mutants at exactly these tests, and a real-tree +// mutant reds the real-tree test instead — one assertion, one lever (design +// M8, review M5). +public sealed class TenantBypassAllowListTests : IDisposable +{ + private readonly string _tempRoot = Directory.CreateTempSubdirectory("t8-guard-").FullName; + + public void Dispose() + { + try { Directory.Delete(_tempRoot, recursive: true); } catch { /* best effort */ } + } + + private string WriteSource(string relativePath, string content) + { + var full = Path.Combine(_tempRoot, relativePath); + Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.GetDirectoryName(full)!); + File.WriteAllText(full, content); + return full; + } + + private string WriteAllowList(params (string Symbol, string File, string Justification)[] entries) + { + var path = Path.Combine(_tempRoot, "allowlist.json"); + var json = JsonSerializer.Serialize(entries + .Select(e => new { symbol = e.Symbol, file = e.File, justification = e.Justification })); + File.WriteAllText(path, json); + return path; + } + + private static GuardReport Scan(string tempRoot, string allowListPath) => + GuardScanner.Scan(Path.Combine(tempRoot, "src"), allowListPath); + + // M8-M1: a bypass in a non-allow-listed method is UNEXCUSED. + [Fact] + public void UnlistedBypass_Fails() + { + WriteSource("src/A.cs", """ + namespace A; + public class R + { + public int Bad() => Query().IgnoreQueryFilters().Count(); + private static System.Linq.IQueryable Query() => System.Linq.Enumerable.Range(0, 1); + } + """); + var report = Scan(_tempRoot, WriteAllowList()); + + var failure = GuardScanner.Evaluate(report).FirstOrDefault(f => f.Contains("unexcused bypass")); + Assert.False(string.IsNullOrEmpty(failure), "expected an unexcused-bypass failure"); + Assert.True(failure!.Contains("A.R.Bad"), + "symbol should name the enclosing method A.R.Bad; full failure: " + failure); + Assert.Contains("IgnoreQueryFilters", failure!); + } + + // M8-M2: an allow-listed bypass is excused; deleting the entry makes it + // unexcused again — same assertion, same lever. + [Fact] + public void AllowListedBypass_IsExcused() + { + WriteSource("src/A.cs", """ + namespace A; + public class R + { + public int Good() => Query().IgnoreQueryFilters().Count(); + private static System.Linq.IQueryable Query() => System.Linq.Enumerable.Range(0, 1); + } + """); + // The symbol is the scanner's reconstructed display form (Namespace.Type + // .Method(paramType paramText)) — see GuardScanner.ParameterTypes. + var withEntry = Scan(_tempRoot, WriteAllowList( + ("A.R.Good()", "src/A.cs", "test fixture"))); + var withFailures = GuardScanner.Evaluate(withEntry); + Assert.True(withFailures.Count == 0, + "expected excused, got: " + string.Join(" | ", withFailures)); + + var withoutEntry = Scan(_tempRoot, WriteAllowList()); + Assert.Contains(GuardScanner.Evaluate(withoutEntry), f => f.Contains("unexcused bypass")); + } + + // M8-M3: an entry matching zero sites is STALE and fails — a deleted + // bypass must not leave a live exemption. + [Fact] + public void StaleEntry_Fails() + { + WriteSource("src/A.cs", """ + namespace A; + public class R { public int X() => 1; } + """); + var report = Scan(_tempRoot, WriteAllowList( + ("A.R.Gone()", "src/A.cs", "site was deleted but this entry was not"))); + + var staleFailure = GuardScanner.Evaluate(report).FirstOrDefault(f => f.Contains("stale allow-list entry")); + Assert.False(string.IsNullOrEmpty(staleFailure), "expected a stale-entry failure"); + Assert.Contains("A.R.Gone()", staleFailure!); + } + + // M8-M4: a filter-free-set query without an AccountId comparison is + // flagged; with one, it is not. SHAPE, not provenance (review M4/F4): + // this proves the predicate exists, not that the compared value is the + // resolved tenant. + [Fact] + public void MissingAccountIdCompare_Fails() + { + // The leg matches on the DbSet PROPERTY name as the model reports it. + // `db.Users` is the property access; `db`-shaped receivers only (a + // domain property named Users elsewhere is out of scope — stated in + // the scanner). + WriteSource("src/B.cs", """ + namespace B; + public class R + { + public async Task Bad(Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.DbSet db) + => await db.Users.Where(u => u.Email == "x").CountAsync(); + public async Task Good(Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.DbSet db) + => await db.Users.Where(u => u.AccountId == Tenant.Id).CountAsync(); + } + public class U { public Guid AccountId { get; set; } public string Email { get; set; } = ""; } + public static class Tenant { public static Guid Id => default; } + """); + + var occurrences = GuardScanner.ScanFilterFreeSet(Path.Combine(_tempRoot, "src"), ["Users"]); + Assert.Equal(2, occurrences.Count); + + var bad = occurrences.Single(o => o.EnclosingSymbol.Contains(".Bad(")); + var good = occurrences.Single(o => o.EnclosingSymbol.Contains(".Good(")); + + Assert.False(bad.PredicateHasAccountId, "query without an AccountId comparison must be flagged"); + Assert.True(good.PredicateHasAccountId, "query WITH an AccountId comparison must not be flagged"); + } + + // M8-M7: one extension-method wrapper must not defeat the guard. A method + // that forwards IgnoreQueryFilters() is itself an occurrence, and its + // callers are occurrences too — the wrapper is not a laundering step. + [Fact] + public void WrapperForwarding_Fails() + { + WriteSource("src/C.cs", """ + namespace C; + public static class Ext + { + public static System.Linq.IQueryable Unfiltered(this System.Linq.IQueryable q) + => q.IgnoreQueryFilters(); + } + public class Caller + { + public System.Linq.IQueryable Use() => Ext.Unfiltered(System.Linq.Enumerable.Range(0, 1)); + } + """); + var report = Scan(_tempRoot, WriteAllowList()); + var failures = GuardScanner.Evaluate(report); + + // BOTH sites must be reported, not just the wrapper definition (review + // P1-3: the old test asserted only Ext.Unfiltered was reported, but the + // CALLER Use() was not — allow-listing the wrapper left the caller + // green, the exact laundering the test claimed to prevent). The scanner + // now flags the call site of a forwarding method (forwards-bypass), so + // the caller Caller.Use is an unexcused occurrence too. + Assert.Contains(failures, f => f.Contains("Ext.Unfiltered")); + Assert.Contains(failures, f => f.Contains("Caller.Use") || f.Contains("Use()")); + } +} diff --git a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassDiscoveryTests.cs b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassDiscoveryTests.cs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..764d546d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassDiscoveryTests.cs @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +namespace Cluckwork.Application.Tests.TenantBypass; + +using Cluckwork.Domain.Accounts; +using Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Identity; +using Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence; +using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore; + +// #536 Part 1 — the discovery floor: the guard's banned surface is DERIVED from +// the EF model (walk everything, exclude deliberately — docs/decisions/407-writing-a-guard.md), +// never hand-recalled. This test pins the discovered filter-free set so a model +// change that silently adds (or loses) a filter-free entity fails LOUDLY here +// instead of vacuously changing the guard's coverage. +// +// API note: IReadOnlyEntityType.GetQueryFilter() is [Obsolete] in the resolved +// EF Core 10.0.11 ("Use GetDeclaredQueryFilters() instead") — under +// TreatWarningsAsErrors the old call is a build error, so the guard uses +// GetDeclaredQueryFilters(). For plain HasQueryFilter(…) the declared set is +// non-empty iff a filter exists; the equivalence probe (Task 1 Step 2b) proves +// it against this model before the pin below is trusted. +// +// The four Identity claim/login/token tables carry NO AccountId column, so the +// AccountId-predicate rule cannot apply to them: ANY query against them is a +// bypass occurrence requiring an allow-list entry, full stop (review finding +// F7). They are part of the pinned set on purpose. +public sealed class TenantBypassDiscoveryTests +{ + private static Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.DbContextOptions BuildOptions() => + new DbContextOptionsBuilder() + .UseNpgsql("Host=localhost;Database=unreachable;Username=unreachable;Password=unreachable") + .Options; + + [Fact] + public void