diff --git a/blindsign/blindrsa/brsa.go b/blindsign/blindrsa/brsa.go
index 1de9a2031..745bbb268 100644
--- a/blindsign/blindrsa/brsa.go
+++ b/blindsign/blindrsa/brsa.go
@@ -19,6 +19,19 @@
 //   - RSABSSA-SHA384-PSS-Randomized
 //   - RSABSSA-SHA384-PSSZERO-Randomized
 //
+// # Security considerations for deterministic variants
+//
+// The deterministic variants (RSABSSA-SHA384-PSS-Deterministic and
+// RSABSSA-SHA384-PSSZERO-Deterministic) use an empty Prepare prefix and, in the
+// PSSZERO case, a zero-length salt, so the EMSA-PSS encoding of a given message
+// is fixed. Blind enforces the RFC 9474 coprimality check (rejecting encoded
+// messages that share a factor with the modulus), which prevents a malicious
+// signer with an invalid modulus from learning gcd(m, N) from a single blinded
+// request. Nevertheless, deployments that sign low-entropy deterministic
+// messages in a malicious-signer setting should still prefer the randomized
+// variants (or otherwise ensure high-entropy encodings) and verify that the
+// signer's key is honestly generated.
+//
 // [RFC-9474]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9474
 package blindrsa
 
@@ -135,6 +148,13 @@ func (c Client) fixedBlind(message, salt []byte, r, rInv *big.Int) (blindedMsg [
 
 	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(encodedMsg)
 
+	// RFC 9474 requires the encoded message to be coprime to the modulus
+	// before blinding; otherwise a malicious signer with an invalid modulus
+	// could learn gcd(m, N) from the blinded message.
+	if new(big.Int).GCD(nil, nil, m, c.v.pk.N).Cmp(big.NewInt(1)) != 0 {
+		return nil, State{}, common.ErrInvalidMessage
+	}
+
 	bigE := big.NewInt(int64(c.v.pk.E))
 	x := new(big.Int).Exp(r, bigE, c.v.pk.N)
 	z := new(big.Int).Set(m)
@@ -243,4 +263,5 @@ var (
 	ErrInvalidBlind            = common.ErrInvalidBlind
 	ErrInvalidRandomness       = common.ErrInvalidRandomness
 	ErrUnsupportedHashFunction = common.ErrUnsupportedHashFunction
+	ErrInvalidMessage          = common.ErrInvalidMessage
 )
diff --git a/blindsign/blindrsa/brsa_test.go b/blindsign/blindrsa/brsa_test.go
index 53f851974..9c7c3f188 100644
--- a/blindsign/blindrsa/brsa_test.go
+++ b/blindsign/blindrsa/brsa_test.go
@@ -184,6 +184,55 @@ func TestDeterministicBlindFailure(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestBlindRejectsNonCoprimeMessage ensures Blind enforces the RFC 9474
+// coprimality check. A malicious signer that publishes an invalid (even)
+// modulus would otherwise learn gcd(encoded_msg, N) from the blinded request,
+// leaking information about low-entropy deterministic messages. Since the
+// EMSA-PSS encoding always ends in the 0xbc trailer, the encoded message is
+// always even, so any even modulus shares the factor 2 with it.
+func TestBlindRejectsNonCoprimeMessage(t *testing.T) {
+	message := []byte("hello world")
+	key, err := loadPrivateKey()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// Build a malicious public key with an even (invalid) modulus of the same
+	// bit length so that the EMSA-PSS encoding is unchanged.
+	maliciousN := new(big.Int).Set(key.N)
+	maliciousN.SetBit(maliciousN, 0, 0) // clear the low bit -> even modulus
+	maliciousPub := &rsa.PublicKey{N: maliciousN, E: key.E}
+
+	for _, variant := range []Variant{
+		SHA384PSSDeterministic,
+		SHA384PSSZeroDeterministic,
+		SHA384PSSRandomized,
+		SHA384PSSZeroRandomized,
+	} {
+		t.Run(variant.String(), func(tt *testing.T) {
+			client, err := NewClient(variant, maliciousPub)
+			if err != nil {
+				tt.Fatal(err)
+			}
+
+			inputMsg, err := client.Prepare(rand.Reader, message)
+			if err != nil {
+				tt.Fatal(err)
+			}
+
+			// Use an invertible blind (r = rInv = 1) so the coprimality
+			// check, rather than the blinding-factor invertibility check,
+			// is what rejects the request.
+			one := big.NewInt(1)
+			salt := make([]byte, client.v.SaltLength)
+			_, _, err = client.fixedBlind(inputMsg, salt, one, one)
+			if err != ErrInvalidMessage {
+				tt.Fatalf("expected ErrInvalidMessage, got %v", err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestRandomSignVerify(t *testing.T) {
 	message := []byte("hello world")
 	key, err := loadPrivateKey()
diff --git a/blindsign/blindrsa/internal/common/common.go b/blindsign/blindrsa/internal/common/common.go
index 55e1c8bfa..957a07220 100644
--- a/blindsign/blindrsa/internal/common/common.go
+++ b/blindsign/blindrsa/internal/common/common.go
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ var (
 	// ErrInvalidMessageLength is the error used if the size of a protocol message does not match its expected value.
 	ErrInvalidMessageLength = errors.New("blindsign/blindrsa: invalid message length")
 
+	// ErrInvalidMessage is the error used if the encoded message is not coprime to the public modulus.
+	ErrInvalidMessage = errors.New("blindsign/blindrsa: invalid input")
+
 	// ErrInvalidBlind is the error used if the blind generated by the Verifier fails.
 	ErrInvalidBlind = errors.New("blindsign/blindrsa: invalid blind")
 
diff --git a/blindsign/blindrsa/partiallyblindrsa/pbrsa.go b/blindsign/blindrsa/partiallyblindrsa/pbrsa.go
index f168b3e56..cf6ec8c22 100644
--- a/blindsign/blindrsa/partiallyblindrsa/pbrsa.go
+++ b/blindsign/blindrsa/partiallyblindrsa/pbrsa.go
@@ -121,6 +121,13 @@ func fixedPartiallyBlind(message, salt []byte, r, rInv *big.Int, pk *keys.BigPub
 
 	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(encodedMsg)
 
+	// The partially-blind RSA draft requires the encoded message to be coprime
+	// to the modulus before blinding; otherwise a malicious signer with an
+	// invalid modulus could learn gcd(m, N) from the blinded message.
+	if new(big.Int).GCD(nil, nil, m, pk.N).Cmp(big.NewInt(1)) != 0 {
+		return nil, VerifierState{}, common.ErrInvalidMessage
+	}
+
 	bigE := pk.E
 	x := new(big.Int).Exp(r, bigE, pk.N)
 	z := new(big.Int).Set(m)
@@ -331,4 +338,5 @@ var (
 	ErrUnexpectedSize       = common.ErrUnexpectedSize
 	ErrInvalidMessageLength = common.ErrInvalidMessageLength
 	ErrInvalidRandomness    = common.ErrInvalidRandomness
+	ErrInvalidMessage       = common.ErrInvalidMessage
 )