DiscoveredSurface_Floor() + { + // Model-only construction: no connection is opened by building the model. + using var db = new AppDbContext(BuildOptions(), new TenantContext()); + var model = db.Model; + + // Deliberate exclusion of a known non-tenant table (see policy above); + // everything else in the filter-free set is banned surface. + // Deliberate exclusions: DurableJob (no tenant by design, #271) and + // Money (owned value types — see policy above; no DbSet exists for them). + var excludedFromBan = new HashSet { "DurableJob", "Money" }; + var filterFree = model.GetEntityTypes() + .Where(e => e.GetDeclaredQueryFilters().Count == 0) + .Where(e => !excludedFromBan.Contains(e.ClrType.Name)) + .Select(e => e.ClrType.Name) + .OrderBy(n => n) + .ToList(); + + // The pinned filter-free surface. Verified against the model 2026-08-22. + // A different actual set is a FINDING to report, not a silent re-pin. + // + // Exclusion policy for the ban (stated, per review F7): + // * DurableJob — a job-scheduling table with no AccountId by design + // (at-most-one-leader lease; #271). Never tenant-scoped; the ban + // would be a false positive, so it is excluded from the walked + // surface. + // * IdempotencyRecord — carries an AccountId column but has NO query + // filter (the idempotency protocol keys on the request id). Any + // query against it is a bypass occurrence: allow-list entry + // required, plus the AccountId-predicate rule where a predicate + // exists. + // * The Identity tables (User/Role + claim/login/token/userrole) + // carry no AccountId column on their base types: any query is a + // bypass occurrence, allow-list entry required, full stop. + // * `Money` appears in the raw model as OWNED value-type entities + // (one per owning table: FeedUsages, InventoryItems, InventoryLots, + // SalesOrderItems, SalesOrders). Owned types have no DbSet and no + // independent query — they are reachable only through their filtered + // owner — so they cannot be a direct bypass. Excluded from the pin; + // the scanner's db. leg can never name them, which is correct. + var expected = new[] + { + nameof(ApplicationRole), + nameof(ApplicationUser), + "IdempotencyRecord", + "IdentityRoleClaim`1", + "IdentityUserClaim`1", + "IdentityUserLogin`1", + "IdentityUserRole`1", + "IdentityUserToken`1", + "RefreshToken", + }; + + Assert.Equal(expected, filterFree); + } + + // Task 1 Step 2b probe: equivalence of GetDeclaredQueryFilters() with the + // pre-10 GetQueryFilter() semantics for plain HasQueryFilter — a filtered + // entity (Account) must show a declared filter; a filter-free one + // (ApplicationUser) must not. + [Fact] + public void DeclaredQueryFilter_Probe_FiltersAreDeclared() + { + using var db = new AppDbContext(BuildOptions(), new TenantContext()); + var model = db.Model; + + var account = model.FindEntityType(typeof(Account)); + var user = model.FindEntityType(typeof(ApplicationUser)); + + Assert.NotNull(account); + Assert.NotNull(user); + Assert.NotEmpty(account!.GetDeclaredQueryFilters()); + Assert.Empty(user!.GetDeclaredQueryFilters()); + } +} diff --git a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassRealTreeTests.cs b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassRealTreeTests.cs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9624cc948 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassRealTreeTests.cs @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +namespace Cluckwork.Application.Tests.TenantBypass; + +using Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Identity; +using Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence; +using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore; + +// #536 Part 1 — the real-tree gate. This is the guard that runs in the +// pre-commit hook and CI: it scans the ACTUAL src/ tree, and fails the build +// when any bypass is not on the committed allow-list (with a justification), +// or when an allow-list entry has gone stale (its site was deleted but the +// exemption was left behind). +// +// This is the test the mutation matrix aims at: a real-tree mutant (an +// unlisted bypass, a dropped AccountId compare, a wrapper) reds HERE, on its +// named assertion — not the temp-tree tests, which exercise the same +// semantics against fixtures. +public sealed class TenantBypassRealTreeTests +{ + private static string SrcRoot() => + Path.Combine(GuardScanner.FindRepoRoot(AppContext.BaseDirectory) + ?? throw new InvalidOperationException("repo root not found"), "src"); + + private static string AllowListPath() => + Path.Combine(AppContext.BaseDirectory, "TenantBypass", "Data", "tenant-bypass-allowlist.json"); + + // The build gate. Every failure message names the offending site or + // stale entry, so a red build tells you exactly what to fix or excuse. + [Fact] + public void RealSourceTree_AllBypassesAreAllowListed() + { + var report = GuardScanner.Scan(SrcRoot(), AllowListPath()); + var failures = GuardScanner.Evaluate(report); + Assert.True(failures.Count == 0, + "tenant-bypass guard failed:\n " + string.Join("\n ", failures)); + } + + // The filter-free-set leg against the REAL tree — a STABILITY test, not a + // shape gate. The scanner finds every db.
access where
is a + // filter-free entity carrying an AccountId column (a tenant table the + // global query filter does NOT scope) and whose enclosing statement has no + // AccountId compare. Each such candidate is classified in + // Data/filter-free-set-sites.tsv with the REASON it is scoped (by-id, + // by-hash, non-tenant sweep, …). + // + // Why stability and not a pure shape gate: the shape check cannot + // distinguish a by-id/by-hash/caller-scoped query (safe) from an unscoped + // one (a real tenant leak) — reviewer M4/F4 named this ("shape, not + // provenance"). So the leg records the classifications and fails only on + // DRIFT: a new unclassified candidate, a disappeared site, or a + // needs-review sentinel. Nothing is silently un-banned — a new unscoped + // db. query cannot land without a classification decision. + [Fact] + public void RealSourceTree_FilterFreeSetSitesAreStableAndClassified() + { + // Tenant-table filter-free property names: filter-free entities that + // (a) have a DbSet on AppDbContext and (b) carry an AccountId + // property. Non-tenant filter-free tables (Roles, RoleClaims, + // DurableJobs) and in-memory domain collections (user.Roles) are + // excluded here — the ban on them is the discovery floor's job, and + // an in-memory `user.Roles` is not a DB query at all (the scanner's + // receiver check drops it). + using var db = new AppDbContext( + new DbContextOptionsBuilder() + .UseNpgsql("Host=localhost;Database=unreachable;Username=unreachable;Password=unreachable") + .Options, + new TenantContext()); + + var filterFreeEntityTypes = db.Model.GetEntityTypes() + .Where(e => e.GetDeclaredQueryFilters().Count == 0) + .Select(e => e.ClrType) + .ToHashSet(); + + // ALL filter-free DbSet properties (tenant + non-tenant). Review P1-2: + // restricting this to sets with an AccountId column left the non-tenant + // filter-free sets (UserRoles, Roles, UserClaims, UserLogins, UserTokens, + // RoleClaims, DurableJobs) invisible to the guard — a future unscoped + // db.UserRoles query would pass silently. Walk every filter-free DbSet + // and give the two categories separate classification handling below. + var allPropertyNames = typeof(AppDbContext).GetProperties() + .Where(p => p.PropertyType.IsGenericType + && p.PropertyType.GetGenericTypeDefinition() == typeof(Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.DbSet<>) + && filterFreeEntityTypes.Contains(p.PropertyType.GetGenericArguments()[0])) + .Select(p => p.Name) + .ToList(); + + // Split into tenant sets (the entity type carries an AccountId property + // — Users, RefreshTokens, IdempotencyRecord) and non-tenant sets (no + // AccountId column — the Identity claim/login/token/join tables, Roles, + // RoleClaims, DurableJob). Note: the split is on the ENTITY's AccountId + // property, which matches the table's AccountId column for these types + // (verified: AspNetUserRoles has columns [UserId, RoleId] only — no + // AccountId — so it is correctly non-tenant; the earlier "HAS AccountId" + // reading was a grep of the mermaid Relations block, not the column set). + var tenantNames = new List(); + var nonTenantNames = new List(); + foreach (var name in allPropertyNames) + { + var elementType = typeof(AppDbContext).GetProperty(name)! + .PropertyType.GetGenericArguments()[0]; + if (elementType.GetProperty("AccountId") != null) + { + tenantNames.Add(name); + } + else + { + nonTenantNames.Add(name); + } + } + + Assert.True(tenantNames.Count > 0, + "expected at least one tenant-table filter-free DbSet property (e.g. Users, RefreshTokens)"); + Assert.True(nonTenantNames.Count > 0, + "expected at least one non-tenant filter-free DbSet property (e.g. Roles, UserRoles) — " + + "the non-tenant track exists to enumerate them, not to skip them"); + + // TENANT-track candidates: db. accesses with no AccountId + // COMPARISON in the enclosing statement (the predicate rule applies). + // Review P1-3: the filter is `!= true`, not `== false`, so a site the + // scanner cannot classify (PredicateHasAccountId == null, "flag for + // review") is a candidate too — it must be classified in the TSV rather + // than silently passing. A `Select(u => u.AccountId)` projection no + // longer reads as a predicate (HasAccountIdComparison returns false), so + // a cross-tenant by-email enumeration is a candidate, not a pass. + var tenantCandidates = GuardScanner.ScanFilterFreeSet(SrcRoot(), tenantNames) + .Where(o => o.PredicateHasAccountId != true) + .Select(o => $"{o.File}:{o.Line}\t{o.Detail}") + .ToList(); + + // NON-TENANT-track candidates: EVERY db. access. These + // sets have no AccountId column, so the predicate rule cannot apply — + // but any query against a filter-free set is a bypass occurrence that + // must be classified (scoped-by-join / scoped-by-user-id / global- + // reference / non-tenant-sweep). An unclassified site is a red build. + var nonTenantCandidates = GuardScanner.ScanFilterFreeSet(SrcRoot(), nonTenantNames) + .Select(o => $"{o.File}:{o.Line}\t{o.Detail}") + .ToList(); + + var candidates = tenantCandidates.Concat(nonTenantCandidates) + .OrderBy(s => s, StringComparer.Ordinal) + .ToList(); + + // Load the classifications. + var tsvPath = Path.Combine(AppContext.BaseDirectory, "TenantBypass", "Data", "filter-free-set-sites.tsv"); + var classified = File.ReadAllLines(tsvPath) + .Where(l => !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(l) && !l.TrimStart().StartsWith("#")) + .Select(l => + { + var parts = l.Split('\t'); + return (Key: $"{parts[0]}\t{parts[1]}", Reason: parts.Length > 2 ? parts[2].Trim() : ""); + }) + .ToList(); + + var classifiedKeys = classified.Select(c => c.Key).ToHashSet(); + + // 1. Every candidate (both tracks) must be classified (no needs-review, + // no missing). A new db. query with no AccountId compare, + // OR a new db. query of any shape, appears as red here. + var unclassified = candidates.Where(c => !classifiedKeys.Contains(c)).ToList(); + Assert.True(unclassified.Count == 0, + "unclassified filter-free-set candidates (a new db. query with no " + + "AccountId compare, a new db. query, or a line shift). Classify each in " + + "Data/filter-free-set-sites.tsv (scoped-by-X or needs-review) or fix the query:\n " + + string.Join("\n ", unclassified)); + + // 2. No classified site may have disappeared (drift). + var stale = classifiedKeys.Except(candidates).ToList(); + Assert.True(stale.Count == 0, + "stale filter-free-set classifications (the query moved or was deleted — " + + "update Data/filter-free-set-sites.tsv):\n " + + string.Join("\n ", stale)); + + // 3. No needs-review sentinel may remain. + var needsReview = classified.Where(c => c.Reason.StartsWith("needs-review", StringComparison.Ordinal)).ToList(); + Assert.True(needsReview.Count == 0, + "filter-free-set sites still marked needs-review — classify or fix:\n " + + string.Join("\n ", needsReview.Select(c => c.Key))); + } + + // Completeness cross-check against the graphify knowledge graph (#583). The + // Roslyn walk's filter-free-set surface should be a SUBSET of what the graph + // models once #583 lands; until then the graph lacks db. call-site + // links, so this is a soft assertion: it records the gap and fails only if + // the graph regresses to modeling FEWER db. sites than the + // walk finds. Kept as a [SkippableFact] placeholder — activated when #583 + // ships the code↔table linkage. (No-op for now: the graph has no such links, + // so there is nothing to compare; the assertion is documented, not run.) + [Fact] + public void GraphCompletenessCrossCheck_DocumentedNotYetActive() + { + // #583: graphify does not yet model db. query call-sites or + // raw-SQL→table links. When it does, this test should assert: + // every (file, line) in the Roslyn walk's filter-free-set + raw-SQL + // occurrences is present in the graph's code↔table edges. + // Until then it is a no-op guard so the cross-check's intent is + // recorded in the suite and discoverable. + Assert.True(true, "#583 not yet shipped — graph completeness cross-check is documented, not enforced."); + } +} diff --git a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassWalkTests.cs b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassWalkTests.cs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4712bea31 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/TenantBypass/TenantBypassWalkTests.cs @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +namespace Cluckwork.Application.Tests.TenantBypass; + +using Cluckwork.Infrastructure.Persistence; +using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore; + +// #536 Part 1 — the walk. These tests prove the scanner actually sees the +// tree (a zero-occurrence result is a scan failure, not a clean bill — review +// M2), and they pin the current occurrence baseline so a future shrink of the +// walked surface is a finding, not a silent green. +public sealed class TenantBypassWalkTests +{ + private static string SrcRoot() => + Path.Combine(GuardScanner.FindRepoRoot(AppContext.BaseDirectory) + ?? throw new InvalidOperationException("repo root not found"), "src"); + + [Fact] + public void Walk_SeesTheWholeSourceTree() + { + var srcRoot = SrcRoot(); + var files = GuardScanner.EnumerateSourceFiles(srcRoot); + + // Floor: the walk must see at least this many files. The current + // source tree is ~200 .cs files; a floor of 150 leaves headroom for + // growth while still catching a root-resolution or exclusion bug + // (which would yield a handful of files, or zero). + Assert.True(files.Count >= 150, + $"walk saw only {files.Count} .cs files under src/ — the floor is 150. The scanner is not seeing the tree."); + + // The walk must include the known bypass-heavy files. If any of these + // disappears from the walk, the exclusion logic is eating real source. + var known = files.Select(f => f.Replace('\\', '/')); + Assert.Contains(known, f => f.EndsWith("src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Repositories/EggLotRepository.cs")); + Assert.Contains(known, f => f.EndsWith("src/Cluckwork.Infrastructure/Identity/IdentityProvider.cs")); + } + + [Fact] + public void Walk_ParsesEveryFileWithoutErrors() + { + var report = GuardScanner.Scan(SrcRoot(), AllowListPath()); + + Assert.Empty(report.ParseErrors); + } + + // False-green proof for the parse-error guard: a file with a syntax error + // MUST surface in report.ParseErrors (and thus fail Evaluate). If the walk + // silently skipped an unparseable file, the parse-error guard would be + // green and the walk untrustworthy — this mutation proves it reds. + [Fact] + public void ParseError_IsSurfacedNotSwallowed() + { + var dir = Directory.CreateTempSubdirectory("t-parse-").FullName; + Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(dir, "src")); + // A genuinely unparseable file: an unclosed brace. (Note: `void X( )` + // with a space is VALID C# — the parser accepts it, so it would NOT + // surface a parse error. The unclosed brace is the real syntax error.) + File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(dir, "src", "Bad.cs"), + "namespace Bad;\npublic class Broken { void X() { "); // unclosed brace + + var report = GuardScanner.Scan(Path.Combine(dir, "src"), Path.Combine(dir, "none.json")); + + Assert.NotEmpty(report.ParseErrors); + var failures = GuardScanner.Evaluate(report); + Assert.Contains(failures, f => f.Contains("parse error")); + } + + // False-green proof for the file-count floor: the real-tree floor must be a + // STATIC minimum, not a tautology of the scan's own count. If the floor + // were files.Count, a walk that silently excluded a subtree would still + // pass. This asserts the floor is below the actual count (headroom) and is + // a const, so the gate has teeth. + [Fact] + public void RealTreeFileFloor_IsMeaningfulNotTautological() + { + var actual = GuardScanner.EnumerateSourceFiles(SrcRoot()).Count; + + // The floor must be a real minimum the tree exceeds, not equal to it. + Assert.True(GuardScanner.RealTreeFileFloor < actual, + $"RealTreeFileFloor ({GuardScanner.RealTreeFileFloor}) is not below the actual count ({actual}) — " + + "the floor has no headroom and cannot catch a walk that excluded a subtree."); + // And it must be a substantial fraction of the tree, so a missing + // top-level directory (which would drop the count by tens of files) reds. + Assert.True(GuardScanner.RealTreeFileFloor >= actual / 2, + $"RealTreeFileFloor ({GuardScanner.RealTreeFileFloor}) is less than half the tree ({actual}) — " + + "it would not catch a walk that missed a whole project directory."); + } + + [Fact] + public void Walk_FindsTheIgnoreQueryFiltersBaseline() + { + var report = GuardScanner.Scan(SrcRoot(), AllowListPath()); + var iqf = report.Occurrences.Where(o => o.Kind == BypassKind.IgnoreQueryFilters).ToList(); + + // Baseline pinned 2026-08-22: 36 code occurrences (52 total grep hits + // minus 16 comment-only lines — comments are structurally absent from + // the syntax tree, which is exactly why the false-positive control in + // the mutation matrix holds). A DROP below the floor means the walk + // lost occurrences; a rise is expected with new code and is excused + // through the allow-list, not by moving this number. + Assert.True(iqf.Count >= 36, + $"only {iqf.Count} IgnoreQueryFilters occurrences found — baseline is 36. The walk is losing occurrences."); + + // EggLotRepository carries 3 of them — a named spot-check that the + // count is not a happy accident of one file. + Assert.Contains(iqf, o => o.File.EndsWith("EggLotRepository.cs") && o.Line > 0); + } + + [Fact] + public void Walk_FindsRawSqlAndIdentityBans() + { + var report = GuardScanner.Scan(SrcRoot(), AllowListPath()); + + // 8 src files use raw-SQL APIs (FromSql*/ExecuteSql*/SqlQuery) — the + // FOR UPDATE/audit paths. The walk must find at least their + // statements. + var rawSql = report.Occurrences.Where(o => o.Kind == BypassKind.RawSql).ToList(); + Assert.True(rawSql.Count >= 8, + $"only {rawSql.Count} raw-SQL occurrences found — expected at least 8 (the FOR UPDATE/audit paths)."); + + // Identity string-lookups: the ONLY legitimate call sites are inside + // AccountUserDirectory (which reimplements them scoped). Every other + // occurrence is a real find. Today's expectation: zero outside that + // file — but the walk must still REPORT any it finds (Task 3's + // allow-list decides what is excused). + var identity = report.Occurrences + .Where(o => o.Kind is BypassKind.IdentityLookup or BypassKind.SignInManager or BypassKind.UserManagerUsers) + .ToList(); + // The seeder comments mention these names but comments are not in the + // syntax tree, so a non-zero count here is real code. Record whatever + // exists; Task 3 allow-lists or fixes each. + _ = identity; // exercised by the real-tree test in Task 3 + } + + private static string AllowListPath() => + Path.Combine(AppContext.BaseDirectory, "Data", "tenant-bypass-allowlist.json"); +} diff --git a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/packages.lock.json b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/packages.lock.json index 02c1c890c..c77faae6b 100644 --- a/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/packages.lock.json +++ b/tests/Cluckwork.Application.Tests/packages.lock.json @@ -2,6 +2,16 @@ "version": 1, "dependencies": { "net10.0": { + "Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp": { + "type": "Direct", + "requested": "[5.0.0, )", + "resolved": "5.0.0", + "contentHash": "5DSyJ9bk+ATuDy7fp2Zt0mJStDVKbBoiz1DyfAwSa+k4H4IwykAUcV3URelw5b8/iVbfSaOwkwmPUZH6opZKCw==", + "dependencies": { + "Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.Analyzers": "3.11.0", + "Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.Common": "[5.0.0]" + } + }, "Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk": { "type": "Direct", "requested": "[18.*, 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"System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt": "[8.*, )" + } } } }